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Why do some opposition movements succeed in deposing authoritarian leaders in the 
former Soviet Republics, while some others fail? How do regime opponents challenge 
authoritarian discourses and practices? How do authoritarian regime institutions and their 
narratives galvanize popular support to retain power? Although post-Soviet scholarship 
has to date offered a variety of explanations for diverse regime trajectories, little work 
has simultaneously examined how autocrats and opposition forces build popular support 
in their efforts to maintain power or resist it, respectively. My work sought to remedy this 
gap by exploring competing political forces’ engagement in the symbolic politics of 
national identity and their access to economic resources in Russia and Ukraine. I find that 
that opposition forces’ effective appeal to a competing vision of national identity and 
autocrats’ limited control over wealth provides a sufficient explanation for the collapse 
of authoritarianism. Yet incumbent leaders’ preeminence over the symbolic struggle of 
national identity and broad control of economic resources enable authoritarian regimes to 
mobilize support both from masses and the political and economic elite, while depriving 
potential opposition forces of meaningful sources of popular support. Overall, this study 
seeks to shed light on how ideational and material resources available to both incumbent 









CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
On November 21, 2013, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich decided not to sign the 
European Union Association Agreement which anticipated closer political and economic 
ties between his country and the Union. In protest, a few hundred young Ukrainian men 
and women began to gather in Kyiv’s central square, Maidan, and agreed to camp out in 
the city center until the government heard their call. On the night of November 30, 2013, 
Yanukovich’s security forces responded by conducting a brutal sweep through the 
Maidan. Images of police beating protestors prompted widespread public outrage, and led 
thousands of people from all over Ukraine to join the demonstrations in solidarity and 
march in the streets of Kyiv by early December. The demonstrations that began as a 
peaceful gathering of a few hundred-people hoping to force Yanukovich’s government to 
reconsider its suspension of the Agreement evolved into a more dramatic political 
movement, seeking the removal of a leader who had been edging the country toward an 
autocratic future. After a three-month standoff with protestors, popular calls for regime 
change caused Yanukovich’s grip on power to crumble - just as it had during the Orange 
Revolution in 2004. 
While massive protests thwarted Yanukovich’s increasingly authoritarian rule in 
Ukraine, similar protests failed to ever pose a significant threat to the consolidation of 
Vladimir Putin’s authoritarianism in Russia. Indeed, a few years earlier in 2011, large 
numbers of Russian people poured into the streets to protest the fraudulent parliamentary 
elections in which Putin’s party United Russia was credited with 49.32 percent of the 
vote. These protests, the largest to occur in Russia within the last two decades, stirred 
many more in the ensuing months of 2012. Putin and his party, in stark contrast to 
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Yanukovich’s rule, were nevertheless able to disperse the calls for political reforms and 
avoid giving any major concessions to the Russian opposition movement. By the end of 
June 2012, the Russian opposition movement simply ran out of steam.  
The obvious question then arises: Why do some opposition movements succeed in 
deposing authoritarian leaders in the former Soviet Republics, while some others fail? 
How do regime opponents challenge authoritarian discourses and practices? How do 
authoritarian regime institutions and their narratives galvanize popular support to retain 
power? In other words, why in some post-Soviets states do autocratic incumbents achieve 
the consolidation of their rule, but not in others? Therein lies the puzzle of this research.  
Earlier studies, discussed below, often focused on regime characteristics, opposition 
resources and tactics, and incumbent strategies when explaining the rise and fall of post-
Communist authoritarian regimes. Further analyses accounted for regional diffusion, a 
set of structural variables including the strength of a regime’s ties to the West as well as 
an autocrat’s organizational capacities, and more recently, divisions over national 
identities. However, only a few of these studies looked simultaneously at both ideational 
and material bases of support harnessed by the authoritarian regime and the opposition.  
Thus, my study first emphasizes the ways in which symbolic appeals of national 
identity shape the survival and fall of authoritarian rule. I argue that a successful 
competing vision of national identity evoked by effective opposition movements is a 
major source both of mobilization of grass roots support and a split among elites. 
Conversely, a higher degree of public support for a national identity espoused by regime 
authorities has the opposite effect. The more an authoritarian regime successfully coopts 
the entirety of national identity, the less the chance the opposition has to mobilize a 
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sufficient number of people and encourage sufficient elite defection to overthrow an 
incumbent leader. 
Second, my argument focuses on the access of competing regime and opposition 
symbolic entrepreneurs to economic resources and on the ways that access enables each 
to invoke their own vision of national identity. The retention of state control over the 
economy admittedly make it less feasible for regime opponents to galvanize popular 
support and to encourage the defections of political elites. Therefore, my study argues 
that the greater the opposition’s access to broad economic resources, the greater the 
chance for successful anti-regime mobilization. 
Finally, I demonstrate that when the regime controls national identity and/or the 
economy, the survival of authoritarian rule is likely.  In other words, the greater the 
popular acceptance of the national identity evoked by a regime and/or the greater a 
regime’s control over economic resources, the greater the chance for the survival of 
authoritarian rule.  
In this vein, my study explains the divergent regime trajectories of Russia and Ukraine 
from 1991 onwards. My analysis begins by exploring and comparing Russia under Boris 
Yeltsin (1991-99) and Ukraine under Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004). More or less 
contemporaneously, both leaders sought to ingrain an authoritarian system of rule by 
using similar methods. With increasingly uneven political playing fields, sympathetic 
media coverage, weakened parliaments, and fraudulent elections, Russia under Yeltsin 
and Ukraine under Kuchma both became more authoritarian. Next, Yeltsin transferred 
power quietly to his preferred successor Putin in Russia by resigning ahead of time in 
December 1999. Putin proceeded to hold on to power by winning 52.9 percent of national 
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votes in the March 2000 presidential election. In Ukraine, however, Kuchma met 
enormous popular resistance in the aftermath of seemingly rigged presidential elections 
in 2004. The subsequent revote authorized by the Ukraine’s Supreme Court brought the 
opposition leader, Viktor Yushchenko to power with approximately 52 percent of the vote 
to Yanukovich’s 44 percent. 
At this point the paths of two similarly authoritarian regimes of Ukraine and Russia 
sharply diverged. While Putin succeeded consolidating authoritarian rule throughout the 
2000s, Yushchenko ended the rise of authoritarianism in the mid-2000s. Down but not 
out, Yanukovich nevertheless regained the pinnacle of power by winning the presidency 
in the 2010 elections and re-embarked upon an authoritarian path immediately thereafter. 
Indeed, Yanukovich had already captured the prime ministership after the parliamentary 
elections of 2006 - although it was for a short period. As in Russia under Putin and his 
successor Dmitry Medvedev, Ukraine’s political playing field quickly became uneven in 
favor of the incumbent, elections were marred with fraud, and independent media 
reporting was suppressed in Ukraine under Yanukovich’s presidency. Notwithstanding 
Putin’s consolidation of power in Russia and Ukraine’s swift reversal under Yanukovich 
in 2010-15, opposition forces were able to mount challenges to both systems. As 
acknowledged above, Russian incumbents succeeded in thwarting the opposition 
movements in 2011-12. In Ukraine, however, Yanukovich was forced from power in 
2014 by a wave of protests. Thus, although the Russian and Ukrainian regimes were 
similar in many respects at the time of protests, the two regimes could not have fared 
more differently in terms of transitional outcomes. As analysis will show, a comparison 
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of the Ukrainian and Russian authoritarian regimes provides leverage for assessing the 
key variables of this study.   
 
Popular Protest and Authoritarian Breakdown in the Post-Soviet States 
When explaining the fall of post-Communist authoritarian regimes, early academic focus 
centered on hybrid regime characteristics, the resources and tactics of regime dissenters, 
and the diffusion of tactical repertoires between opposition movements. 
Some scholars hypothesized that because hybrid regimes, in stark contrast to full 
authoritarian regimes, allowed for regular elections and more pluralism, these factors 
could coalesce to make incumbents vulnerable enough sometimes to succumb to popular 
protests seeking their ouster. According to Michael McFaul and Taras Kuzio, the 
combination of these factors gave opposition movements more breathing space and 
essentially an opportunity to continue existing in between and through electoral cycles in 
post-Soviet states such as Georgia and Ukraine. Therefore, when elections were marred 
by fraud in these hybrid regimes, opposition movements were swiftly able to mobilize 
support on the ground.1 Yet, in several post-Soviet states with similar regime 
characteristics, regime dissenters failed to topple authoritarian rulers on the eve of rigged 
elections.  
Alternative studies developed a model with a focus on opposition strategies that 
revolved around elections. According to Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, where 
regime dissenters ousted autocratic leaders, they relied on a set of strategies, including 
                                                 
1 Michael McFaul, “Transition from PostCommunism,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16(3), July 2005, pp. 
5-19; Taras Kuzio, “Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Post-communist Countries: 
Comparative Perspective on the Fourth Wave,” Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 16(1), Winter 2008, pp. 97-109. 
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forming a united electoral bloc, effective political campaigning, active engagement with 
civil society organizations, election monitoring, parallel vote counting, and – if necessary 
– getting people out into the streets to protest fraudulent elections results. At the same 
time, Bunce and Wolchik noted that regime opponents learned these strategies in part 
from other opposition movements which successfully unseated autocratic incumbents in 
post-Communist Europe and from American and European democracy promotion 
organizations.2  
 Lucan Way’s analysis, in stark contrast, observed that the Belarussian opposition 
movement, although it studied and applied tactical repertoires of other successful anti-
regime movements, could not mobilize a strong support base to pose a threat to the regime 
after the 2006 presidential elections.3 Similarly, the Armenian opposition movement 
failed to oust autocrats both in 2004 and 2008 even though it closely modeled its 
organization and tactics after the opposition forces of Georgia.4 
In the view of Mark Beissinger, the divergent authoritarian outcomes, although 
opposition movements may have employed similar tactics and strategies over time, 
stemmed from the timing of protests. According to Beissinger, earliest opposition 
movements that succeed in overthrowing authoritarian regimes fostered the chances of 
next opposition movements to topple non-democratic leaders. As political revolutions 
reverberated across time and space, would-be opposition forces in other times and places 
however were not the only parties who watched and learned. Incumbent regimes also 
                                                 
2 Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, “Defeating Dictators: Electoral Change and Stability in 
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes,” World Politics, Vol. 62 (1), Jan. 2010, pp. 43-86. 
3 Lucan Way, “National Identity and Authoritarianism: Belarus and Ukraine Compared,” in Orange 
Revolution and Aftermath: Mobilization, Apathy, and the State in Ukraine, edited by Paul D. Anieri, 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010, pp. 137-41. 




learned how to respond to popular protest movements by studying and discerning 
valuable lessons which can be derived from previous confrontations within different 
states. In their efforts to stay a few steps ahead of potential opposition forces, authoritarian 
leaders raised institutional barriers. This arguably prevented late opposition movements 
from dismantling authoritarian regimes.5 
Other approaches emphasized the institutional design of authoritarianism itself in the 
post-Soviet states. Henry Hale argued that constitutionally mandated term limits 
encouraged elite defection from an incumbent regime by setting a certain date for the exit 
of president who would no longer have the power to allocate economic resources and 
dispense favors.6 However, some factors that may affect political elites’ calculation to 
support anointed successor or opposition candidate – including, the benefit of supporting 
the incumbent’s preferred successor, the strength of a possible opposition movement, and 
the ability of regime and its opponents to galvanize mass support – were not discussed in 
Hale’s approach, as indicated by Scott Radnitz.7 At the same time, Way’s examination of 
post-Soviet authoritarian breakdowns highlighted that a large number of ousted 
incumbents would not have been formally required to term out. In other words, there were 
no term limits in place in many instances in which autocrats were deposed by popular 
protests.8  
                                                 
5 Mark R. Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of 
Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol.5 (2), 2007, pp. 259-276. Also, 
see, Mark R. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002.  
6 Henry E. Hale, “Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” World 
Politics, Vol. 58 (1), October 2005, pp. 133-65. 
7 Scott Radnitz, “The Color of Money: Privatization, Economic Dispersion, and the Post-Soviet 
‘Revolutions’,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 42 (2), Jan. 2010, p. 130.      
8 For a table of “Term Limits and Leadership Turnovers 1992-2014,” see Lucan Way, Pluralism by Default: 
Weak Autocrats and the Rise of Competitive Politics, Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 2015, p. 171.  
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Some discussions of authoritarian institutions also concentrated on autocrat’s control 
of state wealth. Radnitz argued that when a state’s economic resources were transferred 
into private hands and created a new capitalist class, this occasionally backfired for 
autocracies. In other words, the interest of the capitalist class varied from the interest of 
the incumbent rule in some instances. At the same time, the dispersion of state’s economic 
resources meant that the general population no longer depended solely upon the state for 
its survival. In the end, Radnitz highlighted, some states that went through mass economic 
privatization (i.e. Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan) faced opposition movements 
backed by newly created capitalist classes and people who were less dependent on the 
state for their economic well-being. Additionally, the growing dispersion of state wealth 
limited autocrats’ potential to deter elite defections to opposition forces. This combined 
with popular protests fostered the fall of authoritarian regimes.9 While I agree that the 
broad dispersion of state economic resources plays an important role in the chances for 
success of an opposition movement in ousting an incumbent autocrat, this critical factor 
in and of itself does not solely indicate when an infusion of financial resources into an 
opposition movement should be expected to yield results or generate sustained mass 
protests.  
Ultimately, all approaches laid out above offer very insightful but partial frameworks 
to understand the reasons for the divergent regime paths of many post-Communist states. 
At the same time, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way proposed a more systematic approach 
to assessing the causes of divergent authoritarian outcomes for most post-Soviet states.10 
                                                 
9 Radnitz, “The Color of Money,” pp. 127-46. 
10 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.They focus on competitive authoritarian regimes. 
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According to these scholars, high linkage11 to the West was a sufficient condition for 
regime transition to democracy. Where density of ties to the West was low or medium, 
high authoritarian organizational capacity12 was predicted to bring authoritarian 
stability. In the case of low or medium organizational power, Western leverage13 
designated the potential outcome. Therefore, high leverage generated unstable 
authoritarianism14 while low or medium leverage led to stable authoritarianism.  
Moreover, Levitsky and Way noted that all post-Soviet authoritarian regimes had low 
linkages to the West because of their Soviet past. Thus, what distinguished one from 
another in terms of transitional outcomes was first and foremost the incumbent’s 
organizational power, followed by Western leverage. In this context, the success of anti-
regime protests in Georgia and Ukraine to unseat autocrats was due in part to incumbent 
regimes’ inability to crack down on organized and sustained opposition protests and to 
prevent former regime allies from deserting for the opposition movement, respectively.15 
Therefore, both aforementioned countries – where organizational power was low and 
Western leverage was high – predicted to become unstable authoritarian regimes. Yet, to 
the contrary, Ukraine democratized following the Orange Revolution. Therefore, critics 
emphasized that this model remained limited in accurately predicting transitional 
                                                 
11 Western linkage is defined as “the density of ties (economic, politic, diplomatic, social and 
organizational) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, and information)” between 
a country and the US, European Union as well as international institutions led by Western powers. Ibid., 
pp. 43-50. 
12 The sources of organizational power as follows: “A single, highly institutionalized ruling party,” and 
“extensive and well-funded coercive apparatus,” or “state’s strong control over the economy.” Ibid., pp. 
54-67. 
13 Western leverage is invoked to highlight “government’s vulnerability to external democratizing powers.” 
Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, pp. 40-3. 
14 Unstable authoritarianism refers to incumbent turnover without democratization. 
15 Ibid., p. 69. 
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outcome when a regime’s organizational power is low or medium.16 In the end, however, 
Ukraine slid back to authoritarianism by 2010 – as predicted by the model favored by 
Levitsky and Way. 
From a theoretical perspective, the question as to whether the degree of an autocrat’s 
organizational power in a country where linkage is low is alone sufficient to account for 
varying authoritarian regime outcomes, regardless of its ideational background, arises. 
Indeed, Way’s recent work focuses on activists’ commitment to anti-regime protests by 
analyzing divisions over national identity.17 Where “relatively equal divisions in titular 
national identity along ethnic, regional, cultural, or other lines”18 existed, authoritarian 
regime’s ability to monopolize power faced major constraints in the post-Soviet era, 
according to Way. Hence, the greater the share of general population that support an 
alternative vision of national identity to the one espoused by an incumbent regime, the 
stronger the chance for potential opposition movement to bring down an autocrat. In 
Ukraine and Moldova, Way suggested, divisions in national identities enabled opposition 
movements to mobilize major support in the form of popular protests and thus help to 
depose autocratic leaders. Conversely, the unified national identity of Belarus made it 
very difficult for the opposition movement to make appeals to the people and to galvanize 
major support for its attempted anti-regime protests.19 While Way’s comparative work on 
the role of divided national identities in the fall of post-socialist authoritarian regimes is 
unquestionably remarkable, his analysis – to a certain degree – moves away from the 
                                                 
16 Dan Slater, “Review: Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War,” Perspectives 
on Politics, Volume 9 (2) , 2011, p. 387. 
17 Way, Pluralism by Default. 
18 Ibid., p. 188. 
19 While divisions in national identity was analyzed to explain the failure and success of the opposition 
movements in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, the authoritarian regime’s organizational capacity figured 
prominently within each case of Way’s book. 
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constructivist approach to identity. For instance, Way notes that “Russia was dominated 
by a single identity that pitted small numbers of ethnic separatists against a large majority 
of Russians.” This understanding however underestimates “competing worldviews” 
amongst Russians and their potential to affect the course of change. Therefore, in Way’s 
account, national identity becomes more about manifestation of “visible,” “historical,” 
“structural” lines and less about processes through which national identity content is 
shaped, negotiated, and contested by political entrepreneurs and people. Along the same 
lines, Way’s framework underlines the use of divided national identity by opposition to 
galvanize support. Yet, it gives less attention to how incumbent regime and its opponents 
promulgate, control, and mobilize these identities. Lastly, in both Ukraine and Moldova 
– two instances in which opposition movements had success in unseating incumbent 
rulers, – divided national identities emerged as territorially concentrated. On the other 
hand, Belarus – where the opposition movement failed in ousting the incumbent ruler – 
had neither a divided national identity, nor territorially concentrated divisions along any 
relevant lines. Therefore, it might be worth asking that are territorially dispersed identities 
associated with authoritarian collapse as strong as territorially concentrated identities?  
Yitzhak M. Brundy and Evgeny Finkel’s analysis of divergent regime outcomes in 
Ukraine and Russia also concentrated on the role national identity in the transition from 
authoritarian rule. According to these scholars, the failure of Russian liberals in the 
immediate post-communist period to actually cultivate an alternative concept of national 
identity combined with the ill-fated market economy gave rise to “ [an] unchallenged 
spread of illiberal, imperial, anti-market, and xenophobic notions of Russian identity” 
12 
 
that persists to day.20 At the same time,  Brundy and Finkel remarked that the legacy of 
Soviet nationalities policy “blur[ed] Soviet and Russian identities” which “reinforced the 
imperial notion of Russian national identity” even within liberal-minded elites.21 As such, 
these scholars suggested that this hegemonic notion of national identity was to a great 
extent accountable for Russia’s non-democratic path. In turn, Ukraine’s historical and 
Soviet-institutional path entailed two competing visions of national identity – the Western 
Ukrainian identity, which centered on Ukrainian language and culture, and leaned 
towards being a part of Europe on one side, and the Eastern Ukrainian identity, which 
favored closeness with Russia, primarily due to cultural and economic considerations, on 
the other side. In this context, Brundy and Finkel argued that the “pro-democratic forces” 
of Ukraine were always able to mobilize support on issues of national identity without 
devoting much attention to economics. Nevertheless, post-Soviet Ukrainian elites who 
drew upon the frames of Ukrainian nationalism, with the arguable exception of 
Yushchenko, and opposition groups and activists, which engaged in Ukraine’s successful 
anti-regime protests, associated with democratic values loosely at best.22  
My study situates itself in the burgeoning literature that attempts to explain the fall or 
survival of authoritarian regimes in post-Soviet states. It builds upon the previous works, 
but with a further focus on national identity – which it proposes to be a major variable in 
explaining divergent transitional paths. More critically, my work links the symbolic 
                                                 
20 Yitzhak M. Brundy and Evgeny Finkel, “Why Ukraine is not Russia: Hegemonic National Identity and 
Democracy in Russia and Ukraine,” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 25 (4), 2011, p. 825.  
21 Ibid., 819. 
22 Beissinger also notes that what unified Ukrainian revolutionaries of 2004 was their common disdain for 
the incumbent ruler, rather than their loyalty to common values of democracy. Elites in opposition on the 
other hand were quick to frame activities with democratic vocabulary to cover a variety of grievances. Mark 
R. Beissinger, “The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine Orange Revolution,” 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 107(3), August 2013, pp. 1-19. 
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politics of national identity with the material bases of popular support that authoritarian 
incumbents and opposition groups can mobilize in Russia and Ukraine. 
 
Explaining Authoritarian Regime Trajectories in the Post-Soviet Territory 
This work analyzes the divergent regime paths of Ukraine and Russia since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. It seeks to explain why Ukrainian opposition movements achieved 
the overthrow of authoritarian incumbents while their Russian counterparts failed to do 
so?  In other words, how did autocratic incumbents popularize and maintain their rule in 
Russia, but failed to do so in Ukraine? I argue that where regime opponents depose 
authoritarian leaders, this hinges primarily upon two variables: (I) opposition engagement 










(I) Opposition engagement in the symbolic politics of national identity 
Until recently, few regime studies systematically analyzed how national identity may 
indeed contribute to the survival and fall of authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet states. 
My study considers national identity as a type of collective identity, which Rawi Abdelal 
et al. dwell on two dimensions – content and contestation. Content refers to the meaning 
of a group’s distinctiveness and boundaries, as well as its purposes and preferences. It 
also entails a group’s relation to other groups, which admittedly enforces group members’ 
perception of what they are (or are not). Arguably most critically for this study, content 
invokes the economic, political, and social perspectives that are associated with a group 
identity, which simultaneously structure the way people view and interpret how the world 
works.23 At the same time, contestation consists of the degree of agreement (or 
disagreement) about the each of the properties of content within a given group. In this 
way, it refers to the process through which people and political elite negotiate an identity 
content.24 As Abdelal et remark, “there is always some level of in-group contestation over 
this [identity] content, implying that social identities vary in agreement and disagreement 
about their norms, worldviews, analytics, and meanings.”25 
Next, this study views a nation as “a collective of people … united by shared cultural 
features (myths, values, etc.) and the belief in the right to territorial self-determination.”26 
                                                 
23 Rawi Abdelal et al., Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009, pp. 18-27.  
24 Ibid., pp. 27-9. 
25 Ibid., 31. 
26 Lowell W. Barrington, “‘Nation’ and ‘Nationalism’: The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science,” 
PS: Political Science & Politics, Vol. 30 (4), pp. 712-17.  
Italic belongs to the author of this study. 
See also, Walker Connor, “A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a …,” Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, Vol. 1, Oct. 1978, pp. 377-400; Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the 
Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977, pp. 1-13. 
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National identity – as a form of collective identity – thus refers to “a set of attitudes, 
beliefs, and commitments regarding qualifications for membership, the location of 
territorial boundaries, and the content of political, social, economic, cultural 
arrangements that are best suited for the given nation.”27 Neither nation nor national 
identity is a substantial entity; each are socially constructed. Indeed, scholars have long 
noted that the state is a “powerful identifier” because of the “material and symbolic 
resources [that it has]” to impose “ a legitimate principle of [social] vision and division” 
over competing alternatives.28 As an incumbent regime effectively harnesses the content 
of a national identity,  the legitimacy of a state in the eyes of its people increases.29 On 
the other hand, “[e]ven the most powerful state does not monopolize production and 
diffusion of identifications … and those that it does produce may be contested.”30  
My work argues that the lower the degree of the popular agreement over a national 
identity content evoked by regime authorities, the higher the chance for opposition 
movements to mobilize a sufficient number of people on the ground and ultimately 
succeed in bringing about authoritarian breakdown. As Rogers Smith remarks, “political 
leaders necessarily engage in ‘people-forming’ or ‘people building’ endeavors to a greater 
or lesser degree all the time” in order to persuade people “to embrace the valorized 
                                                 
27 Bernhard Peters, “A New look at ‘National Identity,’” European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 3(1), 2002, 
pp. 3-32, quoted in Brundy and Finkel, “Why Ukraine is not Russia,” , p.815. 
28 Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004, pp.28-65; 
Pierre Bourdieu, “Social Space and Symbolic Power,” Sociological Theory, Vol. 7 (1), 1989, pp. 14-25; 
Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed. by Graham 
Burchell, Peter Miller, and Colin Gordon, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 87-104. Also, 
see, Loic Wacquant, “Symbolic Power and Group-making: On Pierre Bourdieu’s Reframing of Class,” 
Journal of Classical Sociology, 2013, pp. 1-18. 
29 Herbert C. Kelman, “Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: A Social-Psychological 
Analysis of Political Legitimacy,” in International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and 
Theory, ed. by James N. Rosenau, Revised Edition, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1969, pp. 276-
88.  
30 Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups, p.43. 
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identities, play the stirring roles, and have the fulfilling experiences [that they ascribe for 
them]” through “arguments, rhetoric, symbols, or ‘stories’ of a more obvious and familiar 
sort.”31 Additionally, incumbent autocrats may dismiss or relegate a set of beliefs, values, 
and identities found in society to a secondary role in order to promote regime purposes. 
Rival political leaders or opposition figures, in turn, may appeal to these subordinated 
values and sentiments when challenging the national way of life promulgated by those in 
power, and thus redefine the lexicons of political debate.32  Admittedly however, political 
endeavors of “people building” – both by an incumbent regime and its opponents – say 
nothing about “the depth, resonance, or power” of identities invoked in the daily 
experiences of the people that they are ascribed to, which indeed “can only be addressed 
empirically.”33   
In this context, an effective appeal to national identity is a significant source of 
support for both authoritarian regimes seeking to consolidate rule and opposition 
movements attempting to overthrow autocrats. As Way’s in-depth study of several post-
Soviet states demonstrates, where democratizing push from the West is weak, divisions 
in national identity may help anti-regime movements to mobilize sufficient support in 
bringing about authoritarian regime.34 As such, the larger the share of a population which 
backs a competing vision of national identity evoked by an opposition movement, the 
higher the chance for the fall of an incumbent authoritarian regime.   
                                                 
31 Rogers M. Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 4, 45.  
32 Ibid., p. 53. 
33 Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups, p. 54. 
34 Way, Pluralism by Default, pp. 18-22; Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism. 
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Admittedly, intense disagreement over a conception of national identity harnessed by 
autocratic incumbents may also prompt political elites to defect to opposition movements. 
Expected economic benefits as well as identity choices may drive elite participation or 
non-participation in opposition movements. 
 
(II) Opposition access to economic resources 
The role of the state’s control over economic resources received a considerable amount 
of attention in democratization literature. Recent studies highlighted the importance of 
the state’s economic power to its authoritarian stability. Scholars such as Levitsky and 
Way argued that a state’s strong discretionary control over wealth might substitute for 
weakness in party strength and coercive capacities as it provides incentives for cohesion 
within regime elites and necessary resources for thwarting regime opponents.35  
My study contends that the state’s control over wealth plays an important part in 
regime outcomes as Levitsky and Way propose. Authoritarian incumbents prove stronger 
when major economic resources are overwhelmingly controlled by the state, and 
unsurprisingly they prove weaker when far less economic resources are controlled by the 
state. Additionally, I argue that opposition movements may bring down autocrats even in 
the face of a relatively strong ruling party and coercive forces.  
First of all, dispersion of economic resources to more private actors reduces the share 
of a population that depends on the state for its economic livelihood. This further enables 
a greater share of the population in a country to partake in opposition movements without 
a fear of intimidation and reprisal from state authorities.36 Conversely, with a higher 
                                                 
35 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, pp. 66-7; Way, Pluralism by Default, pp. 16-7.  
36 Radnitz, “The Color of Money,” pp. 127-46. 
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percentage of a population relying on state controlled economic resources, more support 
can be seen for incumbent regime stability. In this vein, an incumbent regime may 
maintain popular support through control and bestowal of economic resources selectively 
to regime loyalists.37  
Second, where autocrats successfully monopolize control over wealth, regime 
dissenters lack economic resources to organize and sustain popular protests. As the 
existing body of post-Soviet scholarship largely demonstrates, independent economic 
actors – namely, oligarchs – indeed played a major part in financing anti-regime activities 
which led to the fall of incumbent autocrats. Along the same lines, independent economic 
actors provide opposition movements with an opportunity to disseminate alternative 
political narratives to pro-government media through media outlets of their own. 
Admittedly, where alternative sources of news and information exist, regime dissenters 
have greater success communicating their messages and spreading their narratives. 
Conversely, opposition movements being starved of economic resources are unlikely to 
reach out to masses, and to galvanize adequate popular support for their causes.38  
Lastly, where state and economy are largely interwoven, less incentive exists for that 
regime elite to partake in opposition activities. In this situation, opposition movements 
fail to attract the necessary economic resources to build enough momentum to dismantle 
incumbent regimes and thence the overall likelihood of incumbent regime collapse 
remains low. At the same time, defection of political elites to an opposition movement 
                                                 
37 For a similar argument, see, Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its 
Demise in Mexico, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
38 For the role of non-state economic actors in financing anti-regime protests and alternative media outlets, 




largely fails to occur. In contrast, the rise of an opposition movement endowed with 
significant economic resources and capable of attracting support effectively for its 
message signal the vulnerability of an incumbent regime. In this situation, the chances of 
elite defection to an opposition movement increase. As political elite desert an incumbent 
regime for a potential opposition movement, the legitimacy of regime dissenters in the 
eyes of the public increases. 
In summary, my work argues that opposition movement’s effective appeal to a 
competing notion of national identity – to the one harnessed by an autocratic regime – 
and its access to broad economic sources provide a sufficient condition for the fall of 
authoritarian regime.  In this vein, I suggest that the lower the degree of popular 
agreement over a national identity espoused by an autocratic incumbent, the higher the 
chance for an opposition movement to mobilize support on the ground and prompt a split 
among regime elites. Conversely, the more an autocratic regime monopolizes national 
identity discourse, the less chance for regime dissidents to bring about authoritarian 
breakdown. Next, I argue that the lower the degree of regime control over the economy, 
the higher the chance for an opposition movement to invoke its own vision of national 
identity, galvanize support, and promote elite defection. A broader concentration of 
economic resources in the hands of an autocrat makes it more likely for regime to survive.  
Simultaneously, my work highlights that an incumbent power’s control over national 
identity discourse and/or its retention of economic resources – the factors which 





Why Russia and Ukraine? 
This study applies the framework laid out above to explain why the Russian and 
Ukrainian states that were similar in many respects in the 1990s have since diverged so 
starkly in authoritarian outcomes. Put succinctly, I seek to understand why Ukrainian 
opposition movements succeeded in deposing autocrats while Russian regime opponents 
failed. In the same vein, my study explores why authoritarian incumbents failed to 
consolidate power in Ukraine but nevertheless succeeded in Russia.  
As Victor Zaslavsky pointed out in the early 1990s, “there were [at the time] high 
hopes that Russia and Ukraine, like the countries of Central Europe, would be able to 
establish Western-style democracies and market economies.”39 Ukraine and Russia both 
began the immediate post-Soviet era with similar impediments to transitioning to a more 
democratic form of government. Both countries inherited undeveloped civil societies, 
weak traditions of the rule of law, and economic systems predicated upon state ownership 
of major resources and industries from their recent Soviet pasts.40 Both also lacked any 
prior first-hand experience with democracy. Neither Ukraine nor Russia had strong ties 
to or interactions with democratic Western powers compared to many Central European 
countries.41  
Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004) in Ukraine 
and Boris Yeltsin (1991-99) in Russia sought to ingrain authoritarian rule by using similar 
methods. Both leaders created systems of support based upon close relations with newly 
                                                 
39 Victor Zaslavsky, “Nationalism and Democratic Transition in Post-communist Societies,” in Daedalus, 
Vol. 121 (2), 1992, pp. 97-121, quoted in Brundy and Finkel, “Why Ukraine is not Russia,” p. 814. 
40 On this issue, see, Marc Morje Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe, 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
41 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, pp. 197-200. 
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emerging class of oligarchs in their respective countries. A few oligarchs in each country 
owned major media outlets, and slanted reporting to favor autocratic incumbents when 
necessary. Both incumbents lacked an effective party organization on the one hand, but 
both were nevertheless able to cripple their nation’s parliament on the other hand. 
Kuchma and Yeltsin both did not shy away committing electoral fraud to retain power. 42 
With increasingly uneven political playing fields, domestic media biased towards the 
each regime in each country, weakened parliaments, and fraudulent elections, Ukraine 
and Russia became more authoritarian under Kuchma and Yelsin.43 Notwithstanding 
these similarities, Kuchma met with resistance from a cohesive and organized protest 
movement which mobilized thousands of protestors on the eve of Ukraine’s rigged 2004 
presidential elections in which Kuchma’s hand-picked successor, Viktor Yanukovich was 
declared to be the winner. Ultimately, the opposition leader, Viktor Yushchenko, 
prevailed in the revote of the 2005 presidential elections. In contrast to Kuchma’s 
Ukraine, Yeltsin cleared the way for his chosen successor Putin by resigning the ahead 
of schedule in December 1999 in Russia. This made Putin acting president of Russia and 
facilitated Putin’s victory in the 2000 presidential elections. 
The moments of transition of power in both countries provide interesting focal points 
and illuminate how Ukrainian and Russian regime paths began to diverge. The incoming 
president of Ukraine, Yushchenko, put an end to the authoritarian rule, while his 
counterpart in Russia, Putin, launched to consolidate authoritarian rule. Down but not out, 
Yanukovich captured the prime ministership after the parliamentary elections of 2006 – 
                                                 
42 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, pp. 186-97, 213-220; Way, Pluralism by Default, pp. 
57-63, pp. 146-9. 
43 On the definition of competitive authoritarianism, see, Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 
pp. 5-12.  
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even it was for a short period. By using illicit practices, Yanukovich was also able to 
garner enough votes to amend the Ukrainian constitution unilaterally under 
Yushchenko’s presidency.44 More critically, Yanukovich regained the pinnacle of power 
in Ukraine by defeating former revolutionary Yuliia Timoshenko in the 2010 presidential 
elections, and re-embarked upon an authoritarian path immediately thereafter. During the 
same time frame, Putin’s hold on power in Russia tightened. United Russia, pro-Putin 
party, gained controlled over Russia’s legislature, by wining 222 seats in the 2003 
parliamentary elections, effectively spelling an end to legislative challenges by opposition 
political parties. Putin further exercised de facto control over Russia’s judiciary, 
foreclosing the possibility that political opponents could ever mount any major challenges 
to his regime. Contemporaneously, regime intimidation of various oligarchs produced 
another desired outcome: economic support for opposition protests evaporated. New 
amendments to electoral laws also placed large obstacles in the paths of regime outsiders. 
In 2008, Putin hence succeeded to transfer power to his close associate Dmitrii 
Medvedev, while he himself remained to lead politics as Russia’s prime minister.  
As in Russia under Putin and Medvedev, Yanukovich in Ukraine undermined the 
independence of the parliament and the judiciary. The Party of Regions’ control of the 
parliament unquestionably abetted the rise of Yanukovich’s authoritarian rule. Similarly, 
Yanukovich’s increasing control over judiciary enabled him to prosecute his main rivals 
and regime dissenters. Lastly, Yanukovich’s close relations with various oligarchs helped 
to cement his authoritarian rule. Thus, both Ukraine under Yanukovich and Russia under 
Putin and his chosen successor Dmitry Medvedev lacked an even playing field, 
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independent media, and clean elections.  Regime dissenters in both countries were 
nevertheless able to mouth severe challenges in the early 2010s. Russian incumbents 
successfully thwarted the opposition movements of 2011-12 while Yanukovich once 
again fell from power in 2014 following a wave of protests. 
Thus, Russia and Ukraine differed greatly on transitional outcomes between each 
other, simultaneously highlighting the key variables of my study over the relevant time 
frame analyzed. This provides leverage for assessing the impact of national identity and 
state (de)concentration of economic resources on regime outcomes in the post-communist 
era. In other words, the cases of Russia and Ukraine allow me to test my hypothesis that 
a people’s acceptance of national identity evoked by regime and a state’s extensive 
control over wealth contributes to the survival of authoritarian rules. In turn, when 
potential opposition has sufficient access to economic resources, and espouses a 
competing notion of national identity among its putative members, a greater chance for 
the fall of authoritarian regime exists. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
This study aims to provide a theoretical framework, reinforced by empirically convincing 
evidence, as to why similar authoritarian regimes experienced divergent outcomes in the 
post-Soviet era. My analysis links ideational frames of authoritarian rule and those of its 
opponents with the material basis of support that each is able to garner in order to shed 
light on the differing transitional paths of Ukraine and Russia. In other words, it looks 
simultaneously at the symbolic politics of national identity and the economic 
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underpinning of popular support garnered by authoritarian regime and opposition 
movement.  
My analysis first shows that appeals to a popular national identity can prove decisive 
in shaping regime paths for autocrats and opposition movements alike. Admittedly, most 
scholars in comparative politics to date placed less emphasis on the role national identity 
plays in molding various regime outcomes in post-Soviet states. There have been only a 
few book-length studies that systematically examine the symbolic politics of national 
identity and its effect upon transitional paths of post-Soviet states. Importantly however, 
these works often focused on the ways in which structural splits in national identity led 
to popular protests. My work stands on the shoulders of previous work done in this area, 
and it further seeks to demonstrate that even in the absence of structurally shaped identity 
choices, internal disagreements about national identity content evoked by an incumbent 
regime may catalyze support in favor of potential opposition forces. By discretely 
focusing on contestation over national identity content – in a way that is not only confined 
to structural splits in a titular group, – this framework thus has the potential to compare a 
relatively larger number of cases in accounting for authoritarian outcomes.  
Second, my work highlights the role that a state’s degree of control of wealth plays 
in overall authoritarian regime stability. Along with previous studies, my findings show 
that a broader concentration of economic resources in the hands of an autocrat makes it 
more difficult for opposition movements to garner popular support and stimulate protests. 
Furthermore, the cases discussed in this study demonstrate, an incumbent autocrat’s 
control of economic resources explain diverging regime outcomes more fully than in 
either the degree of institutionalization of an incumbent party or the coercive capacity of 
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an incumbent autocrat’s regime. Indeed, this work shows that a less-tightly state-
controlled economy can provide potential opposition with an opportunity to defeat 
autocratic regimes – when they also successfully appeal to nationalist sentiments – even 
when incumbents possess a well-disciplined party organization and/or coercive capacity. 
In contrast, where regimes lack great organizational capacity, autocrats may stay in power 
depending on the degree of state’s control of economic resources. 
By accounting for ideational and material basis of mobilizational support both for 
autocrats and their opponents simultaneously, my work overall brings a new perspective 
to assess the survival and fall of authoritarian regimes in the post-communist period. At 
the same time, the comparison of Russia and Ukraine within this framework prompts 
broader theoretical implications for the literature on identity and social mobilization. 
First, my work agrees that earlier institutions and policies matter by making a set of 
identity repertoires available to both regime elites and opposition forces to draw on in 
their efforts to legitimize their demands – even though those policies and institutions no 
longer exist.45 Second, expected economic benefits are not the only factor shaping masses 
and elites’ decision to partake in popular protests. Indeed, their mobilizational preferences 
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are also an effect of their identity choices.46 Third, national identities are not substantial 
entities, but rather constructed through the processes of social negotiation.47 
 
Observational Implications 
This work is comprised of an in-depth analysis of Russia and Ukraine to describe the 
causal mechanisms of transition outcomes in the post-Communist era. My analysis traces 
the processes through which economic dispersion and national identity may affect 
authoritarian regime trajectories in these two countries. While describing the causal 
processes in Russia and Ukraine, I relied on numerous of journal articles, book chapters, 
and books; reviewed a number of local press sources, published surveys, and statistical 
data for the periods of interest; analyzed dozens of videos from protest scenes on 
Youtube; and transcribed the speeches of leaders during both opposition and pro-
government rallies, interviews, and official documents.  In addition, I incorporated the 
findings of my own fieldwork – carried out between July and December of 2015 in 
Moscow and Kyiv and between mid-June and mid-July of 2017 in Kyiv. During this time, 
I conducted sixty-two in-depth interviews and several follow-up interviews with political 
activists, journalists, politicians, and ordinary protest participants in Russia and Ukraine. 
These interviews introduced a variety of issues that I may not capture otherwise, and 
consequently enriched the theoretical framework and empirical findings of this work.  
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I drew on a set of strategies to assess the accuracy of hypotheses. My framework - 
laid out above - suggests that authoritarian breakdown may result from the regime’s 
failure to popularize its choice of national identity and control economic resources. Thus, 
I shall exhibit evidence to illustrate that the opposition successful engagement in the 
symbolic politics of national identity and its access to economic resources prompted the 
fall of authoritarian incumbents in Ukraine. Similarly, I shall demonstrate that the 
regime’s dominance over national identity and/or its retention of control over economy 
and its led to the survival of authoritarian rule in Russia. Thus, empirical evidence shall 
illustrate that when the factors precipitating the fall of authoritarian rule are harnessed by 
the regime, the rise of authoritarian regimes is the likely outcome. The lack of such 
evidence, on the other hand, would show that alternative variables affected transition 
from and back to authoritarian rule.  
Thus, broad disagreements over national identity evoked by an incumbent regime 
should factor in when explaining the cause of authoritarian breakdowns. Where 
opposition movements achieved the overthrow of an authoritarian regime, I shall find 
evidence of its engagement in symbolic politics to mobilize a competing conception of 
national identity. Indeed, public surveys may reveal the strength of potential opposition 
in relation to its cultivation of splits in national identity. By charting the rise of anti-
regime movements simultaneously with growing divisions over national identity content, 
I may demonstrate the critical role identity plays in the fall of authoritarian regimes. 
However, my hypothesis would again prove incorrect if available evidence made it 
apparent that ousted incumbents did not fall in large part due to competition between 
differing national identity choices. In turn, where incumbent forces maintained their rule, 
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a high level of national acceptance of a regime’s sponsored national identity (or a lack of 
a serious competing vision of national identity) would reinforce my hypothesis. 
As I make an explicit claim that the fragmented economy allowed both the political 
elite and the masses to make rather ideational decisions, autocrats’ weakness in 
controlling economic resources should therefore be empirically demonstrable in each 
case of regime collapse. If autocrats defeated opposition movement – which successfully 
galvanized support based on an alternative national identity content – despite a high level 
of economic dispersion, it would suggest that my argument does not hold water. In 
contrast, where autocratic incumbents maintained their rule or transferred power to their 
anointed successor, the appearance of the state’s considerable control of wealth will 
likewise buttress the validity of this model. On the other hand, my hypothesis would prove 
incorrect if incumbent autocrats defeated opposition movements – namely those which 
successfully galvanized support based on a notion of national identity - in spite of a high 
level of economic dispersion as well. 
All in all, neither opposition mobilization of a competing conception of national 
identity nor its access to economic sources may alone explain the fall of authoritarian 
regimes. Only when an incumbent force loses its monopoly over national identity choices, 
along with the broad control over economic resources, then there is a real chance for 
opposition movements to bring down an authoritarian regime. Moreover, when an 
authoritarian regime monopolizes national identity discourse and retains its control over 





Outline of the Dissertation 
Chapter I presented above develops the theoretical framework, questions, and case 
selection that are at the center of the project. Chapter II provides an account of Soviet 
system of nationality policies to shed light on political elites’ endeavors to (re)invent a 
national identity in contemporary Ukraine and Russia, while not a priori postulating the 
acceptance of imposed national identities among masses. Chapter III and IV present a 
detailed analysis of regime trajectories in Russia (1992-2000) and Ukraine (1992-2004), 
respectively. Process-tracing provides leverage for assessing the impact of national 
identity and state (de)concentration of economic resources on regime outcomes in each 
case. Chapter V and VI take off from the point when the two similarly authoritarian 
regimes experienced divergent paths, and afterwards assess the role played by the key 
variables of this study in the fall and survival of authoritarian incumbents with respect to 
challenges mounted by opposition forces in Russia (2000-2012) and Ukraine (2004-
2014). Chapter VI summarizes the research findings and discusses the broader 











 CHAPTER II: THE LEGACY OF SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICIES 
 
In many cases of post-Soviet regime transition, the process by which autocrats acquire, 
retain and lose power has been connected to their ability to control the discourse of 
national identity. However, scholars of social sciences more often treated “nation” and 
“identity” in substantialist and essentialist terms. In the words of Brubaker, “[these terms] 
are used analytically … as they are used in practice, in an implicitly or explicitly reifying 
manner, in a manner that implies or asserts that ‘nations,’ ‘races,’ and ‘identities’ ‘exist’ 
as substantial entities and that people ‘have’ a ‘nationality,’ a ‘race,’ an ‘identity.’”48 
Instead, Brubaker proposes to study national identity both from above and from below: 
 
From above, we can focus on the ways in which [identity] categories are proposed, 
propagated, imposed, institutionalized, discursively articulated, organizationally 
entrenched, and generally embedded in multifarious forms of ‘governmentality.’ From 
below, we can study the ‘micropolitics’ of categories, the ways in which the categorized 
appropriate, internalize, subvert, evade, or transform the categories that are imposed on 
them.49 
 
Through posing the question of “how people – and organizations – do things with 
categories,” this approach overcomes the risk of “conflating a system of 
[institutionalized] identification or categorization with its presumed result, identity.”50 
Indeed, official identity forms may not lie in everyday experiences of the people that they 
are designated to.  
Along these lines, an account of the Soviet system of nationality policies shall not a 
priori postulate its outcomes as the acceptance of imposed national identities among 
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masses. Nor shall researchers dismiss the part that Soviet institutional design and its 
practices played in the elites’ endeavors to invent a national identity in contemporary 
Ukraine and Russia. The Soviet regime’s nationality policies “[made] certain categories 
readily and legitimately available for the representation of social reality, the framing of 
political claims, and the organization of political action”51 to political entrepreneurs in 
the post-Communist period. Therefore, elite circles appealed to the Soviet past in 
rediscovering and construing symbols, memories, and traditions in developing narratives 
of a nation. However, this does not entail that such policies and narratives have a major 
impact on “framing perception, orienting action, and shaping self understanding in 
everyday life.”52 As Smith notes, “[f]or its [nationalism] appeal necessarily depends on 
the resonance of the popular traditions, values, memories, myths and symbols that 
nationalists ‘rediscover’ and adapt for novel political ends.”53   
The story of the blossoming of national identities in the Soviet Union begins with the 
adoption of federalism and indigenization (korenizatsiia) at the center of its nationalities 
policy. Speaking about the Soviet regime, Terry Martin remarks that  
 
Russia’s new revolutionary government was the first of the old European multiethnic 
states to confront the rising tide of nationalism and respond by systematically 
promoting the national consciousness of its ethnic minorities and by establishing them 
many of the characteristic institutional forms of the nation-state … Nothing 
comparable to it had been attempted before, and, with possible exception of India, no 
multi-ethnic state has subsequently matched the scope of Soviet affirmative action.54 
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However “if most socialists agree that federalism was a ‘philistine ideal,’ and that 
‘national culture’ was a bourgeois fiction, and that assimilation was a progressive 
process,” why did the Bolsheviks adopt such practices?55 The answer to this question lies 
in their encounter with nationalism in the years of the Revolution and the Civil War, 
according to many scholars.56 The early Bolsheviks subscribed to the Wilsonian principle 
of self-determination in order to mobilize ethnic support for their revolutionary cause. As 
Martin indicates, the mobilizing force of nationalism – particularly among counter-
revolutionaries – took Lenin by surprise. Lenin reasoned that the arousal of nationalism 
was necessarily a consequence of the distrust that the oppressed nations had towards the 
oppressor nation – in other words, Tsarist Russia. Therefore, the only way to ease it was 
to acknowledge the right to self-determination.57 
 Moreover, for class identity to emerge as salient in society, Lenin argued, national 
identity had to be reconciled with. Appeals to nationalist sentiments were an effective 
source of mobilization in the revolutionary process. This, the Bolsheviks concluded, may 
trigger an “above -class alliance” and result in losing the support of the people.58 
Ironically enough, Yuri Slezkine remarks that “[t]hey [the socialists] needed native 
languages, native subjects and native teachers … in order to ‘polemicize with their own 
bourgeoisie, to spread anticlerical and anti-bourgeois ideas among their own peasantry 
…’ and to banish the virus of nationalism from their proletarian disciples.”59 Thus, the 
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early Soviet leaders agreed that the forms of nationhood may be granted to the people to 
weaken the appeal of nationalism.  In this vein, the development of national identity was 
considered as an inevitable path to galvanize support for socialism. At the same time, the 
“national phase” became associated with the modernization of the backward nationalities 
under socialism.60  
Next, the Soviet nationality policies espoused “an idea of nation fixed to territory.”61 
In this way, the Soviet system designated territories to the “core” nationalities; fifteen 
Union republics and various numbers of autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs were 
established. Simultaneously, indigenization was encouraged in each national territory. 
The language of the core nation was elevated to the status of the official state language. 
National intelligentsia were created and exclusively appointed to privileged positions in 
state institutions.  The public displays of national markers (folklore, poetry, museums, 
customs etc.) were supported.62 After all, Union republics – aside from the Russian 
Republic – particularly resembled nation-states: “[C]onstitutions, flags, anthems, state 
languages, communist parties, council of ministers …, parliaments, radio and television 
channels broadcasting in national languages, unions of writers, moviemakers, painters, 
and composers, national libraries, museums of national history, and Academies of 
Sciences.”63       
All of this however did not entail either the right to self-determination or efficient 
political and economic autonomy to non-Russian nationalities in practice. As Slezkine 
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notes, “[n]ational rights were matters of cultural ‘form’ as distinct from political and 
economic ‘content;’ but ultimately all form derived from content and it was up to party 
leaders in Moscow to decide where the line should be drawn in each case.”64 Therefore, 
the indigenous cadre – which owed its position to the Soviet system – were to exercise 
Moscow’s political control over their fellows and impede the emergence of ethnic 
mobilization by alternative leaders.65 All in all, the Soviet nationality policies meant, 
 
[F]irst to, harness, contain, channel, and control the potentially disruptive political 
expression of nationality by creating national-territorial administrative structures and 
by cultivating, co-opting, and (when they threatened to get out of line) repressing 
national elites; and second, to drain nationality of its content even while legitimating 
it as a form, and thereby to promote the long-term withering away of nationality as a 
vital component of social life.66  
 
While the Soviet regime intended to dissolve the essence of nationhood, its institutions 
and practices rather promoted “new ethnic assertiveness.”67 This was partly an outcome 
of Moscow’s efforts to reconcile with national elites in the post-Stalinist period. First, 
Khrushchev pruned the regime’s repressive apparatus. Second, Brezhnev’s policy of 
“respect for cadres” delegated numerous administrative tasks to national cadres, 
lengthened the term of appointment of national elites, and seconded the recruitment of 
the Party’s leadership positions from titular elites. Finally, national elites were able to 
grab more political autonomy, while fearing less about potential retaliation from the 
center. National cadres began to formulate and pursue the interests of their communities. 
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The native leaders gained broader institutional and popular support for their agendas, 
which enabled them to negotiate with Moscow for channeling further resources to 
national territories.68 
In this vein, as Roeder underlines, “[t]he very success of previous affirmative action 
policies created a large group [of indigenous professional elite and intelligentsia] with the 
skills to constitute themselves as independent political entrepreneurs.”69 Given the Soviet 
regime’s policy to train and promote titular elites to invent national cultures, it can hardly 
be a surprise that the center’s declining ability to compensate natives resulted in the loss 
of their loyalty for Moscow. In the end, as Slezkine aptly puts, “national form seemed to 
have become the content and … nationalism did not seem to have any content other than 
the cult of form.”70 Admittedly, there was nothing left but the narratives of nationhood 
that were invented by the regime-sponsored indigenous elites. 
Similarly, the Soviet practice which assigned each person a distinct ethnic identity “at 
birth on the basis of descent, registered in personal identity documents, recorded in 
bureaucratic encounters, and used to control the higher education and employment”71 
contributed to the development of national consciousness. As the Soviets were unable to 
create the socialist content, ethnicity became a predominant marker of  “social vision and 
division.”72 
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As a result, the very Soviet nationality policies instigated the rise of nation and 
nationalism in autonomous homelands. Federal structures secured the mobilizational 
resources for the national communities, and indigenization created a group of skillful 
political entrepreneurs with their own ethnic agendas.73 The institutionalization of 
individual ethnic identity cemented further nationhood as “a central organizing 
principle,” upon which native elites later based their political claims.74  
 
Russians and Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR)  
From the early days of the Bolshevik revolution onwards, the status of Russian nation 
within the Soviet Union had remained unsolved. Russia’s imperial past marked it as an 
oppressor nation to be reconciled within the Soviet Union.  
In imperial Russia, emperors and intellectuals promoted the idea of Russian empire 
as a Russian nation-state within ever-expanding territories – particularly throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.75 While the Russian entity was envisioned as an 
empire earliest under the rule of Peter the Great, its name acknowledged the multi-ethnic 
character of its people, Rossiiskaia imperiia – instead of Russkaia which refers to ethnic 
Russians. However, this did not mean to change the ultimate purpose of the empire, which 
was to assimilate non-Russian people within its bureaucratic practices. At the same time, 
political elites encouraged the Russian subjects to take pride in the territorial vastness of 
empire and its ethnic and cultural diversity.76 This effort – namely, state patriotism – was 
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reinforced during the reign of Catherine the Great; particularly because the empire upheld 
the view that the territorial expansion of the state was indeed a process of “the gathering 
of indigenous Russian lands.”77 However, Vera Tolz remarks that the “territorial 
nationalism” that envisioned the entire empire as a Russian nation-state had meant little 
for the ordinary people by the time of the Bolshevik revolution.78 
Nicholas I retained the policy of his predecessors to build a unitary state within newly 
annexed lands. Most importantly, Nicholas’ “official nationality policy” espoused a new 
vision of nationhood through the identification with Orthodoxy and Monarchy. As 
Ronald Sunny points out, Russian political elite and intellectuals failed to mold a notion 
of Russianness, distinct from both the ethnicity and the imperial state.79 Instead, the 
“official nationality policy” conflated Russian nation and state into one.  Thus, “[n]otions 
of nation dissolved into religion and the state, and did not take on a powerful presence as 
a community separate from the state or the orthodox community.”80 In the following 
decades this policy was combined with the cultural Russification of non-Russian subjects 
for the purpose of preserving the unity of the empire, which eventually precipitated 
nationalist awakening among them.81  
In most respects, it is this rising nationalism of non-Russian people within the empire 
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century compelled Bolsheviks to 
formulate a nationality policy that would mitigate Russians’ past as the oppressor nation. 
Under the Soviet rule, “Russians, as ‘the former great power nationality,’ thus were to be 
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treated differently than the ‘formerly oppressed’ nationalities.”82 Consequently, Russian 
were denied nationhood privileges, which were guaranteed to other nationalities.83 
RSFSR encompassed only remaining territories after non-Russian republics were created. 
In many ways, its institutions were conflated with those of the Union. According to 
Martin, Stalin’s concern that a separate Russian republic may challenge the authority of 
All-Union institutions, was a major source of this policy.84 Thus, the RSFSR lacked its 
own Communist Party, Academy of Sciences, and KGB. However, Union institutions, in 
practice, were Russian institutions. As Alexander Motyl notes, “[t]he distribution of 
authority … has traditionally been … in the Russians’ favor, especially in central 
institutions such as the Politburo, the Secretariat, the Central Committee and its apparatus, 
ministries of all-Union importance, second secretaryship of republican parties.”85 
Similarly, although Russian culture was not celebrated in the wake of affirmative 
action policies as it represented the culture of an oppressor nation, its language remained 
the lingua franca of all-Union. Yet Soviet leadership began to reconcile with Russians as 
early as the 1930s, “both due to the unacceptably high levels of Russian resentment it [the 
affirmative action] had provoked and because it had failed to disarm ethnic conflict and 
non-Russian nationalism.”86 In the language of Slezkine, “the Party began to endow 
Russians with a national past, national language and an increasingly familiar 
iconography, headed principally by Alexander Pushkin – progressive and ‘freedom-
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loving’ to be sure, but clearly celebrated as a great Russian, not a great revolutionary.”87 
As Soviet historiography and textbooks rehabilitated Russian past, Soviet culture began 
to seem more Russian.88 Ultimately, the retrieve of Russian culture on one hand, and 
institutional overlap between RSFSR and all-Union on the other hand, promoted 
Russians’ identification with the entire Soviet Union. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, Soviet leaders also launched a campaign to espouse a 
notion of Soviet people united by Russian culture. While the Communist Party was 
seeking to “draw [nationalities] closer” to endorse the “merger of nationalities” of the 
Soviet Union, Russian and non-Russian cultural elites were not enchanted with the idea 
of Soviet people.89 As for Russians, Yitzhak Brundy remarks, the notion of Soviet people 
“was too abstract and too unrelated to their own life experiences. It glorified 
modernization while ignoring the problems that accompanied the transition from a rural 
way of life to that of an urban, industrial society.”90 Additionally, with the de-
Stalinization process, various notions of Russian nationalism rejuvenated among 
intellectuals. The growing group of Russian nationalists opposed the concept of Soviet 
people and above all the regime in many ways. In particular, Russian nationalists argued 
that the Soviet economic modernization was attained at the expense of the Russians and 
Sovietization was downgrading Russian culture.91 By contrast, Motyl’s research indicates 
that Russians had the larger share of ethnic resources within the Soviet Union – including 
“demographic size, economic modernization (size of working class), social development 
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(number of urban dwellers), cultural vitality (number of scientific works as a substitute 
for size of intelligentsia), communication capacity (number of books published), and 
organization capacity (number of sociopolitical activists or organizations).”92 As Motyl 
puts it, “the Russians [were] hegemonic societally.”93  
  Earlier Russian nationalism nonetheless remained confined to elite circles and 
resonated little with mass’ experiences. Indeed, surveys – conducted in the late 1970s and 
the early 1980s – indicated that the majority of Russians viewed the entire Soviet Union 
as their own homeland.94 However, the political and economic circumstances 
significantly changed by the late 1980s. Russians began to harbor doubts about the 
wisdom of preserving a multinational state. The self-image of Russians bearing the 
economic burden of the Union, along with the rising unrest of non-Russians, set Russian 
history in a distinct path. Thus, in the words of Zaslavsky, “for the first time, the Russian 
popular response to the growing assertiveness of non-Russians did not favor imperialism 
and chauvinism but rather the emergence of a genuine Russian nationalism that aspired 
the creation of a national Russian state.”95  
In this respect, Boris Yeltsin and his allies placed the demand for Russian sovereignty 
in the center of their political agenda, while negotiating with Gorbachev and the Soviet 
administration in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At the same time, the creation of 
Russia’s Congress of People’s Deputies, along with Yeltsin’s election as chairperson, 
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provided the Russian opposition with a platform to pursue their demand for national 
sovereignty. It is also worthy to note that democrats made up only one fifth of the 
Congress, which had overall 1500 members. The equal number of the deputies were 
communists and nationalists, while the rest gravitated towards the left of the political 
spectrum over time.96 
 Subsequently, Russian deputies voted in favor of making Russian Federation a 
sovereign state on July 1990. In response to the growing calls for independence in Russia 
and other Soviet states, Gorbachev called for a referendum to save the Union from 
dissolution. In March 1991, 71 percent of RSFSR population indeed agreed to preserve 
the Soviet Union, while 26 percent opposed it. The Russian referendum also included a 
question about the formation of the presidential office, which majority of the voters 
supported. In the words of Michael McFaul, “the mixed result of the March 1991 
referenda allowed both sides to claim victory but also underscored the fact that neither 
side had an overwhelming popular mandate.”97 Thus, Gorbachev and Yeltsin, along with 
other leaders, returned to negotiate a deal which envisaged ultimately broader sovereignty 
for republics. At the same time, Yeltsin became the first president of Russia in June 1991 
by receiving around 58 percent of the popular vote. In the end, the August 1991 putsch 
staged by the Soviet hard-liners changed the course of the Soviet history irrevocably, 
ceasing the plans for preserving the Union in any other form. Meanwhile, Yeltsin’s 
resistance efforts against the putschist gained him further popularity in Russia. In 
December 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved and Russia became an independent state.  
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Ukrainians and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) 
As has been noted by Andrew Wilson, “the … borders of the independent Ukrainian state, 
inherited from the Ukrainian SSR as defined by Stalin’s wartime conquests, corresponded 
more closely to Ukrainian ethno – linguistic territory than at any time in the modern 
era.”98 In fact, until after the Second World War, when the western territories of Ukraine 
were entirely incorporated into the Soviet Union, Ukrainian lands were mostly divided 
and under the rule of different empires and later states. An independent Ukraine briefly 
existed only after the mid-1600s and during and after the First World War.99 
The territories of Ukraine first partitioned on the eve of the Mongol invasion (1240) 
and then under the weakened Cossacks rule (1667), later in the late eighteenth century, 
and finally in 1920-21 after the Civil War.100 Thus, Ukraine’s western territories, Galicia, 
Transcarpathia and Bukovyna, remained under the Habsburg rule over a century. After 
the demise of Habsburg Empire in the First World War, Galicia, Transcarpathia and 
Bukovyna were subsumed into Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, respectively.  
At the same time, the Russian Empire gained the control of Ukrainian territories of 
the Right Bank of the Dnieper River and Volhynia following the partitions of Poland in 
the second half of the eighteenth century. While the Right Bank remained successively 
under the rule of Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, Volhynia was seized by Poland 
in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution. Along with the territories of Galicia, 
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Transcarpathia and Bukovyna, Volhynia was incorporated into the Soviet Union 
throughout the Second World War.  
However, the Left Bank of the Dnieper River was absorbed into the Russian Empire 
from the mid-seventeenth century onwards, and next became a part of the Soviet Union 
in 1922. Similarly, the southern territories of Ukraine came steadily under the rule of 
Russian Empire since the late eighteenth century, while the Ottoman Empire was losing 
its control across the Black Sea. The region also saw rapid industrialization and migration 
in the nineteenth century under the Russian rule.101 
Most critically, the divergent historical paths of the Ukrainian territories had a major 
impact on the development of the national consciousness. In many ways, the Ukrainian 
territories under the Habsburg rule were better situated to preserve a distinct sense of 
identity. First, as Keith Darden and Anna M. Grzymala-Busse highlight, promotion of the 
mass schooling by the Austrian rule significantly contributed to raising national 
awareness in Galicia. Since the Habsburg Empire endorsed a separate sense of Ukrainian 
identity in Galicia to counterweight Poles and Russians, its curriculum “had national 
content and stressed the cultivation of distinct identities.”102 Second, the Austrian rule 
granted equal status to the Uniate Church (in other words, Ukrainian Greek Catholic 
Church) with the Roman Catholic Church. This, in the words of Wilson, provided “the 
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best means of preserving ... [Ukrainian/Ruthenian identity] from out-right 
Polonisation.”103 Arguably most importantly, the territories under the Habsburg rule, 
particularly in Galicia and Transcarpathia, were able to experience with elections, which 
in turn arouse Ukrainians’ ethnic consciousness.104 Ukrainians living in the western 
territories under the different states also continued to participate in elections during the 
interwar period. After all, these experiences of Ukrainian people were instrumental in the 
preservation of their identity and in the emergence of national-minded clergy and 
intellectuals under the Habsburg empire.105   
On the contrary, even when the Russian Empire endorsed literacy in the Ukrainian 
territories, the language of the curriculum was Russian, and the content was drawn upon 
the unity of Orthodox and Rus.106 Moreover, the use of Ukrainian language in public was 
restricted in the late nineteenth century over the territories under the Russian rule.107 At 
the same time, as has been noted earlier, the beginning of industrialization had a profound 
impact on the composition of the population in the eastern and southern territories of 
Ukraine. Industrialization brought large numbers of Russians in, but did not affect so 
much Ukrainians. Therefore, the cities increasingly became populated by Russians – and 
thus, Russified, – while the land remained Ukrainian.108 Indeed, Ukrainian peasants did 
not migrate into the urban industrial areas until the 1920s and 1930s.109 
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As a result of these experiences, Ukrainian population under the Russian Empire 
developed relatively late and weaker sense of ethnic identity in comparison to western 
Ukrainians. However, Sarah Birch indicates that by the time the Duma elections were 
held in 1917, “the process of political mobilization had advanced and ethnic Ukrainians 
had begun to articulate demands for regional autonomy.”110   
In this vein, the creation of the Ukrainian SSR in the early 1920s provided a vent for 
reconciliation of national sentiments. Although Soviet federalism did not in practice mean 
administrative decentralization – as laid out above, – Wilson remarks that “the 
territorialisation of Ukraine in the Ukrainian SSR, the existence of a Ukrainian 
‘parliament,’ a Ukrainian cabinet of ministers, a Ukrainian version of the Soviet flag, 
even a separate Ukrainian membership of the United Nations, all provided important 
consolidation points for Ukrainian national identity.”111 
At the same time, the policy of korenizatsiia promoted the development of native 
cadres, and endorsed the Ukrainian language as well as its culture to achieve a dominant 
role in the republic. Thus, the party required the use of the Ukrainian language in the 
primary education and cultural institutions. It also expanded the linguistic Ukrainization 
to publishing, higher education, government bureaucracy, and economic institutions into 
the 1920s. Yet Martin notes that this policy, although it was generally backed by 
Ukrainians, was resisted by groups including Russian-speaking urban workers, Russians, 
Russified Ukrainians, government bureaucrats, and industrial managers.112 Above all, the 
growing concern of Stalin that korenizatsiia was provoking Ukrainian nationalism was 
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the major source of its abrupt end by the early 1930s. The mass revolts of Ukrainian 
peasants about collectivization also contributed to this outcome. Ultimately, the end of 
korenizatsiia entailed purges of large numbers of Ukrainian nationalists and intellectuals 
throughout the 1930s. 
On the other hand, the Ukrainian territories that were dispersed among Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Romania had a comparatively lenient situation for the organic 
development of Ukranian civil society and national identity. Indeed, Galicia under Polish 
rule was hotbed of Ukrainian nationalism in the interwar period. By the early 1930s, the 
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the largest ultra-nationalist group, was 
founded. In the words of Per Anders Rudling, “explicitly totalitarian, the movement 
embraced the Fuhrerprinzip, a cult of political violence, racism, and aggressive-anti 
Semitism.”113 In 1940, the organization split into two factions. While the relatively 
moderate nationalists led by Andrii Mel’nik formed the OUN-m, the radical nationalists 
under the leadership of Stepan Bandera created the OUN-b. During the Second World 
War, these movements supported the merging of dispersed armed groups into the 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Most importantly, the collaboration of the OUN and 
the UPA with Nazi Germany – and also,  fighting the Soviet army – for the purpose of 
the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state is one of the most controversial and 
divisive elements in the history of Ukraine.114 Ultimately, the incorporation of the western 
territories of Ukraine into the Soviet Union and the subsequent repression on the one 
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hand, and the internal disputes on the other hand, considerably weakened the OUN and 
the UPA by the mid-1950s.115 
While all the historic Ukrainian territories were united for the first time in centuries 
under the Stalinist rule, modern boundaries of Ukraine were finalized with the transfer of 
Crimea in 1954.  However, the distinct cultural development of Ukrainian territories 
continued to reflect their historical paths. By the late 1980s, 47.5 percent of pupils studied 
in Ukrainian language schools and 47 percent in the Russian language schools. In Galicia 
90 percent of the schools offered education in Ukrainian language while in Donbas this 
number was less than 10 percent and in Crimea near zero.116 Similarly, the 1960s dissident 
movement rooted in L’viv, although its center was in Kyiv in the late Soviet period; there 
were only a small number of dissidents in the urban cities of the southern and eastern 
Ukraine. While the dissident movement in the 1960s focused on economic well-being 
and cultural rights of the Ukrainians, the waves of repression over three decades plagued 
its activism.117  
More importantly, when the Popular Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) came about after 
Gorbachev’s reforms, it galvanized support largely in the western territories. Even when 
Rukh organized a human chain – up to a million people – as a symbol of national unity 
in the early days of 1990, it stretched from Kyiv to L’viv – but not further. In a similar 
vein, Rukh gained most of its 108 seats with votes mainly from the west of Ukraine – it 
swept almost all the seats in Galicia, performed well in Volhynia, Kyiv, and several urban 
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cities of central Ukraine, but had few seats in southern and eastern Ukraine – in the 
elections of March 1990 to Supreme Soviet. On the other hand, many Ukrainians 
continued to widely support the Communists. Of 450 seats in the parliament, 385 were 
won by the Communist Party. This number later came down to 238 because of defections. 
118      
With the secessionist demands of the Baltic States and Russia’s declaration of 
sovereignty, Rukh was noneteless able to openly call for Ukrainian independence in 1990. 
Yet 70.5 percent of Ukrainians agreed to the preservation of the Soviet Union as “a 
renewed federation of equal sovereign republics” in the Soviet referendum of March 
1991. The support for the Union was particularly strong in the east and south of 
Ukraine.119 By the end of 1991, a marked shift in the attitude of the population residing 
in these territories came about. Consequently, Ukrainian voters in the east and south 
showed high support for independence in the national referendum on December 1, 1991. 
After all, above 90 percent of the population voted for “yes,” and thus Ukraine declared 
independence.120 But, the split in national identity continued to manifest itself in post-
Soviet Ukrainian politics.                  
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CHAPTER III: POST-SOVIET TRANSITION IN RUSSIA (1992-1999):  
THE RISE AND SURVIVAL OF AUTHORITARIANISM                         
 
After the defeat of the putschists in August 1991, Yeltsin became the leader of new 
Russia. Broad support of the people and the Congress provided Yeltsin as “a liberal and 
democrat”1 with a historical opportunity to lead Russia’s transformation from the Soviet 
Union.2 Notwithstanding this, “the revolution was remarkable for its self-restrained.”3 
First, the Congress members who were elected at the time of the Soviet Union remained 
to rule the country by the end of 1993. Second, Yeltsin and the legislative branch 
relegated the making of the constitution to second place. The lack of the rules designing 
the distribution of powers between the president and the legislative branch precipitated 
acute political crisis in the early years of the Russian Federation.    
After Yeltsin forcibly dissolved the Congress and gained broad executive power at 
the expense of the Russian parliament in a referendum marred with irregularities, Russia 
derailed from the path of democratic development. In solidifying his authoritarian rule, 
Yeltsin relied on his associates from Sverdlovsk, where he was the first secretary of the 
Communist Party in 1976-1985,4 and competing power groups instead of surrendering 
himself with a political party. While the president rewarded loyalty of his associates, he 
also did not shy away from playing his subordinates off against each other. In the second 
half of the 1990s, Russia’s new group of businessmen rose to prominence in Yeltsin’s 
camp. The group provided extensive financial assistance and media resources to Yeltsin 
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in the 1996 presidential elections, in return for larger gains in privatization deals. After 
defeating the Communist leader Gennadii Ziuganov in the presidential race, Yeltsin 
continued to meet serious challenges in the Duma. At the same time, Yeltsin’s former 
associates formed a broad political alliance to oppose the Kremlin. Despite the growing 
resistance to his rule, Yeltsin eventually succeeded in installing his chosen successor 
Vladimir Putin. 
Nevertheless, Yeltsin confronted substantial challenges in his efforts to ingrain an 
authoritarian rule throughout the 1990s. Although the president possessed some 
advantages, Russian opposition forces mounted serious threats to his rule. Unlike their 
counterparts in Ukraine, Russian opposition forces eventually failed to remove the 
authoritarian rule. Then, what explains Yeltsin’s ability to maintain his authoritarian rule 
in the face of serious crisis? This part of the study suggests that Yeltsin was able to stay 
in office and eventually transfer his powers to Putin because Russian opposition forces 
either lacked the broad resources to compete with the Kremlin or failed to frame its 
struggle against the regime in national terms. Ultimately, the Russian opposition forces 
were not able to simultaneously raise sufficient public support and broad financial 
resources to defeat the regime, despite Yeltsin’s declining popularity and his inability to 
cultivate a national idea distinct from the Soviet past.   
The rest of this chapter provides a detailed explanation of Russia’s post-communist 
transition under the Yeltsin rule in 1992-2000. At first, it traces the sources of political 
confrontation, which eventually led to the unlawful dissolution of the Congress, between 
Yeltsin and Russian deputies. Next, it analyzes the ways in which Yeltsin ingrained his 
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authoritarianism in Russia and the reasons for opposition forces’ inability to oust the 
incumbent regime in the 1990s.  
 
Russia’s Transition to Uncertainty under Yeltsin in 1992-1994 
After the political victory against the August putschists, Soviet institutions were 
peacefully liquidated in Russia. Yeltsin and the reformist camp received broad support 
from the people and the Congress to carry out the necessary political and economic 
reforms in transition from the Soviet system. In the aftermath of the August putsch, the 
legislature – which the law designated as the supreme authority of the Russian Federation 
–  granted Yeltsin the power to lead the reform process by decree for one year.5  
While Yeltsin decided not to undertake a large-scale revamp of institutions 
immediately, he directed his early efforts to rescue the Russian economy. In October 
1991, Yeltsin and his advisers drafted an economic program which envisioned price 
liberalization, privatization, and stabilization.6 Given the dramatic decline in Russia’s 
national income and production,7 the Congress overwhelmingly supported the proposed 
program of economic reform, with 876 to 16 votes in favor.8 Yeltsin formed a new 
government and appointed Yegor Gaidar as deputy prime minister to lead the Russia’s 
transition to market economy. In November 1991, the Russian government took full 
control of all the economic institutions and natural resources on its territory.9 This was 
followed by price liberalization and privatization in 1992. 
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9 Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, p. 290. 
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With the beginning of the economic policies of shock therapy, the government swiftly 
lost the support of the legislative branch. In the ensuing months, many deputies, who were 
able to preserve their seats after Yeltsin decided not to hold a new parliamentary election, 
strongly opposed the measures presented by Gaidar and his team. These deputies instead 
called for “socially oriented market reforms.” The disagreement about the economic 
policies further intensified by the lack of rules defining the authorities of the executive 
and legislative branches. In fact, a draft constitution written by democratic leader Oleg 
Rumiantsev was published in November 1990, with the endorsement of Yeltsin.10 
However, deputies put little effort to adopt it in the immediate post-Soviet era, arguably 
because it envisaged a strong presidency and called for the dissolution of the Congress. 
As a result, Yeltsin and his government faced increasing opposition from the legislature 
within months of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
In the beginning of 1992, Yeltsin’s presidency also began to meet challenges from 
public. While communists and nationalists held rallies initially to commemorate the 
Soviet Union on various occasions, these forces later came out to streets to protest 
Yeltsin’s reforms.11 In January and February, the number of opposition demonstrators 
ranged from 10,000 to 40,000.12 Several protests also witnessed clashes with the security 
forces throughout the year. Moreover, there had been varied attempts made to unify 
communists and national-patriots within a political platform. In February 1992, the 
Congress of Civil and Patriotic Forces was held in Moscow. While the Congress came to 
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little in the end, the participation of Vice President Alexandr Rutskoi revealed the 
growing disagreement within the Yeltsin administration.13 In October 1992, the National 
Salvation Front was formed by communists, nationalists, and parliamentarians – some of 
whom were earlier Yeltsin’s allies. The members of the Front were unified in their refusal 
of Yeltsin’s presidency and his economic policies. In response to growing opposition 
from communists and national-patriots, Yeltsin issued a decree to “crack down all 
extremist groups that aim to destabilize the country.”14 However, the Front maintained 
its political activities after Yeltsin’s decree, which “expos[ed] the weakness of the 
Russian president”15 to repress the opposition groups.  
After all, the most serious challenges Yeltsin and his administration met in 1992-93 
sprang from the parliament. As noted earlier, the disagreement about the direction of 
economic policies, combined with elusive institutional boundaries between the 
presidency and the parliament, proved to be the main sources of contention in Russia’s 
political scene. By the time of the Sixth Congress of People’s Deputies in April 1992, the 
division between the Yeltsin administration and the legislature grew stronger. The 
speaker of the Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov, “encouraged deputies to exercise 
control over the actions of the government.”16 At the same time, the Vice President 
Rutskoi publicly opposed the economic policies of shock therapy. These two politicians 
were joined by communists and nationalists in the legislature. As a result of growing 
opposition to the government and Gaidar’s reform, Yeltsin made concessions to the 
parliament by changing the composition of the government. While the Yeltsin 
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government succeeded in staying in power in the Sixth Congress, the parliament 
continued to resist Gaidar’s program. When Yeltsin appointed Viktor Chernomyrdin, the 
former head of Gazprom, as prime minister at the Seventh Congress in December 1992, 
Gaidar exited from the government, which delivered a major blow to Russia’s shock 
therapy.17 In his search for new allies, Yeltsin also came closer to the centrist Civic Union, 
composed of industrialists and state enterprise managers.18  
In this respect, the immediate post-Soviet era reveals that the Russian legislature was 
able to form a meaningful opposition to the regime and force Yeltsin to make concessions, 
despite the fact that the distribution of powers greatly favored the president. Ultimately, 
many deputies came to agree that Yeltsin’s executive powers should be curbed to elevate 
the legislative branch. With the initiation of 290 deputies closely linked to the National 
Salvation Front and the endorsement of Khasbulatov, the Congress passed several 
amendments to the constitution in December 1992.19 These amendments revoked the 
presidential rule in favor of the parliamentary system. As a response, Yeltsin threatened 
to call for a national referendum to decide whether the president or the Congress should 
have the power to lead the country. With the mediation of the head of the Constitutional 
Court, Valerii Zorkin, Yeltsin and Khasbulatov eventually agreed to hold a national 
referendum in April 1993 on the division of powers between the president and the 
legislature and to halt the changes to the constitution made at the Seventh Congress.20  
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Nonetheless, the compromise reached between Yeltsin and Khasbulatov did not last 
long, as the two leaders and their supporters failed to agree on the referendum questions. 
Subsequently, the Congress at its Eight Assembly in March 1993 voted in favor for 
revoking Yeltsin’s right to rule by decree, making the government accountable to the 
legislature, and giving the government the right to introduce legislation.21 Yeltsin reacted 
to these resolutions by announcing his decision to bypass the parliament and impose a 
state of emergency in the country. However, Yeltsin’s decision to impose special rule was 
even opposed by his own allies, including the head of the Security Council, Yurii 
Skokov,22 and Zorkin, along with the Vice President Rutskoi.23 At the same time, the 
Congress called for a vote on the impeachment of Yeltsin. Yet xparliamentary opposition 
fell 72 votes short to remove the president. In the end, Yeltsin and the Congress agreed 
to hold a nation-wide referendum in April. 
The upcoming referendum consisted of questions about people’s confidence in 
Yeltsin’s presidency and his economic policies, along with their opinions about holding 
earlier elections for the presidency and the parliament. On April 25, 1993, 64 percent of 
Russia’s 107.3 million adult population went to the polls. The referendum results24 
revealed that 58.7 percent of voters had confidence in Yeltsin’s presidency, while 39.2 
percent did not. Additionally, 53 percent expressed their support for Yeltsin’s socio-
economic polices and 44.6 percent disagreed. At the same time, 49.5 percent of voters 
were in favor of early presidential elections and 67.2 percent supported early 
parliamentary elections. Thus, Yeltsin gained a narrow victory in the referendum, as 
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majority of people remained in favor of his presidency and economic policies. Given that 
Russian people experienced sharp drop in incomes, dramatic rise in prices, and steep 
inflation in the last years, people’s support for Yeltsin’s market reforms were instead 
unexpected.25 However, it is worthy to note that a large share of voters also disapproved 
Yeltsin’s socio-economic policies and backed the early presidential elections. The 
referendum results were even more alarming for the Congress, as many people seemed 
disappointed with the then Congress. 
While considering the April referendum “a clear sign of [people’s] support”26 for 
himself, Yeltsin made swift efforts for drafting a new constitution. A Constitutional 
Commission was organized to lead the efforts for making the constitution in June 1993, 
comprising both the president’s supporters and opponents. Soon however, Khasbulatov 
and Rutskoi, along with opposition representatives, left the Commission in protest. The 
legislature continued to carry out its own constitutional draft. Meanwhile, Yeltsin’s ally 
Civic Union failed to wield an influence in the unfolding political crisis. Thus, the 
Supreme Soviet approved a draft law, which “would make it virtually impossible for the 
president to ratify his constitution without the legislature’s approval” in July.27  As it did 
before the April referendum, the lack of agreement about the rules of amending (and 
making) the constitution between Russia’s leaders dragged the country deeper into 
political crisis.  
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By the beginning of September, Yeltsin came to view that “Russia simply could not 
go on with a parliament like this one.”28 To set in motion his plan to dissolve the 
parliament, Yeltsin summoned his Defense Minister, Pavel Grachev, Interior Minister, 
Victor Yerin, Acting Security Minister, Nikolai Golushko, and Foreign Minister, Andrei 
Kozurev in a dacha nearby Moscow on September 12. After receiving their support, 
Yeltsin decided to disband the parliament on September 19.29 At the time of the 
declaration, a military unit was also planned to occupy the White House where the 
parliament was located. In the next days, Yeltsin made efforts to coordinate the action 
with different political figures. However, the information of Yeltsin’s draft decree on the 
dissolution of the parliament was leaked to the opposition. As Khasbulatov and Rustkoi 
stayed in the White House to resist any potential occupation, Yeltsin had to postpone his 
plans.30 
In turn, the Congressional leaders appeared to believe that they may be able to draw 
significant support from the Russian people in a potential confrontation with the 
president. A public opinion poll conducted at the time showed that Yeltsin’s approval 
ratings dramatically declined from 35 percent in June to 24 percent in August. 
Conversely, Rutskoi scored 27 percent approval rating and came ahead of Yeltsin in the 
poll.31 In addition, the opposition leaders sought to galvanize support from the regional 
and local representatives against Yeltsin’s potential act to dissolve the legislature. The 
Federation Council – which was formed a while ago as a result of the president’s efforts 
and comprised the representatives of Russia’s regions – had already revealed itself to be 
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reluctant to promote Yeltsin’s constitution.32 This arguably made the opposition forces to 
believe that they were backed by a sizable number of regional leaders. Lastly, Rutskoi’s 
military past and his continuing communication with the army raised the hopes for 
military support in a potential confrontation with the Yeltin’s rule.33 
On September 21, 1993, Yeltsin finally issued the Decree 1400 which dissolved the 
Congress, suspended the Constitution, and called for parliamentary elections in 
December.34 The parliamentary opposition denounced Yeltsin’s decree as “a coup d’etat 
in its purest form.”35 The Constitutional Court agreed with the opposition forces in the 
parliament by declaring the decree as unconstitutional.36 The speaker of the Supreme 
Soviet, Khasbulatov, called for an emergency session.37 Legislators passed a vote to 
release Yeltsin from his duties and to install Rutskoi as acting president.38 Over the next 
days, communists and nationalists began to gather in front of the White House, while 
deputies remained inside to defend the building. The opposition leaders also delivered 
arms to crowds surrounding the White House. In turn, Yeltsin cut off all lines of 
communication to the building to hamper the opposition leaders’ attempts to galvanize 
further support. Moreover, the president used his control over media to diminish the 
coverage of parliamentary opposition and legitimize his decision for disbanding the 
Congress. The state TV stations – Channel 1 and 2 – provided only minor (and biased) 
coverage from the parliament and their directors stated their support for Yeltsin.39 
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Simultaneously, the parliament’s media outlets – including Rossiskaia Gazeta – were 
forced to close down.40 Yeltsin also commanded security forces to guard the Ostankino 
television tower from the potential attacks of the opposition.41 
While the police forces under the Interior Minister imposed a stronger blockade of 
the parliament as of September 24, the Yeltsin government did not immediately stormed 
into the White House. Meanwhile, a few generals joined the opposition leaders. Tension 
between the Yeltsin government and the parliament turned into violent conflict on 
October 3, when the opposition supporters attacked the mayor’s office next to the White 
House. The fact that the police blockade rapidly fell apart emboldened the opposition 
forces. In response, Yeltsin declared a state of emergency and ordered the security forces 
to take necessary steps to reestablished the order in Moscow.42 Yet the armed opposition 
supporters were also able to take over the Ostankino tower and shut down the Channel 1 
on the same day. 
Yeltsin’s account of this period also reveals that the army was not enthusiastic to act 
against the parliament.43 At first, the elite units, Alpha and Vympel, resisted to involve in 
the operation to the White House. With great efforts of the director of the security service 
of the Kremlin, Mikhail Barsukov, and the head of the presidential security, Alexander 
Korzhakov – both men were former KGB (Soviet secret police) officers, – some members 
of the units initially agreed to move nearer to the White House. Next, Defense Minister 
Grachev was also reluctant to send the troops to the parliament.44 Although Grachev 
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ensured Yeltsin several times that the army was moving toward the city, troops stood 
beyond the Moscow Ring Road – edge of the city border. In the words of Yeltsin, “the 
army, numbering two and a half million people, could not produce even a thousand 
soldiers; not even one regiment could be found to come to Moscow and defend the city.”45 
Only after he gave a written order, Grachev agreed to seize the parliaments with the tanks.  
On October 4, the army began to shell the White House. Soon afterwards, it became 
clear that the opposition leaders lacked sufficient power to defend the parliament. In other 
words, parliamentary opposition’s inability to frame its struggle in national terms resulted 
in the failure of galvanizing broad support for its cause, although it was backed by 
committed activists from communist and national-patriotic groups. At the same time, 
Yeltsin’s control over media deprived his opponents of resources to communicate its 
potential message with the masses. After all, majority of Muscovites remained in favor 
of Yeltsin, as they did in the April referendum. According to the Public Opinion 
Foundation46 survey which was conducted with one thousand-six hundred Muscovites on 
the same day of the military operation, 72 percent of respondents expressed that they 
supported Yeltsin, while only 9 percent were on the side of the parliament. When asked 
about who was guilty of the bloodshed in the city a few days later, 40 percent of 
Muscovites listed Rutskoi and Khasbulatov while only 8 percent indicated Yeltsin. At the 
same time, 40 percent of respondents stated that all of them were equally responsible for 
the violence. Similarly, 38 percent of the Russian population who participated in the 
survey viewed the opposition leaders responsible for the events of October 3-4, while 
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only 12 percent pointed to Yeltsin and his allies. Additionally, 10 percent stated that 
paramilitary groups were the main reason behind the violence in Moscow and 33 percent 
found all parties equally responsible for the conflict. 
While the opposition movement failed to appeal to the majority of Russians, regional 
bosses and local representatives also did not give substantial support to the Congress. 
Despite the repeated calls of Khasbulatov and Rutskoi, only a few regional leaders turned 
against Yeltsin. In addition to their inability to raise further support, Yeltsin’s opponents 
began to lose allies as events unfolded. In the beginning of October, leaders of the 
Communist Party47 decided not to join street protests, “because these popular acts had 
become increasingly inflammatory and confrontational.”48 With the Communist Party’s 
supporters retreating from streets and the protests’ failure to gain further support, the 
opposition leaders’ potential to defend the White House undeniably weakened. 
In the end, Yeltsin was able to crack down on the parliament. On October 4, 1993, 
Khasbulatov and Rutskoi were arrested and put behind the bars. Simultaneously, the 
National Salvation Front and other movements which supported the parliament were 
banned.49 The newspapers of communists and nationalist-patriots were also forced to shut 
down.50 Immediately after, Yeltsin scheduled elections both for a new constitution and a 
legislative branch.  
In the absence of any meaningful opposition, Yeltsin and his allies were able to 
exclusively define the new rules of the political game in Russia. Therefore, the draft of 
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the new constitution reflected Yeltsin’s victory over the parliament. The executive-
legislative arrangements made in the constitution culminated a super-presidential 
system.51 The new constitution gave the president the power to appoint the prime 
minister, while the Duma – the lower house of the new legislative branch which consisted 
of 450 delegates – approved the president’s nomination. In the case that the Duma 
disapproved three nominations that the president made, the latter could dissolve the 
parliament and call for early elections. Furthermore, the prime minister was given the 
power to appoint his cabinet without the approval of the Duma. Since the prime minister 
had been appointed and dismissed by the president, the executive branch came under 
strict control of the president. Next, the draft made the impeachment of the president 
almost impossible, while the president’s power to dissolve the parliament was 
maintained. In addition to regulating relations between the government and the Duma, 
the constitutional draft also envisaged the creation of the Federation Council – the upper 
house of the legislative branch. The Council consisted of 178 representatives, two 
members elected from each Russia’s regions. 
The constitutional referendum and the legislative elections were held together on 
December 12, 1993. According to the official results, more than 53 percent of Russia’s 
adult population participated in the elections. Around 60 percent of the participants voted 
in favor of the new constitution. However, there had been evidence of fraud in the 
referendum. Although the authorities claimed that 56 percent of the electorate 
participated in the referendum, the voter turnout was less than 50 percent required for the 
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validation of the proposed draft.52 Also, the Yeltsin regime reportedly skewed media 
coverage in the run-up to referendum and put pressure on state employees to approve the 
constitution.53  
In the parliamentary elections, pro-presidential political parties underperformed. 
Despite enjoying broad access to financial resources and state TV channels, Russia’s 
Choice headed by Gaidar won only 16 percent of the parliamentary seats.54 Similarly, the 
Russian Unity and Concord, which was composed of several ministers and politicians in 
the Kremlin and was backed by Chernomyrdin, gained just over 4 percent of the 
parliamentary seats. Conversely, two opposition parties – nationalist Vladimir 
Zhirinovskii’s Liberal Democrat Party of Russia (LDPR) and Ziuganov’s Communist 
Party – received 25 percent of the seats in the parliamentary elections. By adhering to 
“the restoration of the Russian state ‘within the borders of the former USSR’”55 and 
resisting the broad privatization, Zhirinovskii’s party gained 14 percent of the Duma 
seats. Ziuganov run an election platform on opposition to Yeltsin’s political and economic 
stance, combined with Russian nationalism and anti-Westernism.56 This gained the 
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  Table 3.1   Russian Parliamentary Elections, December 12, 1993 
 Votes, % 
 
 Seats Share of Seats, % 
 List SMD  List SMD  
Valid Votes 50.6 50.6     
Invalid Votes 3.7 4     
Total Votes (% of electorate) 54.3 54.6     
Russia’s Choice 14.5 6.3  40 30 15.6 
Liberal Democratic Party 21.4 2.7  59 5 14.3 
Communist Party 11.6 3.2  32 16 10.7 
Women of Russia 7.6 0.5  21 2 5.1 
Agrarian Party of Russia 7.4 5  21 12 7.3 
Yabloko 7.3 3.2  20 3 5.1 
Russian Unity and Concord 6.3 2.5  18 1 4.2 
Democratic Party of Russia 5.1 1.9  14 1 3.3 
Others 8.2 6.6  0 8 1.7 
Independents – 45.2  – 146 32.5 
Against all 3.9 14.8  – – – 
Invalid Ballots 6.8 7.4     
Total 100 100  225 224 100 
In the 1993 elections, 225 deputies were elected from party lists according to the principle of proportional 
representation. Election threshold for political parties was set at 5 percent. The other 225 deputies were 
elected in single-mandate districts through first-past-the-post formula. The deputies were at this time 
elected to serve for two years.  




After December 1993, Yeltsin’s executive powers made the legislative branch seem 
insignificant in comparison. In most aspects, Russia’s strong presidentialism rooted in the 
balance of power already skewed in favor of the incumbent ruler with the successful 
crackdown on the parliament in October.57 To put succinctly, the Russian constitution 
and its super-presidential model was “a reflection of incumbent authority rather than a 
cause of it.”58 With the establishment of the strong presidency, the parliament became 
relatively less competitive – but still posed strong challenges –  in its relation to the 
executive branch in 1993-95. 
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Authoritarianism in Yeltsin’s Russia in 1994-1999   
From 1994 onwards, the Yeltsin administration itself witnessed increasing political 
struggle of various power networks seeking to strengthen their influence in Russia. Prime 
Minister Chernomyrdin and his allies, state enterprise managers, were one of the earliest 
groups involved in the power struggle. The managers controlling the largest industries in 
Russia aimed to increase their share in privatization deals by controlling the 
government.59 This group was challenged by the deputy prime minister, Oleg Soskovets, 
along with Yeltin’s security chief, Korzhakov, and the future director of the FSB,60 
Barsukov. Korzhakov and Barsukov possessed close ties with the army and security 
forces.61 Korzhakov also created a secretive and powerful presidential security service, 
which he led until 1996.62 With the assistance of Suskov, Korzhakov and Barsukov 
additionally acquired the ownership of various companies, and used the money they made 
to finance political activities.63  
 According to some accounts, the latter group played a key role in Yeltsin’s decision 
to wage a war in Chechnya.64 The Chechen republic pushed for its independence from 
Russia since 1991. Unlike many other Russian republics, Chechnia did not sit at the table 
to negotiate a deal with the central government. In December 1994, Yeltsin decided to 
send the army into Chechenia to restore the order.65 The war lasted eighteen months, and 
led to many military and civilian causalities. From the beginning, Yeltsin’s decision to 
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invade Chechnia proved to be unpopular. In a December 1995 poll, 65 percent of Russians 
disapproved the use of force in the Chechen republic, while only 20 percent approved.66 
A February 1995 poll revealed that people’s confidence on President Yeltsin significantly 
decreased. In comparison to the previous year, the share of respondents who expressed 
distrust on Yeltsin was found to have doubled.67  
At this time, the Communist Party sought to capitalize on public dissatisfaction with 
Yeltsin and his government. On June 21, 1995, communists attempted to start Yeltsin’s 
impeachment process, which failed to gather necessary support in the parliament. In spite 
of this, communists succeeded in passing a vote of no-confidence in the Chernomyrdin 
government a day later, with 241 to 70. The prime minister immediately called for a 
second vote. Yeltsin threatened to dissolve the Duma, if the deputies passed the second 
vote of confidence. In the end, Yeltsin agreed to dismiss a number of senior officials as a 
concession to the parliament. 
Yet Yeltsin could not rescue his allies from poor showing in the 1995 parliamentary 
elections, as he himself was highly unpopular in the eyes of the public. The president 
promoted the idea of creating two centrist political parties prior to the elections. In this 
way, Yeltsin aimed to “cut off both the left and right wings of extremists’ movement” 
entering the Duma.68 As a result, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin orchestrated a center-
right party, while the speaker of the parliament, Ivan Rubkin, created a center-left party. 
Although Chernomyrdin’s Our Home is Russia possessed extensive media and financial 
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resources,69 the party gained only 12 percent of the votes. The Rubkin Bloc failed to pass 
the 5 percent threshold in the proportional part of the election. Conversely, the 
Communist Party came first in both proportional representation and single mandate 
districts. Communists gained 35 percent of seats in the Duma. The other opposition party, 
LDPR, won 11 percent of the parliamentary seats.   
 
  Table 3.2   Russian Parliamentary Elections, December 17, 1995 
 Votes, % 
 
 Seats Share of 
Seats, % 
 List SMD  List SMD  
Valid Votes 64.4 62.9     
Invalid Votes 1.3 1.4     
Total Votes (% of 
electorate) 65.7 64.3     
Communist Party 22.3 12.6  99 58 34.9 
Liberal Democratic 
Party 11.2 5.4  50 1 11.3 
Our Home Is Russia 10.1 5.5  45 10 12.2 
Yabloko 6.9 3.2  31 14 10 
Others 44.9 30.1   –  65 13 
Independents – 31.2   – 77 17.1 
Against all 2.8 9.6   – – – 
Invalid Ballots 1.9 2.3     
Total 100 100  225 225 100 




The triumph of the Communist Party, and the poor showing of the pro-presidential 
parties, in the parliamentary elections raised a serious threat to the Yeltsin rule. The 
country’s economic troubles and the ongoing war in Chechenia also plagued the 
president’s popularity rating. An opinion poll found that only 8 percent of 1500 
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respondents backed Yeltsin’s potential presidential candidacy.70 All this nearly convinced 
Yeltsin to suspend the 1996 presidential elections in March.71 
The evolution of Yeltsin’s re-election campaign reflected the shifting balance of 
power among competing groups behind the scenes. With Chernomyrdin’s Our Home is 
Russia underperforming in the elections, the alliance of Soskovets, Korzhakov, and 
Barsukov rose to prominence in the Yeltsin administration. As a result, the group 
commanded the early efforts for Yeltsin’s election campaign. In their opinion, the path to 
victory was to strengthen Yeltsin’s image as a strong leader and to halt the unpopular 
economic reform policies.72 However, Soskovets and his allies soon became convinced 
that Yeltsin was not likely to win the elections. To avoid this outcome, the group 
recommended Yeltsin to cancel the presidential race. 
At this point, a different alliance began to wield influence within the Yeltsin camp. In 
the first half of the 1990s, privatization gave way to a new group of businessmen, which 
became known in Russia as oligarchs. The group, which was mainly comprised of 
bankers, feared that a potential communist victory would deliver a major blow to its 
interests. To ensure Yeltsin’s victory, oligarchs made an alliance with the reformers. In 
late 1995, a “loans-for-shares” privatization set into motion arguably to finance the 
Yeltsin campaign.73 This arrangement ultimately enabled oligarchs to gain the control of 
the shares in Russia’s key companies. In turn, the Yeltsin administration received large 
sums of money from the Russian businessmen. Soon thereafter, Anatolii Chubais –  who 
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was in charge of privatization until the beginning of 1996 – took command of Yeltsin’s 
re-election campaign. 
With this group displacing Soskovets and his allies, Yeltsin’s campaign message was 
considerably altered. In its efforts to counter communist leader Ziuganov’s national-
patriotic outlook, the campaign portrayed Yeltsin as “the guarantor of stability, 
continuity, and progress.”74 Yeltsin speeches emphasized the necessity of defending the 
country against a communist revanche.75 The campaign maintained that a potential return 
of communists would lead to “more hardship, greater uncertainty, and possibly even 
violent conflict.”76 Although Russia had suffered in many ways since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Yeltsin insisted that “the aim of reforms were right and needed no 
changes.”77 His presidency would ensure the stability and continuity of reforms, and thus 
improve the lives of Russians. Overall, Yeltsin’s campaign sought to strengthen the 
president’s image as “a guarantor of stability” and “a father figure … for the nation.”78 
However, Yeltsin’s message of stability remained unconvincing as long as the 
Chechen war did not end. A few months prior to the elections, Yeltsin launched a process 
of negotiation with the Chechen leaders by withdrawing the Russian army from the 
republic. Shortly after, the Russian government signed a treaty with the Chechen 
representatives to end the war.79 In the span of three months, media outlets, which earlier 
criticized the Kremlin policy over Chechnya, also shifted their coverage in favor of the 
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president.80 As a result, Yeltsin was able to broaden his appeal as candidate for stability 
by resolving the very unpopular war in Chechnya just days before the elections. 
Yeltsin had also access to mass resources necessary to promote his candidacy. As 
noted earlier, oligarchs provided substantial funding to Yeltsin’s reelection campaign 
after the loans-for-share privatization.81 Along with the oligarchs’ financial assistance, 
the president used his control over government spending to galvanize broad support in 
the elections.82 Yeltsin populism thus revealed itself “allocating benefits to particular 
geographic, social, or economic constituencies” in the months leading up to the 
elections.83 Next, the Yeltsin team’s domination of major media outlets played a key role 
in communicating the campaign message. Igor Malashenko, who was the director of NTV 
owned by oligarch Vladimir Gusinskii, coordinated Yeltsin’s media campaign. The two 
TV channels controlled by the state – Channel 1/ORT and RTR, – along with NTV 
allocated majority of election coverage to Yeltsin.84 These national TV stations also 
limited the access of other presidential candidates to airtime. Similarly, main national and 
regional newspapers backed the Yeltsin candidacy and provided anti-communist 
coverage.85 
In turn, Yeltsin’s main opponent, Ziuganov, possessed an ideological platform and 
well-established nation-wide party institution, which captured the largest share of 
parliamentary seats in the 1995 elections. Soon after becoming the presidential candidate 
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of the Communist Party, Ziuganov received the support of the Russian national-patriotic 
forces. Ziuganov’s campaign platform built upon the ideas of imperialism, nationalism, 
and patriotism.86 In Ziuganov’s view, Russia’s centuries long history and its geopolitical 
position gave birth to “a unique civilization” which manifested continually itself in the 
form of empire since the beginning.87 Therefore, Ziuganov stated, the empire “was the 
necessary form for the development of the Russian state.”88 According to Ziuganov, the 
last empire, Soviet Union, was destroyed by the Western powers – most importantly, by 
the United States – and the financial actors within the West organized internationally 
because they feared from potential.89 Eventually, their collaborators in the nation – 
Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and democrats – completed the mission of breaking the empire 
apart.90 Ziuganov called for the restoration of the state across the former Soviet territories 
in which ethnic Russians and their culture would possess the dominant position.91 His 
campaign slogan was Russia, Motherland, People. In the end, Ziuganov’s candidacy 
appealed to patriotic sentiments and made only rare references to the ideas of socialism 
and communism.92 
At the same time, Ziuganov had a mass party organization to endorse his candidacy 
across Russia. With “530,000 members in 20,000 party cells”93 in his hand, Ziuganov 
was able to “mobilize thousands of door-to-door ‘agitators.’”94 Given that the Ziuganov 
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team primarily relied on the print media to spread his message, the party organizations 
and its members played a key role in distributing millions of campaign materials in their 
localities.95 The organizational capacity was further boosted by the support of the national 
patriotic camp. This group effectively coordinated campaign activities with the 
communists. Its print media also actively promoted Ziuganov’s candidacy. In particular, 
Alexander Prokhanov and his newspaper Zavtra involved broadly in building the 
campaign messages and promoting them.96 Next, the Communist Party’s lead in the 
Duma enabled Ziuganov to utilize to some extent state resources for campaign purposes. 
The communist leader was thus able to hold campaign rallies extensively across Russia’s 
different regions. Lastly, Ziuganov’s campaign benefitted from the financial assistance 
of red directors across Russia’s territories, but this “was only a fraction of that pledged to 
the Yeltsin team.”97 In the end, the official campaign spending limit was approximately 
$3 million, while Yeltsin significantly exceeded the limit with some estimates of his 
spending ranging between $100 to $500 million.98  
On June 16, 1996, Russians went to polls to elect their president. Yeltsin came first 
in the elections by winning 35.8 percent of the national vote. Ziuganov placed closed 
second behind Yeltsin by receiving the support 32.5 percent of people participated in the 
elections. The former General Alexandr Lebed scored 14.7 percent of the votes, while 
democratic opposition figure Grigorii Yavlinskii gained the 7.4 percent of the electorate. 
The run-off between Yeltsin and Ziuganov was scheduled for July 3. 
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Despite the small margin between the two leaders, Yeltsin maintained an advantage 
as a result of a deal negotiated with Lebed prior to the elections. Lebed promised to 
endorse the Yeltsin candidacy in the second round of elections in exchange for a high-
ranking position in the government. Immediately after the first round of elections, Lebed 
was appointed as the head of the Security Council.99 While Lebed’s inclusion in his 
administration increased the possibility of gaining a victory, Yeltsin also put pressure on 
regional leaders who did not galvanize sufficient public support in between the two 
rounds of the elections.100 
However, Yeltsin’s efforts to win the upcoming election stumbled as a result of a 
power struggle within his own camp.101 A few days after the first round of the elections, 
Korzhakov and his allies orchestrated the arrest of the two associates of Yeltsin’s 
campaign manager, Chubais.  At the time of their arrest, Chubais’ associates were leaving 
a government office in the White House with half a million dollars. By revealing the 
corruption of the Chubais team, Korzhakov and his allies sought to regain their influence 
within the president’s camp. However, Yeltsin took the side of Chubais and ultimately 
fired Korzhakov, Barsukov, and Soskovets from his administration. 
Although this political incident produced a negative image of his administration, 
Yeltsin was able to gain a victory in the second round of the elections. While Yeltsin won 
54.4 percent of the votes, his opponent Ziuganov received the support of 40.7 percent of 
the people who participated in the elections. The residents of largest Russian cities, 
Moscow and St. Petersburg, overwhelmingly backed the Yeltsin presidency.102 Similarly, 
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the younger generation of voters – between the ages of 18 and 29 – gave strong support 
to Yeltsin.103 In turn, Ziuganov performed well across the regions of South-west and 
South-east which had become known as the red belt.104 In several Russian regions, 
Ziuganov eventually appeared to gather less votes in the second round of the elections 
than the previous round.105 In spite of the evidence of voter fraud in different regions, the 
Communist Party did not challenge the election outcomes. 
In sum, the 1996 presidential elections witnessed the only run-off in the history of 
post-Soviet Russia. The Communist leader Ziuganov’s appropriation of national-patriotic 
vision and his well-institutionalized political party enabled him to raise a serious threat 
to Yeltsin’s re-election. On the other hand, Yeltsin’s inability to cultivate a national 
identity in the post-Soviet era deprived him of significant source of popular support and 
his low popularity ratings nearly convinced him to cancel the elections. What appeared 
to enable Yeltsin to win the re-election was the broad financial and media resources 
provided by various oligarchs. These resources helped Yeltsin to re-cast his image as “a 
father figure to nation” and to recapitalize on the threat of communism with voters – 
although Ziuganov made only rare appearances to socialism and communism. As a result, 
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Table 3.3   Russian Presidential Election, 1996 
  First Round, June 16 Second Round, July 3 
Candidates Political Parties Vote % Number Vote % Number 
Boris Yeltsin Independent 35.8 26,665,495 54.4 40,203,948 
Gennadii Ziuganov Communist Party 32.5 24,211,686 40.7 30,102,288 
Alexander Lebed Congress of Russian Communities 14.7 10,974,736  –   –  
Grigorii Yavlinsky Yabloko 7.4 5,550,752  –   –  
Vladimir Zhirinovsky Liberal Democrat Party 5.8 4,311,479  –   –  
Six other candidates 
 
2.2 1,636,950  –   –  
Against all candidates 
 








1.4 1,072,120 1.1 780,592 
Total valid vote 
 
68.7 74,515,019 68.1 73,910,698 
Total  100  100  




The 1996 presidential elections marked the arrival of oligarchs in the state bureaucracy. 
Owing his electoral victory to a great extent to the financial and media resources provided 
by the oligarchs, Yeltsin distributed several influential government positions to his new 
allies. These oligarchs continued to actively run their businesses while serving in the 
government.106 Access to the government enabled the oligarchs to gain further privileges 
in the privatization of state assets. However, the oligarchs’ efforts to accumulate more 
wealth led to increasing competition for power within the Yeltsin administration.107 
While his allies got into a struggle for advancing their political and economic power, 
Yeltsin also continued to meet challenges from the Duma. Indeed, the president’s weak 
support base in the parliament forced him to make concessions to the opposition forces 
throughout his second term. When the Russian economy went into a free-fall in 1998 with 
the Asian financial crisis and the sharp drop in world oil prices, Yeltsin had to agree with 
the appointment of Foreign Minister, Yevgenii Primakov, who was broadly supported by 
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the Duma, as prime minister in September 1998.108 Thus, the parliament was able to block 
Yeltsin’s efforts to reappoint his ally Chernomyrdin as prime minister109 and elevate its 
own candidate to lead the government. 
Given Yeltsin’s poor health and approaching term limit in 2000, Primakov’s 
appointment as prime minister raised the possibility of him becoming the new president. 
Primakov gained the support of both the communists and nationalists in the Duma “for 
his independent politics, his desire to be independent of the oligarchs, and was not himself 
corrupt.”110 Primakov’s independent power base from Yeltsin resulted in him threatening 
the oligarchic interest. When Primakov made efforts to prosecute the oligarchs for their 
corruption, Yeltsin’s daughter Tatiana Diachenko, who herself was highly corrupt, 
encouraged the president to dismiss him.111 Indeed, The Family112 – comprising Yeltsin’s 
family, several oligarchs and government officials – sought to install a prime minister 
who could protect them and their interests, when Yeltsin retired.113 After Yeltsin 
dismissed Primakov as prime minister, the Family continued its search for a potential 
protector. Ultimately, the Family choose the former KGB officer Vladimir Putin as 
Yeltsin’s potential successor because of his “unwavering loyalty toward a political patron 
in his protection of St. Petersburg Mayor Anatolii Sobchak.”114 
While Putin was appointed to the post of premier in August 1999 as Yeltsin’s likely 
successor, the Mayor of Moscow, Yurii Luzhkov, emerged as a presidential candidate in 
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opposition to the Kremlin.115 Both political forces saw the 1999 parliamentary elections 
as a rehearsal for the 2000 presidential elections and made efforts to build their own 
electoral basis. 
Yeltsin’s former ally, Luzhkov, established his own party, Fatherland, in 1998. The 
Fatherland formed an electoral coalition with All Russia which comprised some regional 
leaders. Soon afterwards, Primakov, who Yeltsin sacked a few months before, but who 
was still popular, joined the Fatherland-All Russia (OVR) bloc.116 While establishing a 
broad coalition among various political forces, the party placed itself as a centrist force 
in the Russian political stage. OVR’s campaign message “spouted statist rhetoric,” 
pledging to strengthen the national government and to restore the great power status of 
Russia in the international system.117    
Moreover, OVR had access to financial resources necessary to run an efficient 
electoral campaign. First, Luzhkov controlled the Sistema group, which possessed many 
companies in Moscow.118 Second, regional leaders’ close association with the Russian 
state companies, including Lukoil and Gazprom, and the local businesses provided the 
bloc with further financial assistance.119 In terms of media resources, the TV Center, 
which was owned by the Moscow city center and aired in many large cities, and regional 
TV channels gave substantial airtime to OVR.120 Additionally, oligarch Gusinkii’s NTV 
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and various newspapers provided positive coverage to the bloc in the beginning of the 
campaign.121 
To counter the rise of OVR, pro-Kremlin forces orchestrated a new party, Unity, just 
three months before the parliamentary elections. Sergei Shoigu, the head of the Ministry 
of Emergency Situations, took the lead in running the party. While Unity refused to define 
its place on the political spectrum, its campaign was devoted to “Russia’s territorial 
integrity and national greatness.”122 Given that at the time of campaigning the Chechen 
war had reignited, Unity sought to appeal to nationalist sentiments to mobilize voters.123 
With the endorsement of Putin whose tough stance against the Chechen rebels gained 
strong support from Russians, Unity’s popularity rapidly increased. 
Unity’s ability to provoke national feelings – even though it lacked a systematic 
program –  distinguished its future from the earlier pro-Kremlin parties. While the 
previous political parties possessed significant advantages in terms of accessing financial 
and media resources, their inability to cultivate popular messages resulted in them faring 
poorly in the parliamentary elections.124 By contrast, Unity effectively invoked to 
nationalist sentiments by using the broad resources available to it. The financial and 
media resources were provided particularly by the oligarchs who feared that the strong 
showing of OVR would potentially lead to a Primakov presidency.125 As a result, Unity 
was able to gain larger share of seats in the Duma than OVR in the 1999 elections, only 
three months after its formation (16.2% to 15.1%).       
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Table 3.4   Russian Parliamentary Elections, December 19, 1999   
Votes, % 
 
Seats Share of 





Valid Votes 60.5 60.3 
    
Invalid Votes 1.2 1.3 
    
Total Votes (% of electorate) 61.7 61.6 
    
Communist Party 24.3 13.4 
 
67 46 25.1 
Unity 23.3 2.1 
 
64 9 16.2 
Fatherland–All Russia 13.3 8.6 
 
37 31 15.1 
Union of Right Forces 8.5 3 
 
24 5 6.4 
Liberal Democratic Party 6 1.5 
 
17 0 3.8 
Yabloko 5.9 5 
 





— 114 25.3 
Against all 3.3 11.6 
 
— — — 
Others 13.3 10.9 
  
16 3.4 
Invalid ballots 1.9 2.2 
    
Total 100 100 
 
225 225 100 




As expected, defections immediately began from OVR, after it fared poorly in the 
elections. Primakov withdrew his presidential candidacy as he “lack[ed] time to raise 
funds or to build a sufficient organization” to run an election campaign.126 Similarly, 
Luzhkov decided not to compete in the 2000 presidential elections. Thus, the communist 
leader, Ziuganov, remained the only significant opposition presidential candidate. 
Meanwhile, Putin’s success in the Chechen fight, combined with economic growth 
produced by increasing oil prices, boosted public support for his presidential candidacy. 
Yeltsin was now convinced that it was time for him to transfer the presidency to his 
chosen successor. On the last day of 1999, three months before the end of his term limit, 
Yeltsin announced his resignation and Putin became the acting president. 
                                                 
126 Joel M. Ostrow et al, The Consolidation of Dictatorship in Russia, p. 91. 
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In sum, Russia under Yeltsin became a competitive authoritarian regime. Throughout 
the 1990s, Yeltsin’s weak support base in the Duma forced him to make concessions to 
the opposition forces. Although pro-Kremlin parties had access to broad economic and 
media resources, their inability to cultivate a national idea left them with poor electoral 
results. By contrast, the main opposition parties’ national-patriotic appeal gained them 
substantial support. However, opposition candidates’ inability to access broad economic 
and media resources resulted in them losing the presidential elections, despite their 
campaigns’ successful appeals to nationalist sentiments. In the end, with the founding of 
Unity and its well-performance in the elections through developing a national-patriotic 
appeal, Yeltsin was able to repel the potential presidential candidates in opposition and 
install his own successor.     
 













   
 











CHAPTER IV: POST-SOVIET TRANSITION IN UKRAINE (1992-2004):  
THE RISE AND FALL OF AUTHORITARIANISM 
 
After Ukraine gained independence in 1991, Leonid Kravchuk – the head of the 
ideological division of the Communist Party and later the chairman of the Supreme Soviet 
– became the country’s first president elected with a popular vote in a race against 
Viacheslav Chornovil – the leader of the democratic Rukh movement. While Ukraine 
political regime was relatively open under Kravchuk, the continuity of political 
institutions from the Soviet system created significant obstacles to its democratic 
development. First, in contrast to its Eastern European neighbors, post-Soviet Ukraine 
did not experience the removal of old elite. Instead, Ukrainian parliamentarians, who had 
been elected under the Soviet rule, remained in their positions until the next parliamentary 
elections in 1994. Although Ukraine banned the Communist Party immediately after 
independence, 238 communists continued to make up the majority in the parliament. 
Second, Ukraine preserved its Soviet constitution, while amendments to it were made 
between 1991 and 1995. Although new institutions were also established, the lack of clear 
divisions of state powers in the constitution led to political conflicts and plagued the 
course of change.1 After all, “there was not a political revolution in Ukraine” in the 
immediate post-Soviet era.2 
Despite many hurdles in its post-communist transition, Ukraine was able to carry out 
relatively free and fair presidential elections in 1994. While these elections resulted in 
peaceful transition of power, Ukraine afterwards experienced the remarkable rise and fall 
                                                 
1 See, Kataryna Wolczuk, The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation, 
Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001, pp. 110-22.  
2 Paul D’Anieri, Understanding Ukrainian Politics, Armonk, New York: M.E.Sharpe, 2007, p. 74. 
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of authoritarianism under the incoming leader Leonid Kuchma. As Boris Yeltsin in 
Russia, Kuchma inherited a country with a weak tradition of rule of law, an undeveloped 
civil society, and an economy built upon state-ownership of vast resources. By using 
methods similar to his counterpart in Russia, Kuchma also sought to ingrain his 
authoritarian rule in Ukraine. The new constitution, which was adopted in 1996 after 
Kuchma’s threat to hold a nation-wide referendum on confidence in the president and the 
parliament, asserted the president’s domination over government and diluted the 
parliamentary authority. Next, by using his control over state economic resources, 
Kuchma made efforts to build a power base in legislature. Subsequently, several 
oligarchic factions formed in the parliament, which raised support for Kuchma in return 
for gaining privileges in privatization of state assets.3 Finally, with his control over state 
institutions and close relations to oligarchs, Kuchma engaged in manipulation of media, 
intimidation of regime opponents, and election fraud. Thus, in the 1999 presidential 
elections, Kuchma succeeded in sidelining his main rival, Olexandr Moroz, the leader of 
Socialist Party. By evoking to the threat of Communism, Kuchma was eventually able to 
win the reelection.   
Despite Kuchma’s efforts to build an authoritarian regime, Ukraine eventually 
became democratized in contrast to Russia. In the 2004 presidential elections, when 
President Kuchma sought to transfer power to his anointed successor Victor Yanukovich 
by vote-rigging, opposition forces organized a cohesive protest movement which put an 
end to Ukraine’s authoritarian path. Therefore, the obvious question arises: What explains 
                                                 
3 Way, Pluralism by Default, pp. 57-65. Also, Lucan Way, “Kuchma’s Failed Authoritarianism,” Journal 
of Democracy, Vol. 16(2), April 2005, pp. 131-45.  
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the success of Ukrainian opposition forces in overthrowing the authoritarian regime? 
Why did authoritarianism not survive in Ukraine as in Russia? 
Two factors explain the downfall of authoritarian rule in Ukraine. First, the protest 
movement was able to gain broad support from the Ukrainian population, because many 
individuals, who resisted the content of the national identity harnessed by the regime, 
came out to streets to defend the opposition leader, whose appeal responded to their 
perception of the Ukrainian identity. While the opposition movement clearly benefitted 
from the deeds of democratic–minded leaders and protesters in the Maidan, its appeal to 
Ukrainophile identity was the main source of the success in ousting the authoritarian 
regime in 2004, which will be discussed below.4 Second, the opposition was able to 
access to necessary economic resources, as some oligarchs – who accumulated their 
wealth on good relations with Kuchma – began to turn against the regime in the early 
2000s. These oligarchs eventually provided key organizational and financial resources 
for the Ukrainian protest movement. In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, the role 
of Western assistance to regime opponents also prominently figured in scholarly debates.5 
Although significant funding particularly from the United States had been coming to 
Ukraine since the early 2000s, it was reportedly used for democracy promotion activities 
                                                 
4 See, Dominique Arel, “Orange Ukraine Chooses the West, but Without the East,” in Aspects of Orange 
Revolution III: The Context and Dynamics of the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections, ed. by Ingmar 
Bredies, Andreas Umland and Valentin Yakushik, Ibidem-Verlag: Stuttgart, 2007, pp. 35-54; Beissinger, 
“The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution” ; Way, Pluralism 
by Default. 
5 See, Andrew Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
2005, pp. 183-9; Iris Kempe and Iryna Solonenko, “International Orientation and Foreign Support,” in 
Presidential Election and Orange Revolution Implications for Ukraine’s Transition, ed. by Helmut Kurt 
and Iris Kempe, Kyiv: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2005, pp. 113-22; Michael McFaul, “Ukraine Imports 
Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution,” International Security, Vol. 32 (2), 2007, pp. 
45-83.     
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– not for opposition candidates.6 In the final analysis, Kuchma’s rule was built upon a 
system of patronage, in which he distributed state economic resources to competing 
oligarchs for political gains, and maintained by appeals to polarized visions of Ukrainian 
identity. However, the very same factors which enabled Kuchma to ingrain 
authoritarianism in Ukraine sowed the seeds of its own end. 
The rest of this chapter focuses on the Ukrainian post-communist transition in 1992-
2004. First, it gives an account of Ukraine’s early struggle for political and economic 
transformation from the Soviet system under Kravchuk’s leadership. Second, the chapter 
analyzes the authoritarian regime that Kuchma built and the reasons for its collapse in the 
face of popular protests. 
 
Non-Revolutionary Politics of Ukraine under Kravchuk in 1992-1994  
After winning elections against Chornovil by a big margin, Kravchuk became the 
president of newly independent Ukraine on December 1, 1991. In the words of Anders 
Aslund, “Kravchuk had transformed himself within less than two years from communist 
ideological policeman to national communist leader and now to Ukraine’s first president 
and national leader.”7 In his rise to prominence as Ukraine moved towards independence, 
Kravchuk made efforts to appeal to dissimilar political groups and citizens to galvanize 
support. To achieve this, the future president of Ukraine created “a public persona that 
was most things to most people.”8 This led Kravchuk to remain vague about his potential 
political orientation on the one hand – aside from his unequivocal support for the 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 Anders Aslund, How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy, Washington, DC: Peterson 
Institute for International Economics,” 2009, p. 32. 
8 Wilson, Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, p. 182. 
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country’s independence.9 Partly as a result, Kravchuk, a national (pro-independence) 
communist, was able to gain substantial votes in the east, south, and center, while his 
nationalist rival Chornovil was widely supported in three Galician regions of western 
Ukraine during the 1991 presidential elections. On the other hand, Kravchuk’s reluctance 
to associate with any particular political faction hampered the opportunity for political 
and economic transformation of Ukraine after independence. Because the president opted 
for working with a parliament elected in March 1990 instead of calling early elections – 
which “would have required identifying himself with a particular party and narrowing his 
political base unnecessarily,”10 – communists further remained in prominence in 
Ukraine’s political circle. Although the Communist Party was banned on August 30, 
1991, its former members continued to occupy key positions in bureaucracy and also in 
economy.11 In many ways “the legacy of the Soviet nomenklatura carrie[d] considerable 
inertia in the politics of post-Soviet Ukraine”12 and thus impeded prospects for democracy 







                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., pp. 182-3. 
11 Kerstin Zimmer and Olexey Haran, “Unfriendly Takeover: Successor parties in Ukraine,” Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies, Vo. 41, 2008, p. 545. 
12 Bohdan Harasymiw, “Ukraine’s Political Elite and the Transition to Post-Communism,” Journal of 
Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 21 (1-2), 1996, p. 146. Furthermore, Harasymiw in this study provides numbers 
about the former communists in the key government institutions – i.e. the Presidential Administration, the 
Cabinet of Ministers, and the Parliament – between 1990 and 1996.   
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Table 4.1   Ukrainian Presidential Elections, December 1, 1991 
Candidate 
 
Political Party  Total Vote, % Number 
Total Votes (% of 
electorate) 
 84.2 31,891,742 
Leonid Kravchuk Self-Nominated 61.6 19,643,481 
Viacheslav Chornovil Rukh 23.3 7,420,727 
Levko Lukianenko Ukrainian Republican Party 4.5 1,432,556 
Ihor Yukhnovskii Self-Nominated 1.7 554,719 
Volodimir Grinov Self-Nominated 4.2 1,329,758 
Leopold Taburianskii People’s Party of Ukraine 0.6 182,713 
Against all/ Invalid votes  4.2 1,327,788 
Total Votes  100  
Source: Sarah Birch, “Ukraine,” in Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook, edited by Dieter Nohlen and 
Philip Stover, Baden: Nomos, 2010, p. 1976. 
 
 
While Kravchuk’s commitment to Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union 
enabled him to ascend to power, his attitude towards nationalism was indeed moderate 
early in his presidency. As Ukraine left with a population in which over eleven million 
(22 percent of whole population) was made up of Russians, Kravchuk’s efforts focused 
on ensuring unity among people. In his early speeches, Kravchuk seemingly promoted 
the view of Ukraine “as a state of Ukrainians, Russians and all the nationalities who 
inhabit it.”13 As this line of understanding was necessary to solidify the Ukrainian 
statehood at the time, the president also reminded the Ukrainian elites – particularly in 
the west – of the perils of endorsing the revival of “a national state.”14 
After his first year in presidency, Kravchuk however began to develop a more positive 
attitude towards nationalism. The president embraced the trizub (trident) and the blue-
yellow flag – both of which implied the continuity within Ukrainian history since 
                                                 
13 Holos Ukrainy, January 24, 1992 and December 7, 1991 quoted in Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in 
the 1990s, p. 111.  
14 Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s, p. 111.  
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antiquity – as well as the national anthem –  which was used in independent Ukraine 
between 1917 and 1920.  Conversely, these newly adopted symbols resonated little with 
the population of the eastern and the southern regions.15 Next, Kravchuk invested in 
promoting Ukrainian language and culture, and also opposed the elevation of Russian to 
a second state language. Finally, the president “endorsed the nationalist view of the past 
as an endless series of misfortunes at Russia’s hand” in respect to the Ukrainian history.16 
This line of thinking also took on concrete forms as to distance Ukraine from Russia. 
Overall, these policies enabled Kravchuk to gain support of national democrats in the 
parliament.  
When the Ukrainian economy declined, and living standards dropped sharply in 1992-
93, Kravchuk’s policies began to provoke serious resistance in the east. In particular, the 
discord between the president, prime minister, and the parliament, which was partially an 
outcome of the lack of new constitutional arrangements, hindered the development of a 
consistent economic reform program. Ironically, when Ukraine’s economic difficulties 
were growing, Leonid Kuchma, the head of the military-industrial complex in 
Dnipropetrovsk and future political rival of Kravchuk, was leading the government. 
However, Kuchma was able to “sidestep responsibility for economic crisis simply by 
taking a strong pro-Russian stance” ahead of the 1994 presidential elections since many 
considered the economic troubles an outcome of “Ukraine’s break with Russia and the 
Soviet Union – an event that was indelibly tied to Kravchuk.”17 
                                                 
15 Ibid., p. 111 and 161-2. 
16 Ibid., p. 111. 
17 Yuryi Lukanov, Tretyi Prezident: Polytichnii Portret Leonida Kuchmi, Kyiv: Tak Spravi, 1996, p. 86 
and 110 paraphrased in Way, Pluralism by Default, p. 55. 
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Most importantly, Ukrainian authorities’ political and economic policies led to a 
massive wave of miners’ strike in the eastern Donbas regions in June 1993. Backed by 
the local elite, the Donbas miners demanded regional autonomy and a national 
referendum on confidence in the president and the parliament.18 Indeed, organizations 
and parties in the region already articulated programs by 1993 which called for regional 
autonomy as well as state language status for Russian and greater economic integration 
with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)/Russia.19 The Ukrainian authorities 
nonetheless were able to defer the miners’ call for regional autonomy at this point, while 
accepting to schedule the national referendum on confidence in the president and the 
parliament.20 However, both Kravchuk and the parliament later agreed instead to call for 
early presidential and parliamentary elections. At the same time, the political crisis in 
Russia, which resulted in Yeltsin dissolving the parliament in September 1993, played a 
part in deputies’ decision for early elections.21 
With the ban on the Communist Party lifted in July 1993, the parliamentary elections 
in March-April 1994 witnessed a comeback for the communists. The Communist Party 
gained 25 percent of the seats in the parliament, while the overall Ukrainian left’s share 
of seats amounted to 35 percent in the first round of elections in March-April. In the 
words of Wilson, “the left has gained extra strength from being de facto vehicle for 
Russophone protest at ‘nationalizing’ policies in Ukraine.”22 While the Communist Party 
                                                 
18 Vlad Mykhenenko, “State, Society and Protest under Post Communism: Ukrainian Miners and Their 
Defeat,” paper presented at the Political Studies Association-UK 50th Annual Conference, London, April 
10-13, 2000. 
19 Andrew Wilson, “Growing Challenge to Kyiv from the Donbas,” Ukrainian Weekly, Jersey City, N.J, 
September 9, 1993.  
20 Vlad Mykhenenko, “State, Society and Protest under Post Communism.” 
21 Wolczuk, The Moulding of Ukraine, p. 118. 
22 Wilson, Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, p.189. 
90 
 
was backed strongly in the east, the Socialist Party created at a time the former was 
banned gathered support from Russophile population throughout Ukraine.23 On the other 
hand, Rukh and other national democrat parties, which called for political and economic 
reforms to solidify Ukrainian statehood,24 performed with less success. Rukh gained only 
5.9 percent of the votes in the first round, appealing to the voters in the west. Overall, 
national democrats won 9.2 percent of the votes. Additionally, more than one hundred 
sixty parliamentarians were without party affiliations, and many of these were former 
communists. 
Most importantly, the new parliament marked the emergence of centrist factions 
which gained sufficient seats to shift the balance of power between the left and the right. 
While the centrist political parties had scored only 3.6 percent of the votes after the first 
two rounds of elections, Ukrainian parliamentarians subsequently regrouped and formed 
several other factions in the center. Although these centrist groups were not ideologically 
cohesive, they filled around 125 parliamentary seats by May 1995.25 Similarly, 
businessmen emerged as a political force by winning around 20 percent of the seat in the 










                                                 
23 Sarah Birch, Elections and Democratization in Ukraine, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000, pp. 85-8. 
24 Ibid., p. 85.  
25 See, Wolczuk, The Moulding of Ukraine, p. 134. 
26 Aslund, How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy, p. 65. 
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Table 4.2   Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections, March – April 1994     
Party Votes, First Round, 
% 
Seats  Share of Seats, 
% 
Total Left 18.6 119 35.2 
   Communist 12.7 86 25.4 
   Socialist 3.1 14 4.1 
   Rural 2.7 19 5.3 
Total Centre 3.4 12 3.6 
Total National Democrats 9.2 31 9.2 
   Rukh 5.2 20 5.9 
   Republican 2.5 8 2.4 
Total Extreme Right 2.4 8 2.4 
All Parties 33.5 170 50.3 
Independents 66.3 168 49.7 
Total Seats Filled  338 100 
In 450-single member constituencies, candidates were required to gather a majority of votes to win after 
at least fifty percent of voters participated. For that reason, Ukrainian citizens in some districts voted six 
times. 
Source: Sarah Birch, Elections and Democratization in Ukraine, p. 84. 
 
As his allies in the national democratic camp lost considerable influence in the parliament 
from 108 seats in 1991 to 28 seats in 1994, Kravchuk grew wary of a potential defeat in 
the upcoming presidential elections. Additionally, the approval of the leader of Socialist 
Party, Olexander Moroz, as chairman of the parliament, with the support of communists 
in October 1994, raised his concern. Therefore, Kuchma sought to delay the race also by 
making threats. However, the parliament did not give into the pressure.27 The election 
was scheduled to be held on June 26, 1994. 
During the election campaign, Kravchuk portrayed himself as “the father of the 
Ukrainian nation”28 and defended the Ukrainian independence, language and culture. He 
opposed the development of closer ties with CIS/Russia and elevating the status of 
Russian to the state language.29 With Rukh not putting a candidate forth, Kravchuk 
                                                 
27 Wolczuk, The Moulding of Ukraine, p. 118. 
28 Aslund, How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy, p. 66. 
29 Marta Kolomayets, “Kravchuk, Kuchma to Face Off in Presidential Race on July 10,” The Ukrainian 
Weekly, July 3, 1994, p. 1, 3.  
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moreover was able to dominate pro-Ukrainian discourse. In turn, Kravchuk’s main rival, 
Kuchma, called for improving relations with Russia, upgrading the status of Russian 
language, and decentralizing the system of governance.30 While Kravchuk vilified 
Kuchma by stressing “his ‘Russophile’ tendencies and willingness to convert Ukraine 
into a neocolonial state within the Russian domain,”31 Kuchma pledged to cease the 
domination of “Galician nationalism” over Ukrainian authorities.32 Additionally, socialist 
Moroz was set on running in the election, with the support of the Communist Party. In 
the first round of elections, Kravchuk came first by gathering 37.7 percent of the votes 
with a strong support in the western regions, while Kuchma’s share of vote amounted to 
31.2 with a concentration in the eastern and southern regions. Socialist Moroz was able 
to gain only 13 percent of votes. 
In the second round, both Kravchuk’s and Kuchma’s appeal to voters were bolstered 
by the support of the Rukh and the Communist Party, respectively. Kravchuk used his 
control of the media to slant news coverage in his favor. He also sought to mobilize state 
employees at the local level to steal elections.33 In turn, Kuchma, the head of the 
Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, had broad support of business34 and 
local officials in Eastern and Southern Ukraine.35 In the end, Kravchuk lost the race 
against Kuchma, 45 percent to 52.1 percent. Most importantly, the second round of 
elections further marked the split in the voting patterns of Ukraine’s regions. As Kataryna 
Wolzchuk aptly puts it, “while these cleavages were not so evident during the referendum 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Wolczuk, The Moulding of Ukraine, p. 136. 
32 Ibid., p. 139. 
33 Way, Pluralism by Default, pp. 54-6. 
34 Wilson, Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, p. 196. 
35 Way, Pluralism by Default, pp. 56. 
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in 1991, when the idea of independence, albeit for different reasons, was supported more 
evenly across Ukraine, the two disillusioning years of Ukrainian independence made 
them more apparent. These divisions were readily exploited by the presidential 
candidates.”36 As a result of this, Kravchuk scored over 90 percent of the votes in the 
three Galician oblasts – Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil, – while Kuchma received 
over 80 percent of votes in the more populous Donbas. Furthermore, Kuchma won 
majority of votes in all oblasts east of the Dnieper.37 In summary, Kravchuk’s electoral 
basis had substantially changed from 1991 to 1994. While he had captured strong support 
in the south and east in 1991,38 these same regions backed Kuchma in 1994. Although 
Kravchuk’s share of vote increased sharply in the western regions in comparison to 1991, 
























                                                 
36 Wolczuk, The Moulding of Ukraine, p. 138. 
37 See, for the oblast-level results of the 1994 presidential run-off elections, The Ukrainian Weekly, July 7, 
1994, p.3. 




Table 4.3   Ukrainian Presidential Elections, 1994 










Total Votes (% of 
electorate) 
 68.0 26,480,671 71.0 26,883,642 
Leonid Kravchuk Self-
Nominated 
37.7 9,954,474 45.0 12,111,603 
Leonid Kuchma Self-
Nominated 
31.2 8,244,844 52.1 14,016,830 













Invalid votes/against all   4.43  2.8  
Total  100  100  




    The Rise and Fall of Kuchma’s Authoritarianism in 1994-2004 
As in Russia under Yeltsin, Kuchma’s election to presidency in 1994 instigated the rise 
of authoritarianism in Ukraine. Kuchma, a “red director” from Dnipropetrovsk, relied 
extensively on business and regional groups – with which he had collaborated earlier – 
in building authoritarian rule, while also utilizing his control over state institutions to 
keep political and economic actors in line with the regime. At the same time, the new 
constitution adopted in 1996 enabled Kuchma to dominate the government, while 
considerably debilitating the authority of the Ukrainian legislature. As a result, the 
Kuchma presidency transformed Ukraine into an authoritarian regime, in which the ruling 
elite strictly controlled the media, harassed critics and opposition forces, and carried out 
electoral fraud in various elections. However, none of this ensured the survival of the 
authoritarian regime Kuchma built.  
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When Ukraine experienced its first peaceful transition of power in the post-Soviet era 
in 1994, many hoped Kuchma would move the country in a democratic direction. Despite 
running on a pro-Russian platform during the elections, Kuchma in the ensuing months 
seemed to put his campaign program on a back burner. Instead, he centered his 
administrative efforts on Ukraine’s economic development. At this point, Kuchma and 
his fellow industrialists from Dnipropetrovsk “were just beginning to realize that the new 
Ukrainian state could make them very rich.”39 Partly as a result, Kuchma sought closer 
cooperation with the West to lead the country’s transition to a market economy. His 
campaign promise of improved economic ties with Russia was set aside.  
After three months in the office, Kuchma proposed “deep structural reforms” to 
stabilize Ukraine’s financial system.40 While Kuchma’s plan for market reforms was 
saluted by national democrats, communists were unsurprisingly opposed the prospect of 
privatization. Although the parliament confirmed the economic reform plan with 231 
votes in October 1994,41 the privatization of state assets later proved to be the source of 
contention between the president and the leftist parties in the parliament. As a result, the 
privatization of state assets had been mostly realized through presidential decrees. By the 
end of Kuchma’s first term, the share of private sector in Ukraine’s GDP rose to above 
50 percent – with the assistance of Western institutions.42 More than 25 percent of large-
                                                 
39 Wilson, Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, p. 195. 
40 Marta Kolomayets, “Kuchma Outlines Radical Program of Reforms,” Ukrainian Weekly, October 16, 
1994, p. 1. 
41 Marta Kolomayets, “Parliament Approves Kuchma Reform Program,” Ukrainian Weekly, October 23, 
1994, p.1.  
42 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), “Share of GDP from Private Enterprise, 
1991-2007,” cited in Aslund, How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy, p. 82. 
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scale enterprise assets had been transferred to private ownership by 2001 and mass 
privatization of small companies had been completed by 2003.43 
While Kuchma’s economic model drew strong criticism from the Left, his efforts to 
create a stronger presidency, with a new constitution, intensified the political conflict 
between these two forces in 1995. Kuchma proposed at first a draft law, which could have 
considerably strengthened the presidency, until a new constitution was completed. 
However, the leftist parties – which held altogether over 160 seats at the time44 – insisted 
that because the bill anticipated the reversal of the several articles of the constitution in 
place, this required 2/3 majority in the parliament.45  In response, Kuchma threatened to 
hold a national referendum on confidence in the president and the parliament. Despite the 
protest votes of communists, the draft eventually passed in the parliament on July 1995 
with mostly the support of centrists and right parties.46 The law, which was to stay in 
force for the next twelve months, granted a wide-range of powers to the president. 
However, Kuchma was not able to gain the right to dissolve the parliament, as this 
passage was removed from the law before the vote in the parliament took place. 
In the ensuing months, Kuchma and the parliamentarians negotiated multiple draft 
versions of the constitution. Since the proposed drafts reinforced the presidential 
authority at the expense of the parliament, communists remained in opposition.47 National 
democrats chose to compromise as long as the drafts reflected their vision of 
nationhood.48 The fragmented center, with little ideological concern, found itself 
                                                 
43 EBRD, “Transition Indicators by Country,” http://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/economic-research-and-
data/data/forecasts-macro-data-transition-indicators.html. 
44 Wolczuk, The Moulding of Ukraine, p. 134. 
45 Ibid., p. 194. 
46 Ibid., p. 195. 
47 Ibid., pp. 209-3. 
48 Ibid., pp. 213-7. 
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vulnerable to pressure from other political camps.49 Only after Kuchma moved to call 
again for a nation-wide constitutional referendum, the parliament, with the strong 
leadership of its chairman Olexander Moroz, was able to adopt a new constitution on June 
28, 1996.  
The 1996 constitution crafted a strong presidency, an outcome of Kuchma’s influence 
in the constitution-making process. First, the constitution gave the president powers to 
appoint and dismiss the prime minister, the cabinet members, and the heads of the central 
executive bodies. Second, the president was now able to propose bills, issue decrees, and 
veto laws originated in the parliament. Lastly, the constitution also granted the president 
the right to appoint one third of the Constitutional Court’s justices.50 Thus, the Verkhovna 
Rada (parliament) was no longer to dominate the Ukrainian political stage as it did in the 
Kravchuk era. Notably however, Kuchma’s presidential authority was relatively weaker 
than Yeltsin’s in Russia. In April 2000, Kuchma sought to gain more powers through a 
national referendum. The proposed amendments to the constitution envisaged to grant the 
right to dissolve the parliament to the president, lift parliamentarians’ immunities from 
criminal prosecution, and establish a bicameral parliament.51 All of this seemingly aimed 
at reducing power of the parliament. Despite galvanizing popular support for the 
constitutional changes in the national referendum, Kuchma was eventually not able to 
enforce their implementation. 
The new constitution gave way to the presidential domination of the government and 
debilitated the legislature, partially explaining the rise of Kuchma’s authoritarianism. 
                                                 
49 Ibid., pp. 217-9. 
50 Petro Matiaszek, “A closer look at Ukraine’s Constitution,” Ukrainian Weekly, August 4, 1996. 
51 Jan Maksymiuk, “Subduing the Parliament with a Referendum,” RFERL, January 26, 2000. 
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Equally important was the president’s growing control of security and law enforcement 
bodies, which he effectively used to harass potential rival forces. Kuchma immediately 
appointed his close allies to the highest-ranking positions in the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), and Tax Administration. Meanwhile, the 
security forces of Ukraine recovered from the disarray generated by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The number of police officers that the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
commanded reached almost 400,000 in 1999, four times larger than what it had been at 
the independence.52 The SBU had 28,000 officers, while the State Tax Administration 
employed 72,000 inspectors.53 Furthermore, the three institutions were transformed into 
repressive organs in the Kuchma era and served to collect information illegally on 
politicians and businessmen.54 Most importantly, the regime used surveillance to ensure 
the elites’ compliance with the regime,55 as the Melnichenko tapes revealed. When 
politicians refused to obey, the regime put out damaging information to undermine them. 
Similarly, business owners who turned against the regime found their companies under 
close examination of the Tax Administration.56 Additionally, Kuchma used police and 
tax inspectors to mobilize voters in their districts. Indeed, the employees of these bodies 
were threatened to be fired if they failed to do so.57 
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As Bohdan Harasymiw aptly remarks, “since parliamentarians are themselves 
compromised, they are hampered … in collectively restraining the president from 
employing all means at his disposal … for his own political ends.”58 Instead, Kuchma’s 
leadership in Ukraine created a system of corruption, which went a long way among 
parliamentarians.59 This was largely an outcome of Ukraine’s large-scale privatization, in 
which Kuchma used state resources to create a network of loyalists. In the late 1990s, the 
number of wealthy people in the country substantially increased. Having accumulated 
their wealth through unfair access to state resources, these actors – namely, oligarchs – 
sought to avoid potential prosecutions by holding seats in the parliament. Moreover, 
oligarchs – who were now in the parliament and owning political parties and media outlets 
– mobilized their resources for the incumbent regime, in return for gaining presidential 
favors in the allocation of state assets.60 Yet, the system that Kuchma built to galvanize 
support from oligarchs in the ruling of country also “increased the chances that 
[economic] resources would fall into the ‘wrong’ hands.”61 
The incident of Pavlo Lazarenko was first to signify the drawbacks of Kuchma’s 
system of rule. Having filled the administration with his allies from Dnipropetrovsk, 
Kuchma put Lazarenko, the governor of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in charge of energy as 
the deputy prime minister within Yevhen Marchuk’s cabinet in September 1995. After 
Kuchma fired Marchuk in May 1996, Lazarenko became the prime minister.62 In the next 
twelve months of his premiership, Ukraine “became the epitome of corruption.”63 By 
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extorting money from companies and building the United Energy System of Ukraine – 
which became the largest gas distributor of the country – with Yuliia Timoshenko, 
Lazerenko accumulated massive wealth.64 Furthermore, he exploited his political position 
in privatization deals, seeking to take control of various state assets and monopolize other 
sectors (apart from the gas market).65  In the words of President Kuchma, “[Lazarenko] 
would have ‘ privatized’ the whole country in a year or two.”66 In July 1997 after “he 
long overlooked Lazarenko’s illegal financial machinations,” 67 Kuchma dismissed him 
as prime minister. 
In turn, Lazarenko moved swiftly to oppose the Kuchma regime, by developing 
Hromada (Community) party with Timoshenko and investing millions in media 
companies.68 Seeking to prevent Hromada from entering parliament in the March 1998 
elections, state authorities soon closed down Lazarenko’s newspapers and TV channels 
with arbitrary charges.69 In spite of this, Hromada was able to win 23 seats in the 1998 
parliamentary elections. On the other hand, this intensified the regime’s assault on 
Lazarenko and his party. In August 1998, Ukraine’s widely politicized prosecutors 
accused him of money laundering.70 After Hromada announced Lazarenko as its 
candidate in the 1999 presidential elections and Lazarenko stated his intentions to 
collaborate with Moroz’s Socialist Party,71 Kuchma also got his allies in the parliament 
to lift his immunity from prosecution. Meanwhile, Timoshenko, along with her ally 
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Olexander Turchinov, deserted the party, arguably because of fear of prosecution.72 In 
February 1999, the Rada voted (310 to 39) to lift the immunity of Lazarenko.73 He fled 
the country to avoid prosecution, and Hromada eventually disappeared. 
The Lazerenko case set an example for other regime insiders, revealing the potential 
consequences of challenging the incumbent rule. Using administrative resources, 
President Kuchma also sought to weaken rival political parties on the right and the left. 
The leading party of western Ukraine, Rukh, had already experienced several splits by 
the late 1990s, some of which were master-minded by pro-regime oligarchs.74 
Furthermore, the suspicious death of the long-time head of the party, Chornovil, in a car 
accident75 left the party more vulnerable to factionalism. Similarly, other smaller right-
wing parties also found themselves in the midst of internal power struggles.76 At the same 
time, a number of leftist political parties began to sprout in the early 2000s. To siphon 
votes from the Communist Party, the largest opposition group at the time in the 
parliament, these regime-orchestrated formations also placed “communist” in their 
names.77 Nataliia Vitrenko and her Progressive Socialists, which she established after 
defecting from Moroz’s Socialist Party, formed allegedly “loyal left wing ‘opposition’ 
[forces].”78 
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While the Kuchma regime utilized all means to diminish any political opposition, it 
also began to invest in creating a political party to solidify its ground. At first, the National 
Democratic Party (NDP) – formed in 1996 – aspired to “become a political core of the 
consolidation of pro-Kuchma centrist forces.”79 Despite its poor performance in the 1998 
parliamentary elections, NDP’s share of seats grew significantly by the end of the year.80 
Many parliamentarians, who were elected in single-mandate districts, landed in NDP 
mostly because of its close ties to the regime. Next, the rise of oligarch-engineered 
factions after the 1998 elections provided ground for Kuchma’s authoritarian enactments. 
Because oligarchs sought to safeguard their economic gains, wield influence in the 
corridors of power, and benefit from parliamentary immunity, they poured money into 
building political parties. These forces subsequently aligned themselves with the Kuchma 
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Table 4.4   Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections, March 29, 1998 
Political Party PR Votes, 
% 
PR Seats SMD Seats Total Seats Share of Seats, 
% 
Communist Party 24.6 84 38 122 27.1 
Rukh 9.4 32 14 46 10.2 
Socialist/Rural Bloc 8.5 29 5 34 7.5 
Progressive Socialist 
Party 
4 14 2 16 3.5 
Greens 5.4 19 – 19 4.2 
National Democratic 
Party 
5 17 12 29 6.4 
Hromada 4.6 16 7 23 5.1 
Social Democratic 
Party (United) 
4 14 3 17 3.7 
Other Parties 25.7 – 28 28 6.2 
Independents – – 116 116 25.7 
Against All/Invalid 8.4         
Total 100 225 225 450 100 
In the 1998 elections, 225 deputies were elected from party lists according to the principle of proportional 
representation. Election threshold for political parties was set at 4 percent. The other 225 deputies were 
elected in single-mandate districts through first-past-the-post formula.  
Source: Sarah Birch, Elections and Democratization in Ukraine, pp. 106-7; Central Election Commission 
of Ukraine, www.cvk.gov.ua. 
  
 
The Social Democratic Party (United) (SDP(u) was one of the oligarchic factions in the 
new parliament. While the party was officially headed by the former prime minister 
Marchuk and former president Kravchuk, it was in reality controlled by Victor 
Medvedchuk and Hrihorii Surkis – the Kyiv clan. These oligarchs accumulated their 
wealth in gas and real estate sectors in the 1990s.81 Medvedchuk also gained the control 
of  two Ukrainian TV channels, Inter and 1+1, which maintained around 50 percent of 
the viewer market.82 The Kyiv clan and SDP(u) “were often Kuchma’s most reliable 
supporters in the parliament,” after factionalism thrived within NDP.83 Another oligarchic 
group was the Revival of the Regions (RoR), which was formed in 1999 by the former 
                                                 
81 Aslund, How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy, p. 107. 
82 Olena Prytula, “The Ukrainian Media Rebellion,” in Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s 
Democratic Breakthrough, ed. by Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, Washington, D.C: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2006, p. 111. 
83 Wilson, Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, p. 271. 
104 
 
members of NDP.84 Later, two factions, Democratic Council and Regions of Ukraine, 
sprang from RoR. Olexander Volkov and Ihor Bakai, who both made their money in the 
energy sector, headed Democratic Council. 85 Volkov also played a critical role in 
Kuchma’s re-election campaign in 1999. Regions of Ukraine was controlled by Donetsk 
businessman and politicians.86 In 2001, Mikola Azarov, the head of the State Tax 
Administration, became the leader of the faction. The last oligarchic formation was 
Labour Ukraine, led by Victor Pinchuk and Serhii Tihipko – the Dnipropetrovsk clan. 87 
While Pinchuk, who is also Kuchma’s son-in-law, built up his wealth in steel industry, 
Tihipko made his money in the banking sector. Like Medvedchuk, Pinchuk also owned 
Ukrainian TV channels. His ICTV, New Channel, and STB maintained 35 percent of total 
TV audience.88  
With the support of his allies in different factions, Kuchma was able to remove 
socialist Moroz from the chairmanship of the parliament immediately after the 1998 
elections. At the same time, the decision of the Communist Party, which remained the 
largest group in the Rada, to back Olexander Tkachenko, the head of the Peasant Party, 
enabled the latter to become the new chairman, despite the protest of pro-presidential 
groups.89 Tkachenko subsequently “developed leadership ambitions” and his resistance 
to leave the post of chairman in 2000 precipitated a political crisis within the Rada. 90 
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Notwithstanding this, Tkachenko’s replacement of Moroz’s parliamentary position was 
a victory for Kuchma ahead of the 1999 presidential elections. 
Admittedly, Moroz was the most serious threat on the left for Kuchma’s potential re-
election. To weaken the socialist leader’s appeal in the presidential race, Kuchma on the 
one hand subtly promoted other leftist alternatives.91 In particular, Ukrainian TV stations, 
controlled by the regime and its supporters, provided more coverage to Progressive 
Socialist Party’s leader, Vitrenko, while Moroz, along with the communist leader Petro 
Simonenko, received only negative coverage.92 On 2 October, Vitrenko and her 
supporters were injured in a campaign meeting as a result of a grenade attack by unknown 
persons. The Ministry of Internal Affairs rapidly accused a local head of the Moroz’s 
campaign of organizing the attack.93 With the media providing wide coverage of the 
incident, the socialist leader’s campaign appeal was subsequently tarnished. On the other 
hand, Kuchma effectively deprived Moroz’s campaign of necessary economic resources. 
Wilson remarks that “Lazarenko and, possibly, Timoshenko had planned to finance” 
Moroz.94 As noted earlier, Lazarenko left the country to avoid corruption charges after 
his parliamentary immunity was lifted in February 1999. Conversely, Timoshenko “was 
convinced to return to Kuchma’s fold” after her frozen bank accounts were released.95 In 
the end, Kuchma’s only “viable rival” on the left remained the communist leader 
Simonenko. 
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By using similar tactics, Kuchma was also able to get rid of potential candidates on 
the non-left spectrum. For a while, Victor Yushchenko, the chairman of National Bank 
of Ukraine, “had been toying with the idea of running for president.”96 However, the 
murder of Vadim Hetman, the head of the Ukrainian Interbank Currency Exchange, in 
April 1998, left Yushchenko without any source of financing for his election campaign.97 
Moreover, Kuchma’s campaign manager, Volkov, allegedly offered Yushchenko the post 
of premiership in exchange for his decision not to run in the race.98 Another presidential 
candidate was the former prime minister, Yevhen Marchuk. While he made earlier efforts 
to unite various forces on the left and the center around a common candidate, this proved 
to be futile. After the first round of election, Marchuk declared his support for Kuchma. 
In turn, he was appointed as chairman of National Security Council.99 
While Kuchma systematically eliminated his opponents across the political spectrum 
on the one hand, he boosted his appeal by mobilizing oligarchs and their resources around 
his election campaign on the other hand. An election bloc, made up of NDP and oligarchic 
factions in the parliament and headed by prime minister Valerii Pustovoitenko, was 
formed to support Kuchma’s re-election.100 At the same time, Ukrainian oligarchs 
reportedly raised over $1.5 billion for Kuchma’s campaign expenditure.101 Next, Kuchma 
made extensive use of the state TV station UT1 and other private channels to promote his 
candidacy. The OSCE report reveals that Ukraine’s four main TV stations – UT1, Inter, 
1+1, and later STB – “devoted the majority of their prime-time news coverage to the 
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incumbent … whilst his opponents received substantially less airtime.”102 Additionally, 
TV channels provided sympathetic coverage of Kuchma’s campaign, while his main 
rivals were given mostly negative coverage.103 At the same time, private media stations, 
which refused to endorse Kuchma, came under close scrutiny of State Tax authorities.104 
Lastly, the incumbent regime coerced local authorities, militia, and public institutions 
into campaigning in its favor. According to the OSCE report, the staff of medical and 
educational institutions as well as the heads of collective farms “were threatened with the 
loss of their jobs” if they resisted getting involved in Kuchma’s campaign.105 Also, three 
governors were allegedly dismissed after their regions failed to raise sufficient votes for 
Kuchma.106  
In the first round of the presidential elections, Kuchma was able to gather the largest 
share of votes (36.5%). The communist leader, Simonenko, came in second (22.2 %), 
with Moroz a distant third (11.2%). As many scholars remarked, this was the best possible 
scenario for Kuchma. Similar to Yeltsin’s 1996 presidential campaign in Russia, he was 
able to capitalize on the threat of communism with the Ukrainian electorate. Thus, 
Kuchma portrayed himself “as the only leader capable of preventing a possible red 
‘revanche.’”107 In turn, Simonenko sought to mitigate his appeal by declaring support for 
the improvement of the private sector and Ukrainian independence.108 Yet, Simonenko’s 
last-minute attempt to broaden his appeal fell short. In the end, Kuchma was re-elected 
                                                 
102 OSCE, Ukraine Presidential Elections 31 October and 14 November 1999: Final Report, p. 21. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid, pp. 22-3. 
105 Ibid., pp. 16-8.  
106 Ibid. 
107 Roman Woronowycz, “On the Campaign Trail,” Ukrainian Weekly, October 10, 1999, p.6. 
108 Komunist, No. 45, November 11, 1999, p. 1 quoted in Wilson, Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, p. 203. 
108 
 
by winning the 56 percent of vote against Simonenko’s 38 percent of vote on November 
14, 1999.  
Most importantly, regional polarization, which earlier corresponded to competing 
visions of national identity, mattered less in the 1999 elections. In fact, Simonenko’s pro-
Russian appeal was not able to impede Kuchma garnering support in the eastern regions. 
For instance, Donetsk and Kharkiv, where Simonenko received the largest share of votes 
in October, backed Kuchma in November. In addition to capturing Russophile voters, 
Kuchma was also able to gain the support of Galician oblasts in the west of Ukraine. In 
the end, Kuchma’s anti-communist stance, along with his system of patronage, enabled 
him to garner the votes necessary for his reelection from across Ukrainian regions.  
 
Table 4.5 Ukrainian Presidential Elections, 1999 









Total Votes  
(% of electorate) 
 70.1 26,305,198 74.8 28,212,484 
Leonid Kuchma Self-Nominated 36.5 9,598,672 56.2 15,870,722 
Petro Simonenko Communist 
Party 
22.2 5,849,077 37.8 10,665,420 
Oleksandr Moroz Socialist Party 11.2 2,969,896  
Natalia Vitrenko Progressive 
Socialist Party 
10.9  2,886,972 
Yevhen Marchuk Self-Nominated 8.1 2,138,356 
Yurii Kostenko Rukh 2.2 570,623 
Gennadii Udovenko Rukh 1.2 319,778 
Others  1.8  
Against All/Invalid 
Votes 
 5.7  5.9  
Total  100  100  
Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine, www.cvk.gov.ua. 
 
 
After his victory in the elections, Kuchma immediately turned to building a parliamentary 
majority to raise support for necessary economic reforms. Given that Ukraine was “on 
the verge of default” for foreign loans, oligarchs also joined forces together with Kuchma 
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for accelerating the process of reforms.109 First, Yushchenko, a pro-reform economist, 
was approved as prime minister of Ukraine on December 22, 1999 with 296 votes in the 
parliament.110 He immediately appointed Timoshenko, a former oligarch, as deputy prime 
minister in charge of energy. Second, eleven factions on the center and right formed a 
pro-presidential majority in the Rada on January 13, 2000.111 Lastly, with the support of 
these factions, Kuchma launched an attack on Tkachenko, the leftist speaker of the 
parliament. Tkachenko’s resistance to the parliamentary vote in favor of his dismissal 
was responded by the prosecutor office through re-opening a corruption investigation in 
February 2000 which had been sidelined in 1998.112 In the end, Ivan Pliushch, a Kuchma 
associate, replaced Tkachenko as chairman of the parliament. 
With the strong power-base in the parliament and control over the government, 
Kuchma also reinvigorated his plans to expand presidential authority in early 2000. As 
noted earlier, the president pushed for a national referendum in April, which subsequently 
culminated overwhelming public support for proposed changes, partly as a result of the 
regime’s pressure at the local level. While Kuchma was one step closer to acquiring more 
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The Gongadze Scandal and Its Aftermath 
On November 28, 2000, a month after opposition journalist Georgii Gongandze’s 
beheaded body was found south of Kyiv, Moroz publicized audiotapes of Kuchma that 
had been secretly recorded in 1998-2000 by one of the presidential security guards, 
Mikola Melnichenko. The tapes not only revealed Kuchma’s involvement in the murder 
of Gongadze, but also the depth of his overall abuse of power.113 Subsequently, 
Ukrainians began to pour into the streets in demonstrations calling for “Ukraine without 
Kuchma.” In mid-December, protesters – who were mostly made up of socialists and led 
by the leaders of the Socialist Party, Moroz and Yurii Lutsenko, – erected a tent city in 
the center of Kyiv. Rukh members and radical nationalists also joined the tent city. The 
protesters called for the resignation of President Kuchma, Minister of Internal Affairs, 
Yurii Kravcehnko, and head of SBU, Leonid Derkach.114 After a week of demonstrations, 
with the arrival of Christmas, activists ended their tent city momentarily. 
In early February, the “Ukraine without Kuchma” protest were resumed in Kyiv. The 
demonstrators again consisted of diverse political groups, ranging from communists to 
nationalists. Moreover, Timoshenko of the Fatherland Party (Batkivshcina) stepped into 
the leadership position in this wave of protests. Her efforts to reform Ukraine’s energy 
sector as deputy prime minister over the last year agitated particularly pro-Kuchma 
oligarchs, as they lost their privileges in the business.115 Timoshenko was at first charged 
with money laundering, relating her position in the United Energy System. Next, Kuchma 
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dismissed her as deputy prime minister in January 2000.116 In response, she, along with 
Moroz, created the Forum for National Salvation to coordinate efforts for Kuchma’s 
removal.117 Shortly after this, Timoshenko was jailed and accused of corruption. 
In addition to arresting Timoshenko, the Kuchma regime sought to discredit protesters 
in various ways. The state channel and other stations owned by pro-Kuchma oligarchs 
questioned the motivations of protesters. Kuchma claimed that demonstrations were 
financed by Lazarenko and Timoshenko, and the Gongadze case was used to destabilize 
the country. Next, the regime used provocateurs to disrupt the opposition activities. It also 
organized protests in the center of Kyiv to show support for Kuchma. Lastly, state 
authorities resorted to force in early March and dismantled the tent city. 
In the end, the protest movement succeeded in removing Kravchenko and Derkach – 
both of whom were recorded while speaking about Gongadze with Kuchma – from their 
posts as Minister of Internal Affairs and head of SBU, respectively. However, Kuchma 
continued to stay in power, partly because of opposition leaders’ failure to mobilize the 
bulk of Ukrainian population. The largest demonstrations were able to gather around 
20,000 to 30,000 people.118 A poll, conducted in late 2000 and early 2001, found that only 
1 percent of whole population was ready to participate in protests, while 25 percent were 
inclined to “wait for better times.”119 At the same time, the failure of the opposition 
movement to appeal to the broader public “may be related to the fact that national identity 
played a far less prominent role in this protest than it did in successful protests,” as Way 
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remarks.120 Another reason Kuchma was able to remain in power was because the support 
of oligarchic factions in parliament rescued him from potential impeachment. 
With the Gongadze scandal, Kuchma’s popularity sank at home, dropping as low as 
26 percent.121 He also lost his credibility in the eyes of Western leaders. In 2002, Kuchma 
was excluded from an upcoming NATO meeting. Rejected by the West, Kuchma turned 
to Putin’s Russia to develop closer ties. At the same time, Prime Minister Yushchenko 
emerged as the most popular leader in the government.122 His pro-market reforms gained 
him the support of the West, including the United States. However, Yushchenko’s 
economic policies disturbed pro-Kuchma oligarchs, who suffered losses in their sources 
of income, and aroused the opposition of the communists. Together these two forces 
ousted Yushchenko’s government together with 263 votes in the parliament in April 
2001.123 This also marked the end of the coalition between centrist factions and national 
democrats as the latter favored Yushchenko’s leadership. 
Simultaneously, national democrats began to regroup within two political formations. 
First, Timoshenko initiated steps to create an anti-Kuchma alliance. Following her release 
from prison in March 2001,124 Timoshenko formed an electoral alliance based on her 
Fatherland Party to run in the 2002 parliamentary race. Second, Yushchenko moved to 
lead the electoral bloc “Our Ukraine,” although he continued to refrain from criticizing 
Kuchma’s presidency. Most critically, Yushchenko’s growing popularity attracted the 
support of several wealthy businessmen to his bloc. Petro Poroshenko was one of them, 
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who owned confectionary factories.  Another businessman was Yevhenii Chervonenko, 
who run a drink and a truck company. David Zhaniia and Mikola Martinenko, both made 
their money in the energy sector, were also among the supporters of Yushchenko’s bloc. 
All these millionaires accumulated their wealth, owing to good relations with Kuchma 
and his administration. However, unlike other oligarchs who remained on the side of the 
Kuchma regime, they “nearly all run active businesses, which would benefit from a less 
active state.”125 As the rule of law remained weak in Ukraine, these oligarchs thus saw 
the involvement in politics as a way to protect their properties from the state. Finally, the 
liberalization of economy under Yushchenko’s premiership made the oligarchs less 
dependent on the state, which encouraged them to invest in opposition forces.126 
By contrast, major oligarchs – billionaires – continued to back the Kuchma regime, 
while competing with each other to grab more state assets. Various oligarchic factions in 
the parliament, including centrist NDP, Pinchuk’s Labor Party, and Party of Regions, 
among others, formed an election bloc – “For a United Ukraine,” – ahead of the 2002 
parliamentary elections. The chief of Kuchma’s presidential administration, Volodimir 
Litvin, undertook the leadership position of the bloc. Additionally, Medvedchuk’s 
SDP(u) ran on the side of the regime in the upcoming elections. 
The election result was a victory for Yuschenko’s Our Ukraine, gaining 24.8 percent 
of the seats in parliament. The opposition bloc performed well particularly in multi-
mandate districts, dominating western regions of Ukraine. Although For a United Ukraine 
won only half the number of PR votes and seats as Our Ukraine, it gained around 50 
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percent more SMD seats than Our Ukraine, giving the bloc just 11 fewer total seats in the 
parliament. The pro-Kuchma bloc had a strong showing in the eastern regions of Donetsk, 
Luhansk, and Kharkiv. The Communist Party’s share of seats amounted to 14.4 percent, 
gaining much support in southern Ukraine. Timoshenko’s bloc won 4.8 percent of seats, 
with the backing of western regions. Also, Moroz’s Socialist Party and Medvedchuk’s 
SDP(u) scored around 5 percent of parliamentary seats. While independents won 20 
percent of the seats, no less than 5 percent rapidly aligned with For a United Ukraine. 
 
Table 4.6   Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections, March 31, 2002 
Political Party PR Votes, 
% 
 
PR Seats SMD Seats Total Seats Share of Seats, 
% 
Our Ukraine 23.5 70 42 112 24.8 
For a United Ukraine 11.7 35 66 101 22.4 
Communist Party  19.8 59 6 65 14.4 
Timoshenko Bloc 7.2 22 0 22 4.8 
Socialist Democratic Party 
(United) 
6.2 19 5 24 5.3 
Socialist Party 6.8 20 3 23 5.1 
Other Parties 17.9  – 9 9 2 
Independents    94 94 20 
Against All/Invalid 6.1     
Total 100 225 225 450 100 
Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine, www.cvk.gov.ua. 
 
 
However, the victory of opposition forces in the election did not necessarily translate into 
growing influence in state institutions. On the contrary, Kuchma and his allies succeeded 
in installing Litvin as speaker of the parliament in May 2002 by a vote of 226. After the 
appointment of Medvedchuk as head of the presidential administration, the regime also 
intensified its efforts to form a parliamentary majority. This was completed in October 
with the support of oligarchic factions which earlier put together For a United Ukraine. 
In November, Viktor Yanukovich, the chairman of Donetsk region, was appointed as 
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prime minister, gaining 234 votes in the parliament. The triumph of pro-Kuchma forces 
was partially an outcome of the intimidation, bribery, and blackmailing of some 
parliamentarians. 
While Kuchma’s allies were capturing the government, regime opponents were 
suffering losses. In particular, business owners who backed the opposition forces came 
under close scrutiny of state authorities. The companies of Poroshenko and Zhvaniia, 
among others, were raided on various occasions.127 Journalist and reporters in opposition 
were increasingly subjected to the government’s pressure. Kuchma’s chief of staff, 
Medvedchuk, also tightened the regime’s control of media by imposing a new form of 
censorship. In what is called temniki, Medvedchuk and his staff dictated “specific events 
and topics the television stations should accent in their news coverage.”128 Furthermore, 
journalists who did not comply with temniki had been subjected to threats. 
In response to Kuchma’s growing repression, opposition leaders sought to instigate 
street demonstrations. In September 2002, the “Arise, Ukraine!” movement, led by 
Timoshenko, Moroz, and Simonenko, called for the removal of Kuchma. However, 
Yushchenko’s unclear attitude towards the protest hampered opposition leaders’ appeal 
to Ukrainian people.129 The movement was able to gather 25,000 people in Kyiv, at most.  
While the “Arise, Ukraine” demonstrations failed to gain sufficient support to force 
Kuchma’s exit in 2002, Yushchenko emerged as a favorable candidate in opposition 
before the 2004 presidential elections. In turn, the pro-Kuchma factions in the parliament 
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declared their support for Yanukovich, who also became the head of Party of Regions in 
2003, as presidential candidate. However, Kuchma’s fear that Yushchenko might win led 
him to seek changes in the constitution which would reduce presidential powers and 
strengthen parliamentary authority. While communists and socialists, along with 
oligarchic factions, backed Kuchma’s proposal, the Timoshenko bloc and Yushchenko’s 
Our Ukraine strongly opposed it. On April 8, 2004, 294 parliamentarians voted in favor 
of constitutional changes, just 6 votes short of the necessary two-thirds majority.130 
 
The 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution 
The downfall of Kuchma’s authoritarianism came with the popular protests that arose in 
response to the rigged presidential elections of 2004. The mass rallies, which had become 
known as the Orange Revolution, led to the nullification of the November 21 runoff by 
the Supreme Court and the scheduling of a new run-off on December 26, 2004. In what 
follows, the opposition leader Yushchenko defeated Kuchma’s hand-picked successor 
Yanukovich. Moreover, I argue that two factors led to the success of the opposition 
movement in ousting Ukraine’s authoritarian regime. First, Yanukovich’s election 
campaign, which was purposefully built upon provoking divided perceptions of 
Ukrainian identity, played an inverse role by prompting many people who ascribed to 
Ukrainophile identity to take part in demonstrations against the regime. Second, 
Kuchma’s system of patronage, which distributed state economic resources to private 
actors in exchange for political support, turned against the regime. While privatization of 
the early 2000s increased the wealth of oligarchs, simultaneous market reforms 
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diminished their dependence on the state. All this encouraged some of the oligarchs, who 
grew weary of Kuchma’s strong hand in the economy, to provide financial and 
organizational resources necessary for stimulating the anti-regime protest. In the end, the 
opposition movement’s ability to gain broad support from the Ukrainophile population, 
along with its access to economic resources, led to the downfall of Kuchma’s 
authoritarianism in 2004. We will turn to these arguments below in details.  
As noted earlier, Yushchenko became a popular political figure after serving as prime 
minister in 2000-01. Under his leadership, Ukraine’s economy grew considerably and 
Ukrainian pensioners began to receive their pay checks.131 While Yushchenko’s efforts 
put the country’s economy on its feet and also gained him the support of the West, the 
Gongadze scandal brought Kuchma administration’s corruption and criminality to light. 
At this point, Kuchma’s popularity sank at home, and his only ally remained Putin’s 
Russia abroad. Moreover, Kuchma’s fear of prosecution led him to anoint a successor, 
who was also not very popular in Ukraine. In fact, early opinion polls revealed the 
popularity of Yushchenko in comparison to Yanukovich (around 38% to 32%). 
To broaden his appeal, Yanukovich at first made a populist appeal by promising 
increases in pensions and welfare benefits. Although this had a positive impact in 
Yanukovich’s ratings, it was still not sufficient for him to win an election.132 With the 
arrival of the arrival of Russian political technologists – including Gleb Pavlovskii and 
Marat Gelman – upon the invitation of Kuchma’s chief of staff, Medvedchuk, the 
Yanukovich campaign gained a new direction. The strategy was now to cast the elections 
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as a struggle between the competing visions for Ukraine. Thus, Yanukovich’s campaign 
focused on portraying him as a pro-Russian leader, while discrediting Yushchenko as a 
Ukrainian nationalist. In this vein, Yanukovich pledged to elevate the status of Russian 
to an official language and to introduce dual citizenship of Ukrainians with Russia.133 He 
also revealed himself in opposition to Ukraine’s NATO membership. A 2004 opinion poll 
found that around 60 percent of Ukrainians agreed with Yanukovich’s proposals for 
Russian language and dual citizenship, while more than 20 percent opposed these 
potential policies. 134 Similarly, 43 percent of Ukrainians were against the country’s 
access to NATO, while 19 percent was in favor of such direction. 135 Lastly, Putin’s visit 
to Ukraine a week before the election also strengthened Yanukovich’s campaign appeal 
among the Russophile population.   
In turn, Yushchenko sought to appeal to the Ukrainian people by promising “change” 
in the country. He made a commitment to end corruption, enforce the rule of law, and 
promote freedom. Yushchenko unequivocally supported Ukraine’s greater integration 
with Europe. While his campaign did not embrace ethno-nationalistic vision of Ukrainian 
people, he nonetheless favored Ukrainian to remain the sole state language. Additionally, 
Yushchenko encouraged constituencies to be cautious against the government which 
“tr[ies] to divide the Ukrainian people into ‘west’ and ‘east,’ divide us by ethnic origin 
and language, by history and faith” in order to deflect the opposition against itself. He 
maintained that “there is only one conflict in Ukraine today – between those in power and 
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the people.”136 Thus, Yushchenko refused to run on an election platform that 
Yanukovich’s team very much attempted to impose. 
Despite Yushchenko’s resistance to get involved in a divisive campaign, Yanukovich 
and the regime continued to discredit the opposition leader as a Western agent, extremist, 
and radical nationalist. In October, tons of flyers and posters were found in various 
warehouses in and around Kyiv. These materials propagated anti-American and anti-
Yushchenko sentiments together by even hinting a threat of a civil war if an American 
agent comes into power.137 Next, state authorities labelled youth organizations which 
favored Yushchenko’s candidacy as extremist groups. More than 350 activists of Pora 
(It’s Time), modelled on the opposition movements of Serbia (Otpor) and Georgia 
(Kmara) which had succeeded in overthrowing authoritarian leaders, were detained 
across the country.138 Security services also claimed to find explosives in Pora’s Kyiv 
office. While police found no criminal evidence in their initial search which was 
videotaped by activists, they returned to the office when there was no one around. Next, 
the Prosecutor General’s office filed a case against Pora on the grounds of “terrorism” 
and “destabilizing the situation in the country.”139 State authorities also suggested that 
members of Pora might have planted the bomb in a Kyiv market, which killed one person 
and injured eleven people in August 2004.140 Lastly, various radical nationalist groups 
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with close ties to Medvedchuk and SDP(u) were used to delegitimize Yushchenko and 
his supporters. Pro-regime TV stations widely aired the election advertisements of these 
groups which were ostensibly in favor of Yushchenko, but indeed served to “build up 
anti-Yushchenko stereotypes in the east.”141 In the same vein, the nationalist groups 
controlled by the regime held demonstrations to spread an image of Yushchenko as a 
fascist leader. 
As the regime controlled major Ukrainian TV channels, Yushchenko’s candidacy was 
also continually given negative coverage. Yanukovich’s election campaign dominated 
the news and received sympathetic coverage in all the main TV stations which were 
controlled by the state and pro-regime oligarchs. Moreover, the regime forced censorship 
on editorial boards, journalists, and reporters. Media agencies which refused to comply 
with temniki were systematically harassed. Channel 5 was one of the news outlets which 
was subjected to the regime’s pressure. The TV station, which was co-owned by Our 
Ukraine’s Petro Poroshenko, found its broadcasting license revoked and bank accounts 
frozen in October, because of its alternative coverage of the elections.142 
In a similar way, the government exploited its control over administrative resources 
to promote Yanukovich’s candidacy. State employees were encouraged to campaign in 
favor of Kuchma’s hand-picked successor at local levels. Students and public sector 
workers were intimidated if they refused to support Yanukovich. Simultaneously, police 
officers were used to impede people’s attendance in opposition rallies. Some campaign 
events of opposition presidential candidates were also thwarted by state authorities.143     
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In the end, all these government tactics led to a spike in Yanukovich’s popularity. 
Late polls showed that more than 40 percent of the Ukrainians backed Yanukovich, 
compared to earlier 32 percent.144 Notwithstanding this, the regime reportedly attempted 
to carry out election fraud to ensure a victory for Yanukovich. However, these efforts fell 
short. In the first round of elections, Yushchenko defeated Yanukovich by a small margin, 
39.90 percent to 39.26 percent. Thus, the regime was only able to falsify election results 
to diminish the gap between Yushchenko’s and Yanukovich’s shares of vote, since the 
exit polls showed that Yushchenko was leading by around 5 points.145 As also expected, 
Yushchenko gained the support of the western and central regions, while Yanukovich 
was backed in the eastern and southern regions. 
After the first round of elections, Timoshenko’s bloc, Moroz’s Socialist Party, and 
ex-Prime Minister Anatolii Kinakh came together to endorse Yushchenko’s candidacy. 
Yushchenko’s popularity ratings rose above 40 percent in November, while 
Yanukovich’s ratings declined to 35 percent.146 In turn, the regime intensified its efforts 
to carry out electoral fraud in the run-off elections held in November. According to 
preliminary results, Yanukovich was declared as the winner of the elections late in the 
night of 21 November. Conversely, exit polls put Yushchenko ahead of Yanukovich by 
53 percent to 44 percent.147 As it became clear that state authorities had carried out large-
scale fraud,148 Yushchenko called on his supporters to defend democracy. In response, 
more than 200,000 people poured into Kyiv’s central square Maidan Nezalezhnosti 
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(Independence Square) on November 22. With Pora providing the early organizational 
muscle, hundreds of tents were erected in downtown Kyiv on November 22-23. In the 
ensuing days, many more Yushchenko supporters travelled to participate in the 
demonstrations, particularly from the western regions. Some western regions and cities 
(Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil) also refused the preliminary election results and 
declared Yushchenko as Ukraine’s president.149 In a symbolic act, Yushchenko was 
furthermore sworn in presidency before the parliament on November 23. However, the 
Central Election Commission announced Yanukovich’s victory against Yushchenko on 
November 24, with 49.46 to 46.61 percent of the vote. 
After Yanukovich was declared as the winner of the elections, the anti-regime protest 
became more intensified. The demonstrators seized the Trade Union building, the 
Ukrainian House, and the City Hall in Kyiv center, which were used to coordinate protest 
activities.150 Upon the call of Yushchenko, the activists, mostly made up of Pora 
members, 151 also blocked the state buildings, including the ministries and the Presidential 
Administration offices. While “a couple of thousands of [Pora] activists … create[d] an 
initial ‘nucleus’ for the demonstrations,”152 hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian people 
travelled to Kyiv in support of Yushchenko. Sizable opposition rallies were also held in 
other cities, including Lviv, Sumy, Kharkiv and Odesa. Many protesters displayed 
Yushchenko’s campaign color, orange, in their clothing, ribbons and flags, while chanting 
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the slogans of “Yushchenko is our president,” “Together we are many, we cannot be 
defeated,” and “East-West together.” 
Thus, massive electoral fraud sparked popular protests throughout Ukraine on the side 
of Yushchenko. According to Mark Beissinger’s study of different surveys, between 13 
and 18 percent of Ukraine’s 36 million adult population participated in these 
demonstrations which lasted nineteen days.153 A larger share of Ukrainian people also 
gave support to the pro-Yushchenko movement rather than opposing it, although the 
margin varied between 1 percent to 11 percent in the surveys.154 Despite many people 
seemed to unite against an authoritarian regime, Beissinger finds that protesters had 
indeed a weak commitment to democratic values. For instance, only 34 percent of 
Ukrainians who joined the demonstrations stated that they supported a multi-party 
system, while 38 percent did not share this view.155 Similarly, 61 percent of pro-
Yushchenko demonstrators agreed that strong leaders could overcome the challenges that 
the country met better than democratic mechanisms.156 Lastly, only 40 percent expressed 
that they protested “to defend the values of a just, democratic society,” when asked to list 
two reasons for participation.157 Therefore, Beissinger remarks that “a majority of those 
who participated were not primarily motivated by the desire to defend democratic 
values,” although the protest certainly benefitted from democratically minded individuals 
and leaders.158 
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Then, the obvious question remains: What explains this popular protest? Indeed, 
competing visions of Ukrainian nation seem to be the major source of mobilization of 
support on the ground. As noted earlier, Yanukovich’s campaign sought to provoke and 
exploit the divided perceptions of Ukrainian identity in anticipation of gaining broader 
support than Yushchenko. Thus, Yanukovich used his election platform to make pro-
Russian appeals and to discredit Yushchenko as a radical Ukrainian nationalist. However, 
this culminated an inverse effect by impelling many citizens who ascribed to 
Ukrainophile identity to come out to streets in protest, after the electoral fraud of 
November 21.  
Indeed, Beissinger’s analysis of a survey reveals that Ukrainophile identity – which 
supports the development of Ukrainian language and culture, and opposes closer ties with 
Russia – played a key role in protest participation. First, 74 percent of Orange 
Revolutionaries stated that they spoke mostly Ukrainian in their daily lives, compared to 
70 percent of Yanukovich’s supporters who stated to speak Russian.159 Next, more than 
65 percent of pro-Yushchenko protesters were against making Russian an official 
language.160 Third, around 80 percent of Ukrainian protesters agreed either that “Ukraine 
should develop relations primarily with the West” or that “Ukraine should remain 
independent and rely on its resources.”161 
Additionally, many protesters were from western regions which had been the 
breeding ground for Ukrainian nationalism. Western Ukrainians protested in support of 
Yushchenko at rates up to eight times greater than the rest of Ukrainians.162 Despite their 
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smaller share in the Ukrainian population (around 18 percent), western Ukrainians made 
up of 50 percent of all Orange revolutionaries.163 Another 40 percent of pro-Yushchenko 
protesters were from central regions.164 Thus, overwhelming majority of protesters in the 
Orange revolution came from western and center regions, although these two regions only 
contained half of the Ukraine’s overall population. By contrast, many Ukrainians in the 
eastern and southern regions remained in opposition to the Orange revolution.165 In the 
end, competing visions of the Ukrainian identity had overwhelming effect on the attitudes 
of country’s population toward the protest. 
As many Ukrainophile activists arrived in Kyiv, the Maidan became the epicenter of 
the protest in support of Yushchenko. Several political figures undertook the role of 
leading the crowds on the ground. Yushchenko’s ally Timoshenko and campaign 
manager Olexandr Zinchenko166 often appeared on the stage to maintain the commitment 
to the protest. Our Ukraine’s Mikola Tomenko and the Socialist Party’s Yurii Lutsenko 
addressed the Maidan daily to organize protest activities. On the ground, Our Ukraine’s 
Roman Bessmertnii167 worked with Pora to coordinate logistic, security, further 
opposition actions. Meanwhile, Kyiv’s Mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko stated his support 
for the protest. The city administration began to provide utility services and sanitary 
facilities, which helped to sustain ever-growing number of protesters.168  
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Moreover, pro-Yushchenko oligarchs mobilized financial and organizational 
resources necessary for maintaining the protest movement. From the beginning, David 
Zhvaniia, a big donor of Yushchenko’s presidential campaign, contributed substantially 
to the Maidan, by bringing tents, kitchen equipment, food, and biotoilets.169 Petro 
Poroshenko and Olexandr Zinchenko – both were Kuchma’s former allies – also provided 
funding for the tent city and the protest.170 According to Zhvaniia, the cost of the 
Yushchenko campaign and the Orange Revolution was together more than $150 million, 
and it was paid by Ukrainian businessmen.171 Additionally, Kyiv’s small and medium 
size business owners who had “begun to resent the influence of the arriviste Donetsk 
elite” under the Yanukovich premiership contributed to maintain the protest in the 
Maidan.172 Likewise, ordinary Kyivans supported demonstrators by bringing warm 
clothes, foods, medicine as well as donating money. Small donations of the Ukrainian 
people reportedly amounted to 20 million hryvna (around $3.85 million) in the first 
twenty days of the protest.173  
At the same time, Poroshenko’s Channel 5 proved to be critical in conveying the 
messages of the Maidan to the Ukrainian people. As pro-Kuchma allies extensively 
controlled Ukrainian TV stations, Channel 5 became the main provider of the protest 
coverage. The TV station aired continually protest events and interviews with opposition 
leaders. Although Channel 5 was available to viewers in less than half of the Ukrainian 
territory, its rating increased substantially by the end of the November.174 Next, news 
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reporters in major Ukrainian TV channels, including 1+1, Inter, and the state TV Channel 
1, began to oppose the government’s increasing censorship by collectively going on strike 
or resigning from their positions.175 Finally, the resistance of journalists against the 
government pressure enabled the opposition movement to receive coverage from national 
TV stations – 1+1 and Channel 1. 
While all this access to different resources led the opposition movement to grow 
stronger on the ground, Yanukovich also sought to demonstrate his strength by mobilizing 
his supporters. Indeed, Beissinger’s study finds that between 1.9 and 3.9 percent of the 
Ukrainian adult population took part in pro-Yanukovich demonstrations.176 A large share 
of the protesters consisted of individuals from the Donestk region (around 40 percent).177 
At the same time, pro-Yanukovich protestors  were linked to greater dependency on the 
government for their livelihood and possessed less wealth compared to the Orange 
revolutionaries, which arguably made them more susceptible to potential reprisal from 
the regime.178 Partly as a result of this, Yanukovich’s supporters’ commitment to the 
protest was seemingly weak in Kyiv.  Indeed, the rallies remained small in number and 
lasted only for a couple of days. 
While his efforts to organize rallies in Kyiv did not result in strong showing of 
support, Yanukovich, along with his allies in the regime, made growing demands to use 
of force against the pro-Yushchenko protesters. According to several reports, Ukraine’s 
Interior Ministry commanded 10,000 troops, with bullets and tear gas, to move towards 
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Kyiv on November 28, 2004.179 Yet Kuchma resisted the use of force to disperse the 
protest180 and called the country’s leaders since early on to return the negotiating table 
for resolving the political crisis. At the same time, Ukraine’s security forces were 
fragmented to launch a crackdown on the pro-Yushchenko protesters. In particular, the 
SBU was reported to cooperate with the opposition forces by providing the transcripts of 
phone conversations revealing the electoral fraud and also passing on information about 
the government’s preparation for a violent response.181 Moreover, the military allegedly 
conveyed its intention to defend the protesters, if the Interior Ministry deploys troops in 
Kyiv.182 
As Yanukovich and his allies were not able to get rid of the protesters forcibly – and, 
similarly, the opposition forces “lacked the power to impose unilateral victory,”183 – 
Ukraine’s political elite had to negotiate a solution to end the conflict. On November 26, 
Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski, Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus, the 
EU Commissioner Javier Solana, and OSCE representative Jan Kubis, in addition to the 
speaker of the Russian parliament Boris Grizlov, arrived in Kyiv to mediate the talks 
between the political forces. At the same time, Volodomir Litvin, the speaker of the Rada, 
played a significant role in this process. On November 27, the Ukrainian parliament under 
Litvin’s leadership declared the second round of the presidential elections invalid by a 
vote of 255 out of 450. 307 parliamentarians also voted that the election result did not 
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reflect the will of voters.184 Although these resolutions were non-binding, the decision of 
the Rada rendered the opposition demands legitimate. It also revealed that the pro-
Kuchma oligarchic factions were no longer united behind the Yanukovich presidency. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court eventually deemed the election results invalid on 
December 3, 2004. A re-run of the second round of the presidential elections were 
scheduled to be held on December 26. 
While the specifics of the election were yet to be determined, Yushchenko sought to 
ensure that the new law would provide sufficient mechanisms to reduce the voter fraud. 
In turn, the elite of the old regime were eager to weaken the powers of a potential 
Yushchenko presidency, with the purpose of protecting their own interests through the 
parliament. These concerns resulted in the parliament to negotiate a comprehensive 
agreement between the political forces on December 8. While the agreement introduced 
new regulations to promote free and fair elections, it also articulated constitutional 
reforms to diminish the presidential powers. According to the proposed amendments to 
the constitution, Ukraine will have a parliamentary-presidential system, the parliament 
will select the prime minister and appoint many members of the government. The 
president will remain limited in its power to dismiss the parliament. With 402 
parliamentarians, including 78 members of Our Ukraine and 1 member of Timoshenko 
bloc, voting in favor of these overall changes in the law, the agreement between the 
Ukrainian political forces sealed.185 Following the vote in the parliament, Ukrainian 
people went to the polls for a re-run of the second round of the presidential elections. On 
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185 “Politreforma iz ‘Paketa’: Kto Chto Poluchit i Kogda,” [Political Reforms According to the Package of 
the Constitutional Amendments: Who Gets What and When], Ukrainskaia Pravda, December 8, 2004.  
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December 26, 2004, Yushchenko became the country’s third president by defeating 
Yanukovich, with 52 percent to 44 percent. 
To sum up, the Orange Revolution stemmed from spontaneous actions of individuals 
who were ascribed to Ukrainophile identity in the face of large-scale election fraud. While 
democratic values certainly motivated some proportion of the protesters, Yanukovich’s 
pro-Russian appeal indeed provoked massive numbers of Ukrainian people to join the 
demonstrations in opposition to the regime. At the same time, the opposition forces were 
able to access to economic resources critical for stimulating the protest, as several 
oligarchs who had previously benefitted from close relations to the Kuchma 
administration aligned themselves with the Yushchenko camp. While Yanukovich sought 
to use force against the protesters, Kuchma’s reluctance to do so weakened his chosen 
successor’s ability to command the internal security forces. Additionally, the 
disagreement between Yanukovich and Kuchma arguably emboldened different security 
agencies to resist the government’s potential act of repression. Moreover, the pro-regime 
alliance also dissolved in the face of the mass protest, which led the opposition forces to 
gain a legitimate ground for their demands in the parliament. In the end, regime 
opponents’ ability to captivate support based on a competing vision of national identity 




















































CHAPTER V: AUTHORITARIAN CONSOLIDATION AND POPULAR 
PROTESTS IN RUSSIA (2000-2012) 
 
Elected by winning 52.9 percent of national votes in March 2000, Putin, in his first 
presidential term, moved swiftly to consolidate authoritarian rule. To achieve this end, 
Putin’s regime on the one hand sought to dominate the right to articulate claims about 
Russian nation.1 While the regime turned to patriotic lexis to evoke a sense of a Russian 
national identity, the cultivation of this identity allowed the incumbent rule to neutralize 
its opponents and galvanize support from both political elite and people in the 
strengthening of central authority. By placing references to patriotism, Russia’s great-
powerness (derzhavnost), its state-centeredness (gosudarstvennost), and collectivism, the 
Kremlin aimed at espousing a sense of ultimate meaning and coherence to nation which 
would legitimize Putin’s authoritarian vision.2 At the same time, the regime-sponsored 
national idea was increasingly imbued with ethno-political connotations.3 Following 
Putin’s first term, traditional values began to seem more russkii (ethnic Russian) than 
ever before in the post-Soviet period. In the end, this line of nationalism strengthened the 
incumbent autocrat’s ability to maintain the loyalty of disparate groups in Russia. 
                                                 
1 See, Marlene Laruelle, In the name of the Nation: Nationalism and Politics in Contemporary Russia, pp. 
134-48, “Rethinking Russian Nationalism: Historical continuity, political diversity, and doctrinal 
fragmentation,” in Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia, London and New York: 
Routledge, 2009, pp. 13-49, “Russia as an anti-liberal European civilization” in The New Russian 
Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000-15, ed. by Pal Kolsto and Helge 
Blakkisrud, Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2016, pp. 275-98.      
2 See, Petr Panov, “Nation-building in post-Soviet Russia: What kind of nationalism is produced by the 
Kremlin,” Journal of Eurasian Studies,” Vol. 1, 2010, pp. 85-94; Alfred B. Evans, “Putin’s Legacy and 
Russia’s Identity,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vo. 60(6), August 2008, pp. 899-912; Aleksandr Verkhovskii and 
Emil Pain, “Civilizational Nationalism: The Russian Version of the ‘Special Path,’” Russian Social Science 
Review, Vol. 56(4), August 2015, pp. 2-36. 
3 Pal Kolsto, “The ethnification of Russian nationalism,” in The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, 
Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000-15, edited by Pal Kolsto and Helge Blakkisrud, Edinburg: Edinburg 
University Press, 2016, pp. 18-45. 
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In consolidation of authoritarian rule, Putin’s presidency on the other hand invested 
in reasserting state control over economy. Russian political system under Yeltsin was 
seemingly vulnerable to oligarchic interests. While oligarchy owed its wealth to unruly 
privatization of state enterprises, their survival relied on close relations with political 
elites. To advance their economic interests, oligarchs did not shy away from meddling 
into electoral campaigns, financing political parties, and buying off seats in the Duma. 
The competition among oligarchs, along with the regime’s failure to resist lobbying 
pressures, degraded state institutions. After a decade of Yeltsin’s leadership in which state 
authority weakened, crime and corruption became widespread, and living standards 
dropped dramatically, Putin launched a campaign to reinstitute a larger role for state in 
economy. To do this, the incumbent regime distanced a group of oligarchs, which it 
perceived as potential threat to its authority, through selective application of law. Soon 
thereafter, the regime effectively regained the control of assets privatized in the 1990s. 
As Putin’s rule stripped prominent oligarchs of their assets, and reasserted state 
control over economy, regime dissenters also saw their economic resources drying up. 
While opposition parties and grassroots movements lost their ability to mount serious 
challenges to the authoritarian state, increasing oil prices, and economic growth 
accompanied to it, enlisted people further behind Putin’s rule. Thus, Russian citizens, 
who enjoyed better standard of living, became more invested in the stability of the regime. 
Above all, the Putin period clearly illustrates that when national identity discourse and 
economic resources – the factors that precipitate the fall of authoritarian rule – are 
simultaneously harnessed by an incumbent power, this strengthens incumbent 
authoritarian’s ability to retain power. 
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The Consolidation of Putin’s Authoritarianism in 2000-2008 
Following Yeltsin’s surprise announcement of resignation, Putin became acting president 
of Russia in the last day of 1999. A few days before Yeltsin stepped down, Putin discussed 
ideological and economic underpinning for his potential (authoritarian) rule in the words 
of the attainment of Russia’s revival in a document entitled Russia at the turn of 
Millennium.4 In what is commonly now referred as Millennium Manifesto, Russia’s future 
president began with offering his own interpretation and reconciliation of Russia’s past 
and present. At first, Putin insisted that “[i]t would be a mistake not to recognize … the 
unquestionable achievements of those [communist] times. But it would be an even bigger 
mistake not to realize the outrageous price our country and its people had to pay for that 
social experiment.”5 Therefore, Putin suggested, this epoch moved Russia away from “the 
mainstream of civilization.” Next, the prime minister asserted that the country “reached 
its limits for political and socio-economic upheavals, cataclysms and radical reform.”6 
Seeking to repudiate calls for revolution, Putin stressed that “[b]e it under communist, 
national-patriotic, or radical-liberal slogans, our country and our people will not stand a 
new radical break-up.”7 Lastly, Putin insisted that “[the] country’s genuine renewal 
cannot be achieved by merely experimenting with abstract models and schemes taken 
from foreign textbooks.” 8 In the view of Putin, Russia’s experience in the 1990s already 
demonstrated that the country had to find “its own path of renewal.” 
                                                 
4 Vladimir Putin, “Russia at the turn of the millennium,” December 29, 1999 in Putin: Russia’s Choice, 
Richard Sakwa, 2nd ed., New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 317-28. Also, see, “Rossia na rubezhe 








In this context, Putin’s Millennium Manifesto continued by outlining the various ways 
in which unity of Russian people and restoration of a strong state can lay the basis for 
Russia’s future. Admittedly, hence, Putin aimed at consolidating Russian nation around 
state. While Putin stressed the importance of efforts to endorse the unity of nation, this 
ostensibly did not entail his support for the cultivation of a state ideology. In the words 
of Putin, “[t]here should be no forced civil accord in a democratic Russia. Social accord 
can only be voluntary.”9 However, Putin insisted that national consolidation can be 
attained on the grounds of “primordial, traditional values of Russians (Rossianin).”10 At 
the center of Russian idea, Putin thus placed patriotism, greatness of Russia, state-
centeredness, and social solidarity. 
According to Putin, patriotism was “a feeling of pride in one’s country, its history and 
accomplishments.”11 At the same time, patriotism was “the striving to make one country 
better, richer, stronger and happier.”12 Insofar as patriotic feelings were not filled with 
“nationalist conceit” and “imperial ambitions,” Putin argued, “there is nothing 
reprehensible or bigoted about them.” Next, Putin asserted that “Russia was and will 
remain a great power.”13 In his view, “characteristics of its [Russia’s] geopolitical, 
economic, and cultural existence”14 dictates nation’s destiny to thrive as a great power. 
Additionally, Millennium Manifesto highlighted, “[f]or Russians, a strong state is not an 
anomaly to be discarded.”15 In the words of Putin, “[o]ur state and its institutions and 
structures have always played an exceptionally important role in the life of the country 










and its people.”16 Putin’s emphasis on social solidarity further amounted to this line of 
thinking, as Millennium Manifesto reiterated that “collective forms of social activity” 
rather than “individualism” was what Russians accustomed to. Thus, Putin insisted that 
“paternalistic sentiments have struck deep roots in Russian society.” 
However, the “primordial, traditional values” that Putin identified with rossiiskii 
people throughout the Manifesto emerged to be drawn from a past which rather belongs 
to ethnic Russians. Although Putin’s choice to use rossiiskii over russkii in appearance 
evoked an understanding of nationhood based on citizenship, as Pal Kolsto notes that the 
values ascribed to the nation “were generally the same ones as those that numerous 
authors before him singled out as typical of ethnic Russians and not necessarily of other 
peoples of Russia.”17 Thus, the culture that Russian regime promoted as constitutive of 
nation in the ensuing years was imbued with a particular ethnic marker. This also became 
discernible as Putin’s nationalist ideology increasingly displayed references to russkaia 
culture. 
Accordingly, adherence to patriotic identity and values swiftly emerged to be the 
point of reference for inclusion, and so exclusion, in the moral and political community 
of nation – instead of citizenship – under Putin’s presidency.18 At the same time, this line 
of thinking ironically allowed rulers to mobilize support – both of ethnic and non-ethnic 
Russians – in the name of state, regardless of the constitutive content of peoplehood (civic 
vs. ethnic understanding of nationhood). By emphasizing the historical continuity 
embodied in the state – above and beyond any transformation in political authority, – 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Kolsto, “The ethnification of Russian nationalism,” p. 19.  
18 This idea is built upon Brubaker’s discussion on nationalism, see, Ethnicity without Groups, pp. 132-47. 
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Putin’s regime was also able to appeal to disparate political groups regardless of their 
vision of nation. With the adoption of Russia’s state symbols in December 2000, the 
incumbent power further reconciled the three epochs of the Russian history.19 The new 
national anthem was the same Soviet one with new lyrics, while the coat of arms was a 
red flag, symbolizing Soviet past, with a double-headed Tsarist eagle on it. The new flag 
consisted of white, blue, and red colors, representing Russia’s democratic experiment 
under provisional government in 1917.20 
To reinstate a strong state, Putin’s Millennium Manifesto moreover called for the 
formation of “a democratic, law-based, workable federal state.” Putin particularly seemed 
to concern with “the constitutionality of adopted laws” in sub-national units in his 
Manifesto. As Russia’s judiciary remains slow to ensure this, Putin argued, “the 
constitutional security of the state, the federal center’s capabilities, the country’s 
manageability and Russia’s integrity would then be in jeopardy.” Additionally, 
Millennium Manifesto ascribed a larger state role in the economy to ensure Russia’s 
resurgence. Because Russia’s free market experience without “a clear understanding of 
national objectives and advances” during the 1990s plagued the country, Putin insisted, 
“today’s situation necessitates deeper state involvement in social and economic 
processes.” Hence, “the state should act where and when it is needed.” 
After all, Putin in Millennium Manifesto articulated a state-centered notion of 
nationhood which aimed at galvanizing popular support for his authoritarianism and 
                                                 
19 “Russia’s state symbols,” http://eng.flag.kremlin.ru/. 
20 The new state symbols enjoyed substantial public support. A Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) survey 
in 2002 revealed that 66 percent of respondents liked the new national anthem, while 53 percent felt the 
same for national coat of arms. Similarly, 64 percent had a positive attitude regarding the state flag, see, 




legitimizing increasing political control of the Kremlin in the ensuing years. Although 
similar notions of Russian idea were claimed by various groups across the political 
spectrum throughout the 1990s,21 the predicaments of Chechenia allowed Putin to 
appropriate this idea and mobilize public support behind the regime. Putin created an 
image of himself as “the defender of nation”22 by sending the federal forces to crush 
separatists in Chechenia following the Chechen incursion led by Shamil Basayev into the 
neighboring region of Dagestan in August 1999 and a wave of apartment bombings in 
Moscow and nearby towns in September 1999 blamed on Chechens. As Putin adamantly 
argued that “if we didn’t stop the extremists right away, we’d be facing a second 
Yugoslavia on the entire territory of the Russian Federation – the Yugoslavization of 
Russia,”23 Chechenia emerged as “his biggest selling point” in the 2000 presidential 
elections.24 Given that Putin also had economic access to broad financial and media 
resources as a result of his close relations with the Family,25 his support rose from 2 
percent at the onset of his premiership in August, 21 percent in October, a surprising 40 
percent in November, and 45 percent by the end of 1999.26 In the end, Putin was able to 




                                                 
21 See, Laruelle, In the name of the Nation. 
22 Colton and McFaul, Popular Choice and Managed Democracy, p. 180. 
23 Natali Gevorkyan, NatalyaTimokava, and Andrei Kolesnikov, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank 
Self-Portrait by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, translated by Catherina A. Fitzpatrick, New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2000, p.141. 
24 Colton and McFaul, Popular Choice and Managed Democracy, p. 171-97. 
25 Ibid., pp. 177-80; Joel M. Ostrow et al, The Consolidation of Dictatorship in Russia, pp. 96-98. 




Table 5.1   Russian Presidential Elections, March 26, 2000 
Candidate 
 
Political Party  Total Vote, % Number 
Vladimir Putin – 52.9 39,740,434 
Gennadii Ziuganov Communist Party 29.2 21,928,471 
Grigorii Yavlinskii Yabloko 5.8 4,351,452 
Aman-Geldy Tuleev – 3.0 2,217,361 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky Liberal Democrat Party 2.7 2,026,513 
Konstantin Titov Union of Right Forces  
(unofficial candidate) 
1.5 1,107,269 
Ella Pamfilova For Citizen's Worth 1.0 758,966 
Stanislav Govorukhin – 0.4 328,723 
Yuri Skuratov – 0.4 319,263 
Aleksei Podberezkin Spiritual Heritage 0.1 98,175 
Umar Dzhabrailov – 0.1 78,498 
Against all  1.9 1,414,648 
Electorate    109,372,046 
Invalid Votes  0.6 701,003 
Total Valid Votes  68.0 74,369,773 




As Putin’s regime reclaimed the Russian idea, opposition parties in parliament, which 
invoked to similar notions of nation, lost their ideological platforms and underperformed 
in elections. This led to inner party conflicts, while making opposition forces more 
susceptible to Kremlin’s influence in the ensuing years. With the formation of the 
Kremlin-sponsored political party Unity, Putin hence was able to gain the control of 
Russia’s legislative branch. 
In the 1999 Duma elections, the Fatherland – All Russia bloc (OVR), which was 
expected to be a front runner, lost considerable support after the formation of Unity. 
Unity, created only a few months ahead of elections, did not seem to have a systematic 
political program. However, Putin’s endorsement of Unity, and his tough handling of 
Chechenia, allowed the party to siphon votes off from OVR, which sought to represent 
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itself also as “the union of patriotic and democratic forces” of Russia.27 After coming 
third in the parliamentary elections behind Unity, the OVR coalition began to dissolve. 
First, the All Russia faction broke away from the coalition in January 2000 and pledged 
support to Putin ahead of the presidential elections. Following the defection from the 
bloc, the leader of OVR, Primakov, seen as a presidential contender28 while ago with his 
message for stability and strong state, decided not to run in the 2000 elections, and later 
resigned from his leadership position in the party.29 Next, in April 2001 the Fatherland 
leader Yurii Luzhkov announced the upcoming merger of his party with Unity.30 With 
the completion of this process, United Russia emerged in December 2001. Thus, by the 
end of 2001 the Kremlin accomplished to put one of its main rivals in the centrist camp 
under its control. 
Similarly, after Putin’s patriotic appeals in the 1999 presidential elections led to the 
defeat of the communist leader Gennadii Ziuganov – who ironically mounted a serious 
challenge to Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential elections as he claimed to represent patriotic 
forces of Russia, – the Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF) also found itself 
in the midst of internal conflicts. In October 2000, Gennadi Seleznev, the communist 
chairman of the State Duma, moved to form a left-democratic movement Rossiia, while 
maintaining his membership in the CPRF.31 In May 2002, Seleznev however was 
expelled from the party after his refusal to leave the speaker’s post in the Duma. The same 
year, Seleznev created the Party of Russia’s Rebirth, based on the Rossiia movement.32 
                                                 
27 See, “Manifest izbiraltelnogo bloka ‘Otechestvo – Vsia Rossiia’” [Manifesto of the Electoral Bloc 
‘Fatherland – All Russia’]. 
28 Hale, Why not Parties in Russia? p. 214. 
29 “Primakov Clears the Way for Putin,” Moscow Times, February 5, 2000. 
30 Andrei Stepanov, “Fatherland Merges with Ruling Party,” Moscow News, April 18, 2001. 
31 Aleksei Zverev, “Gena’s Engineering,” Moskovskii Komsomolets, October 2, 2000. 
32 “Left Democratic Forces Want to Have Own Faction in Next Duma,” RIA Novosti, November 16, 2002. 
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Yet Seleznev’s electoral bloc with Russian Party of Life had a marginal victory during 
the 2003 elections by gaining 3 seats in the parliament. Notwithstanding this, the CPRF 
also saw a marked decline in its support by receiving only 11.6 percent of votes, compared 
to 25.1 in the 1999 elections. According to Andrei Kunov et al., United Russia was “the 
biggest beneficiary of the communist electoral collapse” as it attracted approximately 20 
percent of the CPRF’s 1999 vote.33 
Moreover, the formation of the Kremlin-orchestrated leftist, national-patriotic party, 
Rodina (Motherland), whose one of founders Sergei Glazev was a former ally of 
communists, contributed to the decline of CPRF’s electoral support in 2003. In Luke 
March’s words, “[the CPRF’s] unwillingness to concede leadership of the national-
patriotic alliance to the rising Sergei Glazev drove him towards the competitor bloc 
Rodina.”34 The bloc, led by Dimitri Rogozin and Sergei Baburin along with Glazev, run 
on a platform which alloyed social-justice discourse, criticism of oligarchy with Russian 
ethno-nationalism.35 As Rodina enjoyed favorable media coverage and the regime’s 
financial support, it was able to win 8.2 percent of national votes in the 2003 
parliamentary elections. Hence, Laruelle highlights the positive correlation between the 







                                                 
33 Andrei Kunov, Mikhail Myagkov, Alexei Sitnikov and Dimitry Shakin, Putin’s ‘Party of Power’ and the 
Declining Power of Parties in Russia, London: Foreign Policy Center, April 2005. 
34 Luke March, “The Contemporary Russian Left after Communism: Into the Dustbin of History?” Journal 
of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 22 (4), December 2006, 435. 
35 Laruelle, In the name of the Nation, p. 102-112. 
36 Ibid., p. 105.  
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Table 5.2   Russian Parliamentary Elections, December 7, 2003 
 Votes, % 
 
 Seats Share of 
Seats, % 
 List SMD  List SMD  
Valid Votes 54.8 54.3     
Invalid Votes 0.9 1.1     
Total Votes (% of 
electorate) 
55.7 55.4     
United Russia 37.6 23.2  120 102 49.3 
Communist Party 12.6 10.8  40 12 11.6 
Liberal Democrat 
Party 
11.5 3.1  36 0 8.0 
Rodina 9.0 2.9  29 8 8.2 
Yabloko 4.3 2.6   0 4 0.9 
Union of Right Forces 4.0 2.9   0 3 0.7 
Agrarian Party of 
Russia 
3.6 1.7   0 2 0.4 
People’s Party 1.2 4.4  0 17 3.8 
Others 9.9 6.6  – 6 0.7 
Independents – 26.8  – 68 15.1 
Against all 4.7 12.9  – 3 0.7 
Invalid Ballots 1.6 2.1     
Total 100 100  225 225 100 
Electoral threshold was set at 5 percent. 
Source: “Results of Previous Elections to the Russian State Duma,” Center for Study of Public Policy, 
http://www.russiavotes.org/duma/duma_elections_93-03.php. 
 
After the CPRF’s poor showing in the 2003 parliamentary elections, Ziuganov faced 
another wave of opposition raised by Gennadii Semigin. Semigin, a businessman and 
communist deputy, sought to become the CPRF’s presidential candidate in the 2004 
elections. However, the communist leader Ziuganov backed his ally Nikolai Kharitonov 
to run in the race. The conflict within the CPRF plagued Kharitonov’s campaign and 
contributed to the electoral failure. In May 2004, the CPRF excluded Semigin from its 
membership, accusing him of cooperating with the Kremlin. Semigin formed a left 
leaning nationalist party Patriots of Russia by the end of the same year.37 Ultimately, 
communists were not able to pose as solid opposition to Putin’s regime as it did to Yeltsin, 
                                                 
37 “Patriots of Russia” Intend to Compete with the Kremlin Using Public Organizations,” RIA Novosti, 
November 24, 2004. 
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since Ziuganov’s party lost its grip on patriotism and failed to avoid internal rivalry. In 
fact, CPFR was no longer a serious regime contender in Russia under Putin. 
While Putin’s regime vanquished its main rivals in parliament, its patriotic appeals 
also attracted support of some other opposition parties. The populist-nationalist leader 
Vladimir Zhrinovskii swiftly moved his Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) to 
second Putin’s war in Chechenia. Similarly, Russia’s liberal party Union of Right Forces 
allied itself with Putin over Chechenia. As the regime also assaulted critics of Chechen 
war by claiming their lack of loyalty to state, the language of political debate in Russia 
echoed merely with patriotic voices.38 After all, as Marlene Laruelle remarks, “patriotism 
has become the ideological posture shared by all parties,” while “any meaningful public 
debate on what political, social, and economic direction Russian society should take” 
eroded from Russian political life.”39 
With Putin gaining more popular support and asserting his control over Moscow’s 
politics, the regime turned to weaken potential sources of rivalry in periphery in the words 
of restoring a strong state. Referring to “its genetic code, its traditions, and the mentality 
of its people,” Putin argued, “from the very beginning, Russia was created as a super 
centralized state.”40 Among other things, the Kremlin first divided 89 regions of Russia 
into seven super districts, headed by presidential envoys, in May 2000.41 Second, the State 
Duma replaced the law that directly made governors and the chairs of regional legislatures 
                                                 
38 Simone Ispa-Landa notes that “[u]npatriotic’ was applied to so often and in so many cases – to publicizing 
‘ugly’ facts about the war, calling for an end to the fighting rather than victory, and approving of 
international mediation rather than relying on Russian governmental bodies,” see, “Russian Preferred Self-
Image ant the Two Chechen Wars,” Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 11(2), 2003, p. 313. 
39 Marlene Laruelle, “Rethinking Russian Nationalism: Historical continuity, political diversity, and 
doctrinal fragmentation,” p.25. 
40 Natali Gevorkyan, NatalyaTimokava, and Andrei Kolesnikov, First Person, p.186. 
41 “Putin seeks power over regions,” BBC, June 15, 2000. 
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members of the Federation Council, the upper house of the parliament.42 Next, the 
Constitutional Court granted the president the right to remove regional heads who 
repeatedly failed to comply with federal laws and disband regional parliaments if their 
adopted laws violated federal legislation in April 2002.43 Lastly, the Kremlin designed 
new laws that in effect stripped regional parties of their right to contest national elections 
and reduced independent candidates’ ability to gain a seat in Duma.44 Thus, regional basis 
of politics came under close scrutiny of Putin’s regime. Simultaneously, opposition 
groups which enjoyed administrative resources brought by regional governors lost their 
financing.45 Yet, Putin’s consolidation of power over regions seemingly enjoyed 
considerable public support. As Richard Sakwa highlights, “in [the] 2004 [presidential 
elections] he [Putin] came top in every region, and this endowed his federal reforms with 
popular legitimacy.”46 
In the rise of Putin’s authoritarianism – so his outmaneuvering of opposition forces 
and ensuring the Kremlin’s political authority, – incumbent’s investment in reasserting 
its control over economy also played a key role. Admittedly, Putin’s presidency framed 
the battle against oligarchy – which were allegedly guilty of creating disorder and 
instability in Russia in the 1990s – as a way of ensuring Russia’s resurgence. Indeed, 
state’s increasing control over economy provided Putin with necessary material resources 
to sustain popular support for the regime while depriving regime opponents of any 
meaningful financing to mount challenges to itself. 
                                                 
42 “Putin Signs Last Bill in Plan,” AP, August 5, 2000. 
43 “Constitutional Court outs more limits in president’s right to dismiss elected local officials,” Newsline, 
RFERL, April 5, 2002. 
44 “Putin Wins Vote to Limit Parties,” Moscow Times 
45 Way, Pluralism by Default, p. 149. 
46 Richard Sakwa, p. 193.  
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As soon as Putin came to power, he took immediate steps to curb oligarchic influence 
on Russian politics and economy. On May 11, a few days after Putin’s inauguration, 
federal security agents raided the offices of Vladimir Gusinskii’s Media-MOST empire – 
the largest independent media group of Russia.47 As Media-Most outlets, most 
significantly NTV television station and Segodnia newspaper, were known to provide 
coverage highly critical of Putin and the war in Chechenia, the raids were widely 
interpreted as politically motivated. On June 13, Gusinskii was arrested on charges of 
embezzlement and released after four days in custody.48 In the ensuing weeks, Gusinskii 
had to sell NTV to the state-controlled energy company Gazproom and flee Russia.49 
Similarly, after Boris Berezovskii had a falling out with Putin and moved into opposition 
by forming Liberal Party, the Kremlin ordered the tax police to audit his television station 
TV-6 and oil company Sibneft in the summer of 2000.50 Ultimately, Berezovskii had to 
transfer his shares in the television station ORT and the gas company Sibneft to his 
business partner Roman Abramovich, who enjoyed preferential treatment from the 
Kremlin, and left the country in November 2000.51 The same year, some of Russia’s 
biggest business – Norilsk Nickel, Lukoil, and Avtovaz – came under scrutiny of 
authorities through also the investigation of tax evasion and improper sale deals. 
Amid the government crackdown on oligarchy, Putin summoned twenty-one leading 
business elite to lay down the rules of new era. On July 28, 2000, Putin first agreed that 
the authorities shall not review post-Soviet privatization deals. In turn, competing 
                                                 
47 Brian Humphreys, “Commandos Raid Media-MOST,” Moscow Times, May 12, 2000. 
48 Simon Saradzhyan, “Prosecutors Arrest NTV Boss Gusinsky,” Moscow Times, June 14, 2000; Oleg 
Shchedrov, “Russian Media Mogul Freed amid Outcry,” Moscow Times, June 16, 2000. 
49 Arkady Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia: From Gorbachev’s Freedom to Putin’s War, New York: 
Viking, 2015, 263-303. 
50 “Authorities suddenly interested in Berezovsky and Abramovich entities,” Monitor, July 28, 2000. 
51 Ibid,; Sarah Karush, “Berezovky Says He’s Quitting Duma,” Moscow Times, July 18, 2000. 
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business elites shall not seek to wield influence on government institutions to advance 
their interests.52 Second, Putin pledged to level the playing field by remaining 
“equidistant” from business leaders. In the end, oligarchs were no longer to benefit close 
ties with the authorities. On the contrary, they were now required to act according to law 
and stay out of politics.  As Kommersant newspaper put it, Putin in this meeting revealed 
that “[he] does not intend to be an equal partner with big business, but an elder one.”53 
This not only meant that the Kremlin was ready to put the oligarchs equally in their place, 
but also compelled them to act in the interest of state. Therefore, business leaders soon 
began to mobilize their own resources behind the regime as Putin called for it.54 
Moreover, the Kremlin manifested its decisiveness to remove oligarchs who did not 
comply with the new rules of the game by ordering the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovskii 
– the head of the Russia’s biggest oil company of Yukos – on charges of tax evasion and 
fraud in October 2003 and the subsequent accusation of the company.55 Despite Putin’s 
warning to stay away from politics, Khodorkovskii attempted to form a loyal cohort in 
the 2003 Duma elections by financing liberal parties, including Yabloko and Union of 
Right Forces, while Yukos also poured funding into the CPRF.56 Indeed, CPRF’s national 
party list included several Yukos-affiliated candidates. At the same time, the news of 
Yukos chief’s potential candidacy in the 2004 presidential elections – if not, then in 2008 
– were circulated. 57 By arresting Khodorkovskii ahead of the December elections, the 
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incumbent regime not only pushed the liberal parties that the oligarch funded out of the 
Duma, but also removed a potential competitor from political scene. 
Also, the Yukos affair was a key turning point to bring assets privatized in the 1990s 
back under the state control. As Andrei Yakovlev remarks, “natural resource rent was a 
political asset” for Putin’s regime to galvanize popular support for its enactments.”58 In 
this respect, the regime regained the possession of 11 percent of Russia’s petroleum 
production with the acquisition of Yukos.59 Simultaneously, Putin launched a campaign 
– national championship program – which called for controlling at least 51 percent of 
stocks of companies parties in the energy sector.60 In 2005, the incumbent power 
reclaimed 51 percent of Russia’s energy giant Gazprom’s shares.61 The same year, 
Abramovich also agreed to transfer his shares in Sibneft to Gazprom, which led the state 
to control one third of Russia’s overall oil output.62 In the end, a new political-economy 
system – namely, state capitalism – was born in Russia under Putin’s presidency. As 
Sakwa aptly puts, “the economic sphere was to be controlled by the authorities” in this 
new system, and “oligarchs were to understand that their historic role as the creator of 
capitalism was over.”63 
As for Russian people who witnessed their country’s wealth being cheaply sold to 
oligarchs, Putin’s steps to reassert state control over economy provided strong incentives 
to support the regime. In a ROMIR poll in 2003, 45 percent of respondents viewed the 
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influence of big corporations on the economy as negative, while only 25 percent found it 
to be positive.64 Similarly, according to a 2004 survey, 82 percent of respondents, when 
asked to choose between a stronger state and flourishing private enterprise, opted for the 
state. Of the remainders, only 12 percent advocated for private business.65 With oil prices 
sky-rocketing, and GDP rising average 7 percent a year in 1999-2007, Russian people 
mobilized further behind the regime in its battle against oligarchy. 66 In 2000-2004, the 
president’s approval ratings hovered between 61 percent and 86 percent.67 
As Putin’s rule stripped prominent oligarchs of their assets and reasserted state control 
over economy, Russian opposition hence founded itself deprived of economic resources 
and media access. Regime opponents lost their ability to challenge the authoritarian state. 
Consequently. many dissident movements vanished from Russia’s public life during 
Putin’s first term. In the absence of any meaningful opposition movement, Putin was 
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Table 5.3   Russian Presidential Elections, March 14, 2004 
Candidate 
 
Political Party Total Vote, % Number 
Vladimir Putin – 71.3 49,565,238 
Nikolai Kharitonov Communist Party 13.7 9,513,313 
Sergei Glazev – 4.1 2,850,063 
Irina Khakamada – 3.8 2,671,313 
Oleg Malyshkin Liberal Democrat Party 2.0 1,405,315 
Sergei Mironov Russian Party of Life 0.7 524,324 
Against all  3.4 2,396,219 
Electorate    108,064,281 
Invalid vote  0.5 578,824 
Valid vote   63.8 68,925,785 
Source: “Results of Presidential Elections,” Center for Study of Public Policy, 
http://www.russiavotes.org/president/presidency_96-04.php. 
 
Nonetheless, Putin, in his second term, met with social unrest at home and a wave of color 
revolutions abroad. The Beslan school attack by Chechen militants in the fall of 2004, the 
widespread mobilization against the “monetization of social benefits” in 2005, and the 
growing ethnic Russian nationalism posed challenges to regime elites in domestic 
politics. The color revolutions, seen in Georgia with the overthrow of Eduard 
Shevardnadze in 2003, next in the Orange revolution of 2004 in Ukraine, and lastly in the 
Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan with the ouster of Askar Akaev in 2005, also amounted 
to the Russian authorities’ concerns. 
To encounter these challenges, the regime reformulated the very ideational sources of 
its legitimacy. In this respect, the regime’s discursive practices first touted a color 
revolution in Russia and the return of oligarchy as potential threats to the country’s 
stability. Second, ruling elite promoted an idea of national-self conditioned by Russia’s 
special path. Third, the Kremlin made growing nationalist appeals to ethnic Russians. 
Lastly, the regime launched its own “grassroots” movement Nashi (Ours) to propagate its 
line of nationalism and to counter ideological opposition to Putin’s authoritarianism. 
152 
 
In the beginning of Putin’s second term, ruling elites put substantial effort to 
delegitimize color revolutions. In the wake of Orange revolution, through which the 
leader that the Kremlin endorsed was defeated, the Russian regime widely depicted these 
events as being promoted and financed by the West against “itself.” Moreover, the 
regime-sponsored publications propagated that a color revolution in Russia would not be 
able to bring an end to criminality, corruption and oligarchy’s power. On the contrary, it 
will lead to a less democratic regime by creating chaos and diluting the state power.68 
Instead, Putin’s leadership remarked, Russia “will decide for itself timeframe and 
conditions” of its democratic development. In the meantime, the regime declared, “[a]ll 
methods of fighting for national, religious, and other interests that are outside the law 
contradict the very principles of democracy. The state will react to such methods 
firmly.”69 
Moreover, Vladislav Surkov, the deputy chief of the presidential administration, 
developed a concept – “sovereign democracy” – in 2006, aiming at legitimizing the role 
of ruling elite in Russia’s stability.70 In the view of Surkov, it was the Russia’s “united 
elite” which could shield Russia against potential color revolutions managed by outsiders 
and the return of oligarchy, while the country builds its democracy on its own traditions. 
As Andrey Okara points out, Surkov’s project attempted to “furnish the power-wielding 
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camp with grounds for claiming the exclusive right to the upkeep of its preponderant 
status and to legitimize itself in the eyes of the nation and the world community.”71 
While the regime engaged in stirring up anti-revolutionary sentiments, public opinion 
polls found ironically widespread apathy among Russian youth toward a color revolution 
in their country. According to Sarah Mendelson and Theodore Gerber’s survey in 2005, 
72 percent of respondents did definitely not want to see an Orange revolution occurring 
in Russia. 17 percent also did probably not want to see such a development. Only 3 
percent supported the idea of Orange-like revolution in Russia. Moreover, Russian youth 
largely considered the Ukrainian revolution orchestrated by outsiders.72 In the lack of 
political enthusiasm among Russians, the Kremlin’s narrative of color revolutions thus 
served the purpose of strengthening the ideological foundations of Putin’s 
authoritarianism and further legitimizing suppression on regime dissidents. This in fact 
laid the groundwork for a new law on NGOs in 2006. To monitor “the registration, 
financing and activities” of NGOs in Russia, the new regulation created a chamber. Most 
strikingly, the chamber was authorized to decide whether to disband an NGO on the 
grounds of receiving foreign funding for political activities or engaging in activities 
beyond its declared goals.73 In other words, this law left the state authorities with the 
excessive discretion in restricting “unwanted” NGOs. Putin’s leadership soon froze bank 
accounts of Khodorkovsky’s civil society foundation, Open Russia, as a part of the new 
law disallowing convicts from creating and running NGOs.74 
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To counter a potential revolution in the country, the regime also made efforts to 
espouse a national idea, which emphasized Russia’s special path, its civilizational 
uniqueness,  and centuries-long state tradition. Ruling elite often referred to these ideas 
to justify the “distinct course of democratic development.” Moreover, Putin and his allies 
attempted to configure a national-self by comparing Russia with Europe, which ironically 
asserted its “Europeanness.” According to this view, although Russia shared the 
democratic ideals of Europe, its democratic development will be independent. In Putin’s 
words, “the democratic road we have chosen is independent in nature, a road along which 
we move ahead, all the while taking into account our own specific internal 
circumstances.” 75 Thus, Russia, Putin stated, will cultivate its democracy in accordance 
with “[its own] historic, geopolitical and other particularities.”76 Surkov, in 
Nationalization of the Future, further unfolded Russia’s particularities. According to 
Surkov, European democracy was built upon the tradition of individualism. By contrast, 
Russia’s civilization was based on the traditions of state-centeredness and collectivism. 
The attainment of Russian people’s sovereignty thus meant the preservation of a strong 
state.77 In this way, Surkov justified the rise of Putin’s authoritarianism in the words of 
the renewal of Russia’s strong state – as a part of country’s tradition. 
While Putin’s presidency capitalized on a potential color revolution to credit its own 
authoritarian enactments, it was the rise of (ethnic) Russian grassroots nationalism which 
posed in practice a challenge to the regime. Several political formations, including The 
Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) and Rodina, played a major role in 
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provoking xenophobic nationalism in 2004-08. Putin’s regime sought to discredit these 
movements as a threat to state, per se. Therefore, official speeches filled with remarks, 
urging that nationalism and xenophobia may lead the collapse of Russia’s multi-ethnic 
state.78 However, ethno-nationalist grassroots movements did not always represent 
themselves in opposition to the regime. 
DPNI led by Alexander Potkin (Belov) was one of those nationalist groups, which at 
first glance offered to work with the state. Established in 2002, DPNI ascended in a short 
time of period to a leading position among radical nationalists. This largely relied on its 
ability to “translate ethnic xenophobia into more socially acceptable rejection of 
immigrants.”79 In this way, DPNI’s propaganda targeted illegal migrants from Central 
Asian republics as well as the country’s non-ethnic Russian citizens who moved into 
“traditionally ethnic Russian” regions. The movement garnered substantial support from 
ultranationalists and skinheads, although it lacked any further ideological outlook. Its sole 
focus on immigration also allowed the movement to collaborate with political elite in 
parliament sharing the same position, regardless of their overall ideological differences. 
DPNI had for the first time its opportunity to draw considerable public attention, when 
state authorities established a new holiday – People’s Unity Day – on November 4, 2005. 
At the day of the holiday, Eurasia Youth Movement (ESM), which was founded a few 
months earlier by the nationalist ideologist Alexander Dugin’s International Eurasia 
Movement, officially organized a “Right-Wing March” to protest the Western influence 
                                                 
78 See, Surkov, “Nationalization of the Future.” 
79 Galina Kozhevniko, “Radical Nationalism and Efforts to Oppose It in Russia in 2005,” SOVA, February 
25, 2006, https://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2006/02/d7366/#_ftn7. 
156 
 
in Russia.80 When the march started as planned, approximately 3000 radical nationalists 
under DPNI, including violent skinhead groups, swiftly turned it to an anti-immigration 
demonstration. DPNI’s ability to take control over a rally with its xenophobic slogans in 
the center of Moscow further convinced its member to see themselves as “a legitimate 
patriotic movement.” In Belov’s words, DPNI was “no longer a marginal group but a 
popular force that everyone will have to take into account.”81 
A year later in September, DPNI gained arguably its largest political victory during 
the ethnic clashes in Kondopoga, a Karelian city. When a fight broke between locals and 
Caucasus natives in the town and left two people dead, Belov and his movement promptly 
involved in leading the ethnic riots. Because of the xenophobic attacks, many Caucasus 
natives had to flee the town. This “success” of DPNI brought extensive media coverage 
to the movement.82 Within the following months, DPNI’s activities to organize the 
Russkii March on the Unity Day further drew the attention of the media. More 
importantly, the event indicated the growing collaboration between DPNI and nationalist 
opposition in parliament.  
The left wing-nationalist Rodina began to reveal itself as more of an oppositional 
voice in 2005-06, after seen as a Kremlin-loyalist group in parliament for a few years. 
Rodina’s first act of dissent emerged during mass protests against the “monetization of 
social benefits” in the early 2005. From the very start, Rodina indeed attempted to lead 
the movement.83 Several Rodina members, including Rogozin, staged a hunger strike to 
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suspend the law, which clearly set the party in political opposition to United Russia and 
Putin. Rodina’s defiance of the Kremlin on the other hand gave way to closer relations 
with CPRF. Rodina members joined the May Day rally organized by CPRF in 2005. 
Remarkably, these two parliamentary opposition parties also extended their collaboration 
to one of the biggest grassroots movements National Bolshevik Party when its strongly 
anti-Putin leader Eduard Limonov was given the floor to address the crowd in the rally.84 
While Rodina’s growing engagement with opposition groups on the left already 
concerned the Kremlin, it was however the party’s xenophobic nationalism led it to lose 
its “election privileges.” Ahead of the Moscow city Duma elections in December 2005, 
Rodina run a campaign, which urged voters to “clean the city of garbage.” LDPR, which 
also competed for nationalist votes, ironically accused Rodina of instigating ethnic hatred 
in its campaign. Consequently, the Moscow city court barred the party from the elections 
in response to LDPR’s petition.85 The Kremlin additionally denied Rodina’s registration 
to seven out of the eight regional elections in March 2006 by using its already well-
established institutional control.86 Rogozin soon had to resign from his position as the 
party leader under the pressure from state authorities. Putin’s regime thus condoned 
ethnic nationalism insofar as Rodina remained loyal to its authority. However, the regime 
found itself challenged by Rodina’s leaders as the party’s support base swiftly grew and 
its message radicalized. Most critically, Rodina’s experience revealed that a competing 
notion of national identity may be the source of ideological opposition to the regime’s 
legitimacy. This realization prompted the Kremlin to put an end to Rodina. 
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When Rodina dissolved in 2006, many of its nationalist leaders and supporters 
however moved closer to DPNI. Rogozin and several members of Rodina first joined to 
DPNI’s efforts to organize the Russkii March in November. The nationalist march met by 
growing pressure by the state authorities in Moscow. Consequently, it gathered fewer 
people than the Right-Wing March a year before. However, the Russkii March in 2006 
turned out to be a nation-wide event, as demonstrators in other 11 cities held rallies.87 
Next, nationalist leaders began to orient their efforts to create a formal political 
platform. In 2007, Rogozin and Andrei Saveliev, former Rodina leaders, founded a new 
political party, Great Russia, with Belov. Many commentators agreed that Great Russia 
would cross the seven percent threshold, which was necessary to gain seats in parliament, 
if it was to contest elections.88 At the time, opinion polls also found substantial level of 
xenophobic attitude in society that Great Russia’s leaders were seeking to capitalize on.89 
When asked about the idea “Russian for the Russians (russkikh),” approximately 55 
percent of respondents agreed at a minimum that it was a good idea in 2007, which rose 
up from 43 percent in 1998. 32 percent of participants also stated that non-ethnic Russians 
were the reason behind Russia’s many problems. Moreover, around 40 percent indicated 
to feel “irritation,” “dislike” and “fear” from natives of Russia’s southern republics who 
migrated into their cities. Similarly, 57 percent of respondents argued for restricting 
immigration from Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus, Great Russia’s narrative had 
potential to resonate with a relatively large segment in society. This led the Kremlin to 
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deny registration of Great Russia as a political party ahead of the 2007 parliamentary 
elections. 
While Putin and United Russia dismantled nationalist forces from the electoral scene 
by using their control over institutions, they also engaged more in narratives and projects, 
which promoted the primacy of ethnic Russians over others in the federation. Particularly, 
ruling elites made efforts to evoke a sense of ethnic Russians as the core of the (multi-
ethnic) state. For instance, ethnic Russians were proclaimed as “[the] tireless rulers” of 
“the multi-faceted civic-Russian world” in Surkov’s essay – Nationalization of the 
Future. Similarly, Surkov, in his lecture on Russian Political Culture, professed that 
“God created us to be ethnic Russians [russkie] as well as citizens of Russia [rossiane].”90 
In this context, the regime offered a story of “civic-Russian nation,” which was 
contradictorily imbued with ethnic Russian connotations. 
This line of thinking also manifested itself in regime’s investments in creating an 
official idea of Russian nation. According to Galina Zvereva’s analysis of the federal bill 
“On the Foundations of the State Nationalities Policy of the RF” in 2003 and its multiple 
versions in 2006, the official discourse of Russian nation centered around the ideas of 
“continuity between the Russian Federation and the ‘thousand-year history’ of the 
Russian state and the Soviet Union,” “‘civilizational uniqueness’ of the Russian state and 
society” and “the special status and historical role of ethnic Russians.”91 By appealing to 
Russia’s long history and civilizational uniqueness, ruling elites first reinforced the idea 
of a strong state as “the bearer of nation’s destiny.” Next, the very same ideas enabled 
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Putin’s leadership to insinuate that ethnic Russians, their language and culture historically 
played “the unifying role” in nation’s destiny. Lastly, ruling elite also distinctively 
attempted to acknowledge ethnic Russians as “the state-forming people.” Although Putin 
and United Russia were not able to conclude a “binding” idea of the nation, which would 
recognize the primacy of ethnic Russians over other nationalities in the federation, their 
nationalistic appeals reflected the growing nationalist sentiments among ethnic Russians 
in society. 
Moreover, ahead of the 2007 parliamentary elections, United Russia engaged in 
projects to mobilize nationalist votes behind Putin’s regime. Particularly, the Russkii 
Project, led by Ivan Demidov, the head of United Russia’s youth organization Young 
Guard, Andrei Isaev and Pavel Voronin, United Russia’s deputies, attempted to reclaim 
the discourse of Russian nationalism from DPNI and galvanize support among former 
Rodina.92 To achieve this, the project coordinators planned to conduct public seminars to 
discuss ten russkii questions, including what russkii nationalism is, what russkaia nation 
is, and what the relationship between russkii nationalism and racism is.93 With the victory 
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Table 5.4   Russian Parliamentary Elections, December 2, 2007 
 Votes, % 
 
Seats Share of 
Seats, % 
Valid Votes 63.1   
Invalid Votes 0.70   
Total Votes (% of electorate) 63.71   
United Russia 64.30 315 70 
Communist Party 11.57 57 12.7 
Liberal Democrat Party   8.14 40 8.9 
Fair Russia 7.74 38 8.4 
Others 7.14 0 0 
Total  450 100 
Election threshold was set at 7 percent. 




In 2004-08, Putin’s leadership thus sought to cultivate an idea of collective-self which 
was grounded in the rejection of Western-style democracy and the defense of Russia’s 
special path. The representation of state “as the bearer of nation’s destiny” justified 
Putin’s tightening grip on power in the restoration of state political authority. The idea of 
nation confined in state also allowed Putin’s regime to lament its opponents as enemies 
of nation.94 In this course, the Russian state was increasingly attributed to russkii culture. 
The ruling elites hinted the core role ethnic Russians, their culture, and language played 
historically in the state. Explicit efforts were also made in official discourse to appeal to 
ethnic Russian nationalism. This was particularly a response to the rise of xenophobic 
movements, challenging the Kremlin’s sole authority to articulate claims about the 
Russian nation. 
Moreover, the regime launched a “grassroots” movement Nashi (Ours), which would 
propagate its line of nationalism, in countering ideological oppositions to its authoritarian 
rule. In February 2005, Russian media first reported that the Presidential Administration 
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was planning to develop a new youth movement, which would replace the pro-Putin 
movement “Marching Together” (Idushchie Vmeste).95 In April 2005, Nashi was 
officially established, and a board of five “federal commissioners,” including the former 
leader of Marching Together Vasilii Yakemenko, was assigned to lead the movement. Its 
main goal was manifested as to “preserve the sovereignty and integrity of Russia” from 
external and internal threats.96 External opponents, according to Nashi, strove to dominate 
Russia under the guise of democracy and freedom. Internal opponents on the other hand 
sought either to bring back the oligarchic capitalist regime of the 1990s or to spread 
fascism in the country. Moreover, Nashi claimed, “an unnatural union between liberals 
and fascists, westernizers and ultra-nationalists, international funds and international 
terrorists are being formed only by one thing: a hatred of Putin.” Against this alliance, 
Nashi pledged itself to support Putin and his political vision for Russia. Admittedly, thus, 
Nashi’s mission was to counter any potential opposition, which may disturb the transition 
of power in Putin’s Russia on the eve of the 2007-2008 election cycle.  
To achieve this, Nashi mobilized thousands of youth in support of Putin’s regime on 
various occasions. The movement held its first meeting in May 2005 during the 
commemoration of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. Over 60,000 people gathered 
in Moscow for Nashi’s “Our Victory” rally. In March 2007, around 15,000 Nashi activists 
became “President’s Messenger” in a two-day activity in the capital. After the 2007 
parliamentary elections, 30,000 Nashi members marched in to Moscow’s streets to 
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congratulate Putin for the victory of United Russia.97 Nashi also organized an educational 
camp every year on Lake Seliger. Its activities involved in rallies, lectures, and meetings 
with political figures. 3,000 activists first participated in the camp in 2005, and this 
number reached to astounding 10,000 in 2008. At the same time, Nashi trained its activists 
to monitor elections and conduct exit polls in countering potential challengers. All 
movement activities were financed by the state and Russia’s big businesses.98 
Given the victory of United Russia in the 2007 parliamentary elections and Medvedev 
in the 2008 presidential elections, Nashi clearly succeeded in completing its mission. 
After this desired outcome, the regime found it costly to sustain the movement. Therefore, 
Nashi soon was reoriented to work on social, economic, and innovative projects. 
 
Table 5.5   Russian Presidential Elections, March 2, 2008 
Candidate 
 
Political Party Number Total Vote, % 
Dmitry Medvedev United Russia 70.3 52,530,712 
Gennady Ziuganov Communist Party 17.7 13,243,550 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky Liberal Democrat Party 9.3 6,988,510 
Andrei Bogdanov – 1.3 968,344 
Electorate   107,222,016 
Invalid votes  0.9 1,015,533 
Valid votes  69.7 73,731,116 
Source: “Election 2008,” Center for Study of Public Policy, 
http://www.russiavotes.org/president/presidency_2008.php   
 
In contrast to other autocratic regimes in the post-Soviet territory, which engaged in 
various tactics to undermine potential opposition forces and yet failed, the survival of 
Putin’s authoritarianism in Russia could be partly attributed to the regime’s 
monopolization of national identity discourse. At the same time, opposition groups’ 
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ability to challenge Putin’s authoritarianism was significantly undermined by the 
regime’s increasing control over wealth over the 2000s. 
By the end of his second term in 2008, Putin achieved in renationalizing and 
controlling key companies of Russian industry – in the sectors of energy, banking, 
transportation, and communication.99 The process of reversed privatization sent a clear 
signal that the Putin regime would not tolerate any act of defiance by oligarchs. With the 
further erosion of rule of law, private businesses had no option but to comply with the 
government’s agenda. At the same time, Putin placed his close associates, who in many 
cases also held administrative positions, to the boards of renationalized companies to 
ensure government interests in these assets. Ultimately, the increasing control of the 
regime over economy left opposition groups no means to finance their activities. 
Moreover, under Putin’s presidency, the regime’s ownership of oil production 
dramatically rose – from around 15 percent in 2000 to 50 percent in 2012, –  while the 
country’s overall oil production increased over 40 percent.100 With high energy prices, 
the Putin regime gathered significant popular support in its autocratic turn. 
By the time the 2008 presidential elections were held, Russia in fact transformed into 
an authoritarian regime. Russian parliament was no longer a base for opposition. 
Judiciary lacked any meaningful independence from Russia’s ruling elite. Moreover, 
Putin’s regime established its strict control over media. While TV and radio channels, 
and newspapers mostly lacked the ability of independent reporting, journalists in 
                                                 
99 For a table of companies renationalized and controlled by the Putin regime, see, Goldman, Petrostate, p. 
135. 
100 James Henderson and Alastair Ferguson, International Partnership in Russia: Conclusion from the Oil 
and Gas Industry, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp. 22-34. 
Hence, Russia’s oil and gas accounted for almost 45 percent of its budget revenue by 2008. See, Anna 
Andrianova and Dina Khrennikova, “How Cheap Oil is Squeezing Russia’s Economy,” Bloomberg, 
January 25, 2016. 
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opposition were frequently harassed. Sweeping restrictions on NGOs were placed, 
sources of civic activism dwindled. Elections no longer offered a genuine choice of 
candidates. By amending laws on elections and political-parties, the Kremlin 
systematically barred opposition parties from contesting. Races were also marred by 
some irregularities. After systematically removing regime challengers from political 
scene, Putin smoothly transferred power to his close ally Medvedev in 2008. However, 
Putin himself continued to lead Russia’s politics as prime minister.   
 
Popular Protests and Authoritarian Survival under Putin-Medvedev Tandem 
in 2008-2012 
 
After winning 70.3 percent of national votes in March, Medvedev stepped into the 
Kremlin as Russia’s third president in May 2008. In his 2009 article entitled “Go Russia!” 
– in which the president outlined his administration’s priorities, – Medvedev rather 
appeared as a liberal voice in support of economic modernization and political reforms.101 
With the 2008 global financial crisis – and 8 percent decline in Russia’s GDP 
accompanied to it in 2009, – the necessity of innovative technologies to diversify the raw-
material based economy and fighting corruption were laid out as the main goals of the 
president’s program in modernizing Russia’s economy. At the same time, Medvedev, in 
his article, discussed the ways in which improving democracy and reforming judiciary 
may contribute the country’s future. In particular, the president criticized the paternalistic 
attitude found in society as a source of weak civil society – and so a serious impediment 
in democratic development. 
                                                 





Speaking of the institutions of modern democracy, Medvedev insisted that political 
reforms made under his presidency moved Russia towards a more competitive system. In 
response to regime critics – displeased with the pace of change, – Medvedev underscored 
that “[h]asty and ill-considered political reforms have led to tragic consequences more 
than once in our history.” Thus, Medvedev, in line with Putin’s political narrative, 
cautioned against radical means to reform the system and reasserted that such a 
development will bring the chaos of the 1990s back in Russia. Similarly, the president 
ensured that foreign models cannot simply guide Russia’s democratic development. 
While Medvedev’s lexis of economic modernization and political reforms appealed 
to some Russian citizens more than others, his inability to implement change raised anger 
and frustration.  Indeed, Medvedev, in his last televised interview as Russia’s president, 
stated that he, himself, was “not entirely satisfied” with economic progress.102 Moreover, 
Medvedev’s support for Putin’s return to power clearly displayed that nothing had 
changed in politics under his presidency. Yet, as Timothy J. Colton aptly puts it, 
“Medvedev the politician could not act freelance. Having no opportunity to build his own 
power and patronage base, even had he wished it, he was as dutiful a cog in the Putin 
machine as ever.”103 Thus, Medvedev, in practice lacking a distinct political and 
economic agenda from his predecessor, failed to response to Russian citizens’ demands 
for democracy. However, the rise of living standards over the decade gave birth to a group 
of people in larger cities, which were ready to voice their disappointment with Russia’s 
regime in streets.                
 
                                                 
102 “Interview to Russian TV Networks,” April 26, 2012, available at kremlin.ru. 




Russian Spring: “The star of joy will rise again!”104 
 
On December 5, 2011, a day after the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) announced 
that United Russia won 49.32 percent of votes, several thousand-people poured into the 
streets of Moscow in response to the reports of massive electoral fraud.105 In the ensuing 
days, more people joined the protest. Large numbers of protestors were unexpected, and 
these rallies were the first of their kind in the last twenty years. Opposition forces 
continued to protest during the winter of 2011 and 2012 in Moscow and other larger cities. 
However, I argue that the Putin regime’s monopolization of national identity and its 
retention of considerable control over economy instigated the defeat of regime dissenters 
in Russia.  
Table 5.6   Russian Parliamentary Election, December 4, 2011 
 Votes, % 
 
Seats Share of 
Seats, % 
Valid Votes 59.2   
Invalid Votes 0.9   
Total Votes ((% of electorate) 60.1   
United Russia 49.32 238 52.9 
Communist Party 19.19 92 20.4 
Fair Russia 13.24 64 14.2 
Liberal Democrat Party 11.67 56 12.4 
Yabloko 3.43 0 – 
Others 1.57 0 – 
Total  450  




At first, a protest, organized by liberal Solidarity and Left Front, brought thousands of 
protesters onto Moscow’s Bolotnaia Square on December 10, with the demand “For 
Honest Elections.”106 On December 24, around a hundred thousand people again 
                                                 
104 Pushkin, To Chadaev, recited by an interviewee, Moscow, November 12, 2015. 
105 In fact, United Russia failed to maintain its absolute majority in Duma after the 2011 parliamentary 
elections, as its share of votes dropped from 64.7 percent in 2007. See, “Duma Voting Behavior,” Center 
for Study of Public Policy. 
106 Kevin O’Flynn, “Silliness, Civic Activism Merge at Record Rally,” Moscow Times, December 12, 2011.  
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responded to the call of opposition forces by gathering in downtown Moscow, Sakharov 
Prospect.107 Many displayed white ribbons and chanted slogans for honest elections. My 
discussions in the field revealed that protesters’ call for new elections rather stemmed 
from their desire to overall change Russia’s political system. In the words of an 
interviewee, “we were tired of corruption, lies, unruly behavior of government officers, 
and old style management.”108 Another respondent adds that, “we wanted democracy – 
free and fair elections, opposition parties and candidate to be allowed to contest elections 
without the barriers of registration, freedom of expression.”109 At the same time, many 
interviewees highlighted the need for restoring independency of Russia’s judicial system. 
Moreover, protesters’ desire for political change became evident after Putin’s 
announcement of a potential return to presidency on September 24, 2011. In the words of 
an interviewee, “I remember that panic and despair were all over Facebook. All my 
friends wrote that they were either leaving the country or thinking about their age when 
Putin leaves the office next time … They were not particularly pleased with Medvedev, 
but the return of Putin meant the end of any hopes.” The interviewee adds that “this mood 
created the protest. Parliamentary elections were just a trigger.”110 In my discussions, 








                                                 
107 Alexander Bratersky, Natalya Krainova, “Saturday Rally Suggests Protest Mood Is Growing,” Moscow 
Times, December 24, 2011. 
108 Author’s interview, Moscow, July 2, 2015. 
109 Author’s interview, Kyiv, July 30, 2015. 
110 Author’s interview, Moscow, November 10, 2015. 
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81 81 86 83 77 78 65 66 68 71 
Agree 
 
15 14 11 14 17 16 18 18 18 18 
Disagree 
 
2 2 1 1 1 2 6 8 8 4 
Strongly 
disagree 
1 1 1 1 1 1 5 3 2 2 
Difficult 
to say 
1 2 1 1 4 3 7 6 4 5 
Source: “Opros na prospekte Sakharova 24 dekabria” [Public opinion poll on Sakharov Avenue on 
December 24], Levada-Center, Moscow, December 26, 2011, http://www.levada.ru/old/26-12-
2011/opros-na-prospekte-sakharova-24-dekabrya; “Opros na mitinge 4 Fevralia” [Public opinion poll on 
February 4 meeting], Levada-Center, Moscow, February 13, 2012, 
http://www.levada.ru/2012/02/13/opros-na-mitinge-4-fevralya/. 
 
As the crowds gathered, protesters were soon infused with the feeling of majority in 
Moscow. To voice their dissent against Russia’s regime, protesters chanted the slogans 
of “You don’t even represent (and also imagine) us.” Hence, as an interviewee puts it, 
“we did not imagine ourselves, either. We were so surprised to see each other in 
December – Ocean of people in front of my eyes … Then, until March, we thought we 
were majority.”111 As the protest garnered support from disparate political groups in 
Moscow, this sentiment strengthened. While liberals rose in prominence in the protest, 
other groups, including communists, social democrats, and nationalists, joined them.112 
                                                 
111 Author’s interview, Kyiv, July 30, 2015. 
112 “Opros Na Mitinge 4 Fevralia” [The survey at the Rally on February 4], Levada-Center, Moscow, 
February 13, 2012. 
170 
 
In the words of Denis Volkov, “[having] looked inside of the movement, it seemed that 
‘everyone’ and ‘very different people’ came to protest (partly because the crowd was 
quite colorful, there were diverse flags, slogans, demands, costumes, and clothes).” 
However, he continues, “for an average Russian watching what was happening in TV, it 
must have seemed like a gathering of the rich.”113 Admittedly, the portrayal of the protest 
as a movement of the “creative class” in independent media amounted to the latter image, 
and so plagued opposition forces’ ability to appeal to Russian people. 












Democrats 38 30 Conservatives 3 2 
Liberals 31 27 New Left 2 4 
Communists 13 18 Anti-Fascists 2 2 
Socialists /  
Social Democrats 
10 10 Different 4 4 
Greens 8 6 None above 6 6 
National-Patriots 6 14 Difficult to 
answer 
3 3 
Anarchists 3 4    
Respondents were allowed to choose more than one answer in these surveys.  
Source: “Opros na prospekte Sakharova 24 dekabria” [Public opinion poll on Sakharov Avenue on 
December 24], Levada-Center; “Opros na mitinge 4 Fevralia” [Public opinion poll on February 4 
meeting], Levada-Center. 
 
The “creative class” in Russia was used to describe young urbanites from “rising” 
professions – e.g. media, design, art, and IT. This new group owed its economic well-
being to the restoration of the Russian economy over the last decade. Indeed, Russian 
sociologists and political scientists largely debated the economic composition of the 
creative class. 114 The discussion revolved around if the members of creative class could 
                                                 
113 Denis Volkov, “Protestnoe Dvizhenie v Rossii v Kontse 2011-2012 gg: Istoki, Dinamika, Rezultaty” 
[The Protest Movement in Russia in late 2011 and 2012: Origins, Dynamics, Results], Levada-Center, 
September 2012.   
114 See, Artemy Magun, “The Russian Protest Movement of 2011-2012: A New Middle-Class Populism,” 
Statis, Vol. 2(1), pp. 160-91; Alexander Bikbov, “The Methodology of Studying ‘Spontaneous’ Street 
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be categorized as middle-class. However, during my interviews in the field, many 
protesters did not associate themselves with middle-class. Some respondents highlighted 
the wage gap between Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other cities of Russia in assessing 
their own economic well-being.  
 The members of the creative class nonetheless differed from fellow Russians with 
their “cultural habits.” Many spoke English, travelled abroad, and spent their time on the 
internet. The creative class set its sight on the European way of life. 115 However, as an 
interviewee puts it, “the creative class was just the most noticeable part of protesters, 
who were in bright clothes and brought the funniest slogans … It was not the group which 
was ready for long political work … There were also many different people in the protest 
- working class, old school democrats, university professors, and political activists of any 
kind.”116  
 
Table 5.9   Levada-Center’s survey with protesters, December 24, 2011 and February 4, 2012 




 Dec. 24  
 
Feb.4 
Age (%)   Occupation (%)   
18-24 25 21 Specialist 46 36 
25-39 31 37 Manager 17 14 
40-54 23 23 Student 12 11 
55 and older 22 20 Business owner 8 9 
Education (%)   Pensioner –  11 
Incomplete secondary 
school 
1 1 Office employee 8 – 
Secondary or vocational 
school 





13 11 Unemployed 2 5 
Higher education 70 70 Other – 8 
Source: “Opros na prospekte Sakharova 24 dekabria” [Public opinion poll on Sakharov Avenue on 
December 24], Levada-Center; “Opros na mitinge 4 Fevralia” [Public opinion poll on February 4 
meeting], Levada-Center. 
                                                 
Activism (Russian Protests and Street Camps, December 2011-July 2012). Summary,” Laboratorium, 
Vol.4(2), 2012, pp. 275-84. 
115 See, Aleksandr Morozov, “Po tu storonu vyborov” [On the other side of the elections], Russkii Zhurnal, 
November 28, 2011. 
116 Author’s interview, Moscow, November 10, 2015. 
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However, as the opposition movement continued to project an image of itself based on 
the creative class, the protest failed to galvanize support from ordinary Russian people. 
First, the idea of the creative class contributed to protesters’ understanding of themselves 
in opposition to Russian people. In the words of a respondent, among others, “trendy 
media portrayed us as the creative class – good looking people with ironic posters. We 
were happy to be the creative class – Russian Europeans. That was the way that separated 
us from the rest of Russia which belongs to the working class.”117 Second, the protesters’ 
identity as cultivated by the media and themselves devalued efforts to appeal to Russian 
people. The opposition leaders attempted to respond to the identity of the protesters whom 
they aspired to lead. However, this hindered the opposition movement from arousing a 
wider sense of collective-self among Russians, which may have stimulated the protest. 
Therefore, the cleavage between the westernized, urban, and wealthier protesters and the 
rest of Russia continued to widen. As an interviewee further explains, “people were trying 
to understand if the movement was about them and their interest. Unfortunately, they 
found out that it was about the creative class. They thought that they were not creative. 
They decided to wait for Putin, because he was their voice.”118 Lastly, the image of the 
protest helped the Kremlin to discredit the opposition as a movement of angry urbanites 
“from the narrow world of building one’s own individual well-being.”119 In pro-
government rallies, the regime also attempted to counter the opposition forces, and so 
their western liberal values, by evoking Russia’s (state) traditions. 
                                                 
117 Author’s interview, Kyiv, July 30, 2015. 
118 Author’s interview, Moscow, October 6, 2015. 
119 Vladimir Putin, “Demokratiia i kachestvo gosudarstva” [Democracy and the quality of state],” 
Kommersant, February 6, 2012. 
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From December 24, 2011, onward, the opposition moreover created the Organization 
Committee to lead the protest actions. The committee was composed of politicians, 
activists, journalists, and public figures. Its members raised funds for rallies, conducted 
permit negotiations with the city authorities, provided logistical assistance, coordinated 
speakers at the rallies, and informed the public about the subsequent actions.120 My 
discussions with the few committee members revealed that regime dissenters across the 
political spectrum provided financing to the protest. A member explains that among the 
main donors of the protest, there were conservative figures, which later supported the 
“Crimea is Ours” campaign as well as the so-called Donetsk People Republic in Ukraine. 
Additionally, business owners with liberal views and government employees offered 
financing to the opposition movement. The committee member notes that “there were 
some rules to the game. People who worked for the government financed the movement 
anonymously.”121 However, as another committee member explains, “there were no 
major businessmen who were ready to support the movement. Some of them were among 
the protesters, but they tried to remain incognito.”122 Admittedly, the regime’s control of 
economy disseminated a fear of reprisal, which curbed the opposition movement’s ability 
to access broader resources to stimulate the protest. At the same time, business owners 
and companies, which supplied equipment to the protest, were occasionally harassed by 
the regime.123 With the increasing government repression in early May 2012, the 
                                                 
120 Denis Volkov, “Protest Movement in Russia through the Eyes of its Leaders and Activists,” The Russian 
Public Opinion Herald, December 2012. 
121 Author’s interview, Moscow, November 11, 2015. 
122 Author’s interview, Moscow, November 10, 2015. 
123 Author’s interview, Moscow, November 11, 2015. 
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Organization Committee had to conceal publicly available financial information to avert 
a crackdown on its supporters. 
From the beginning, several media outlets provided coverage to the protest. The 
independent radio channel Echo Moskvy, whose main shareholder is GazProm, and the 
cable channel TV Dozhd gave voiced to the opposition movement, while state-controlled 
media mostly dismissed the protest. Given that over 70 percent of Russians received their 
news from the state-owned TV channels, protesters’ ability to disseminate alternative 
political narratives to the regime was largely curtailed.124 Moreover, a poll in 2013 found 
that around 60 percent of the population considered the news on state-sponsored TV 
channels reported mostly objectively.125 Unsurprisingly, the Kremlin used its media 
dominance to endorse the pro-government rallies and Putin’s candidacy ahead of the 
March 2012 presidential elections. 
Nevertheless, the protest movement was also unexpected to the Kremlin. In the 
beginning, the government seemed open to the negotiations with the opposition 
movement. While regime elites rejected the protesters’ demands for a rerun of the 
parliamentary elections and the dismissal of the head of CEC Vladimir Churov, they 
offered to restore the gubernatorial elections and ease the registration rules for political 
parties and candidates after the upcoming presidential elections.126 However, the 
government harshened its attitude towards the protest, with Putin’s re-election to 
presidency. At the same time, the regime achieved in maintaining elite unity. The 
resignation of Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin in September 2011 - shortly after Putin 
                                                 
124 “Russian Public Opinion 2013-2015,” Levada-Center, Moscow 2016, p. 203. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Bratersky and Krainova, “Saturday Rally Suggests Protest Mood Is Growing.” 
175 
 
announced his candidacy for presidency - remained the only defection from the ruling 
elite.  
In February 2012, the opposition movement continued its actions. Around a hundred 
thousand people again poured into the streets of Moscow on February 4 in protest of 
Putin’s potential presidency.127 The movement leaders urged all Russians “Not to Give a 
Single Vote to Putin.” Meanwhile, President Medvedev met with the three opposition 
leaders – the coordinator of the Left Front movement, Sergei Udaltsov, and the co-
founders of the People’s Freedom Party, Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Ryzhkov, – to 
discuss political reforms on February 20. The opposition figures further agreed to join the 
working group for settling the changes to the political system.128 On February 26, in the 
last protest before the presidential elections, more than thirty thousand Russians gathered 
in downtown Moscow and created a “Big White Circle” by holding hands and wearing 
white ribbons.129    
Simultaneously, the regime mobilized its own supporters in pro-government rallies to 
encounter and delegitimize the opposition movement. On February 4, thousands of people 
gathered for an “anti-orange” rally in Poklonnaia hill – a place which is dedicated to 
Russia’s military victories.130 The next rally drew over one hundred thousand regime 
supporters into the Luzhniki stadium on February 23 – the day of the Defenders of the 
Fatherland.131 During the rallies, people carried banners with the slogans “No to Orange 
Revolution,” “We are for Putin,” and “If not Putin, then Who?” At the same time, state-
                                                 
127 Alexander Bratersky, “Protest Fever Stays High Despite Cold,” Moscow Times, February 6, 2012. 
128 Lyudmila Alexandrova, “Russian authorities enter into dialogue with radical opposition,” TASS, 
February 21, 2012. 
129 Kevin O’Flynn, “Opposition Join Hands in Anti-Putin Protest,” Moscow Times, February 27, 2012. 
130 Lyudmila Alexandrova, “Russian authorities respond to middle class demonstrations,” TASS, February 
6, 2012 
131 Alexander Bratersky, “Putin Rally Raises Bar for Opponents,” Moscow Times, February 24, 2012. 
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controlled media provided extensive coverage of the two rallies. Independent media 
sources however reported that some of the people were forced by their employers or paid 
to attend in the rallies.  
At first, speakers at the rallies discredited the anti-government protesters as “traitors” 
financed by the West, aiming at provoking unrest in Russia. Sergei Kurginian, a 
coordinator of the anti-Orange protest, called on protesters to say “no to the destruction 
of Russia,” He added that “we say no to the American embassy, where these disgraced 
people turned to when Michael McFaul arrived.” Second, Putin’s presidency was justified 
as the only way to sustain a strong and stable Russia. Several speakers at the rallies 
reminded Russian people of the disorder and instability in the 1990s. Putin was praised 
as the leader who could defend the nation against an Orange Revolution and a return to 
the oligarchic rule as it was a decade ago. Otherwise, speakers suggested, an Orange 
revolution will put an end to Russian statehood and national unity. Lastly, Putin himself 
made nationalist appeal to the crowds in the last rally. In his address, Putin insisted that 
“the battle for Russia continues” – against unspecified enemies. Invoking Russia’s 
victorious history and nation, Putin therefore reasserted that “we are ready to defend our 
great motherland … always and forever” and “we will not allow anyone to meddle into 
our affairs.” At the same time, Putin cautioned Russian people “not to look overseas” and 
“not to betray the country.” Thus, Putin, as the other rally speakers, insinuated that anti-
regime protesters were not loyal to Russia and its culture.132 Most importantly, the 
presidential candidate was once again able to portray himself as “the defender of the 
nation.” 
                                                 
132 Videos of speakers at pro-regime rallies are available on Youtube. 
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On March 4, 2012, Putin was reelected by winning 63.60 percent of national votes. 
Independent election observers reported procedural irregularities during the count, while 
assessing voting positively.133 The next day, 14,000 people gathered in the Pushkin square 
to protest the presidential elections.134 While the opposition leaders chanted the slogans 
of “Putin is a thief,” they had nothing new to offer to the crowds. The relatively low 
numbers of protesters also suggested the disappointment with the movement. At the same 
time, Putin’s victory marked the increasing crackdown on protesters. On March 5, around 
200 protesters, including Alexey Navalny, the anti-corruption blogger who emerged as 
the most popular leader of the protest movement, Ilia Yashin, the leader of Solidarity, and 
Sergei Udaltsov, were arrested.135 In the end, there were only 25,000 people – although 
permission was obtained for 50,000 –  attending the rally on March 10.136  
 
5.1.1   Russian Presidential Elections, March 4, 2012 
Candidate 
 
Political Party Total Vote, % Number 
Vladimir Putin United Russia 63.60 45,602,075 
Gennadi Ziuganov Communist Party 17.18 12,318,353 
Mikhail Prokhorov – 7.98 5,722,508 
Vladimir Zhirinovskii Liberal Democrat Party 6.22 4,458,103 
Sergei Mironov Fair Russia 3.85 2,763,935 
Electorate   109,860,331 
Invalid votes  0.8 836,691 
Valid votes  64.5 70,864,974 
Source: “Results of Presidential Elections,” Center for Study of Public Policy, 
http://www.russiavotes.org/president/presidency_result.php. 
 
                                                 
133 See, OSCE, Russian Federation, Presidential Election, 4 March 2012: Statement of Preliminary 
Findings and Conclusions, Warsaw, March 5, 2012. 
134 Andrew Roth, “A Test of Will: Alexy Navalny Starts to Test His Limits,” Russia Profile, March 6, 2012. 
135 Andrey Sinitsyn, “Some Get a Maydan, Others Get a Fountain. Opposition Rally on Moscow’s Pushkin 
Square Was a Flop for Its Organizers,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 7, 2012. 
136 “Miting ‘Za chestnye vybory’ na Novom Arbate zavershilsia” [Meeting ‘For Honest Elections’ on Novii 
Arbat Ended], Lenta.Ru, March 10, 2012. 
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Yet by March protesters across the political spectrum were able to bypass their 
differences and unite “For Honest Elections.” However, as an interviewee puts it, “it is 
easier to make numerous protests based on election theme, when there is competition 
among political parties and candidates.”137 The opposition’s lack of an alternative 
candidate in the presidential elections, its failure to formulate new demands, and most 
importantly its appeal as a movement of creative class impeded it from gaining broader 
support basis. At the same time, disagreements within the opposition movement 
increased. In the words of a respondent, “so-called liberals did all they could do to 
alienate ethnic Russian nationalists.”138 Socialists also felt unease with the liberals’ 
projected image of the protest, which, they argued, legitimized Putin’s idea of “silent 
majority.” Among liberals, the peaceful tactics of the protest emerged as a matter of 
disagreement. 
Moreover, the regime did shake off the effects of earlier opposition movement. In 
response to the protest movement, Medvedev signed three bills into law. The first law 
lowered the number of required membership for registering a political party from 40,000 
to 500.139 However, the law did not include any provision, which may allow political 
parties to form an electoral bloc to increase their chances to win a seat in Duma. The 
second bill reinstated the direct election of regional heads, which were removed by Putin 
in 2004. The law required a candidate to gain support of at least five percent of municipal 
deputies in a region to contest elections. As for independent candidates, the law also 
indicated the need for collecting additional signatures from at least 0.5 percent of the 
                                                 
137 Author’s interview, Moscow, October 20, 2015. 
138 Author’s interview, Moscow, October 3, 2015. 
139 Natalya Krainova, “Medvedev Signs Party Reform Bill into Law,” Moscow Times, April 4, 2012. 
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population. Given United Russia’s control over regional parliaments, the regime 
continued to have considerable leverage over the election process. The last bill waved the 
requirement for collecting signatures to run in parliamentary elections and reduced the 
number of signatures that a candidate needed to collect for contesting presidential 
elections.140 Thus, the Kremlin was able to fend off the opposition forces without making 
any major concessions. 
On May 6, 2012, a day before Putin’s inauguration, thousands of anti-regime 
protesters poured into the streets of Moscow. The “March of the Millions” led to the 
serious clashes between protesters and security forces. Around 400 people, including 
Navalny and Udaltsov, were detained.141 In the following days, protesters, and thus 
police, moved from streets to streets in Moscow. Authorities detained more protesters 
during the three days of “walking.” On May 13, the opposition figures headed the Test 
Walk Rally which drew 10,000 people into the streets.142 At the same time, some 
protesters began to camp out near by the monument of Kazakh poet Abai Kunanbaev on 
Chistye Prudy. Around 3,000 people visited the camp until it was forcefully demolished 
on May 16.143 In the beginning of June, the Russian parliament passed a bill that stipulated 
larger fines for participants of unsanctioned rallies, that ordinary protesters will not be 
able to afford. On June 12, a few days after Putin signed the bill into law, the last mass 
rally was held. Afterwards, the protest movement evidently petered out. Thus, Putin was 
                                                 
140 Alexander Bratersky, “Racing the Clock, Medvedev Signs Final Reforms,” Moscow Times, May 3, 
2012. 
141 Mark Bennets, “Russia’s Anti-Putin Activists Look to Maintain Protest,” RIA Novosti, May 10, 2012. 
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able to hold on to his authoritarian rule in Russia, without making major concessions to 
the protest movement. 
In summary, the Russian opposition movement mobilized a segment of the nation, 
with its narratives against political system and Putin. However, the protest failed to gain 
larger support base partly because of its ineffective engagement in the symbolic politics 
of nation. As an interviewee aptly puts it, “the EuroMaidan protest was against 
Yanukovich and for Ukraine. However, we had only one of these factors: we were against 
Putin.”144 In fact, Russia’s regime not only dominated the right to speak for the nation, 
but also depicted the anti-Putin protest as a movement against the nation. Putin again 
emerged as the “defender of the nation.” At the same time, the opposition’s lack of access 
to economic resources, and thus media outlets, impeded its ability to disseminate the 
protest message and stimulate the movement. Moreover, Russia’s regime control over 
broad economic resources discouraged people to attend the protest because of the fear of 
reprisal. Simultaneously, the Kremlin used its control over media to mobilize support for 
the regime. In the end, the regime’s control over national identity discourse and economic 
resources – the factors which precipitated the fall of authoritarian rule in Ukraine – 











                                                 




























































CHAPTER VI: DEMOCRATIZATION, AUTHORITARIANISM, AND 
POPULAR PROTESTS IN UKRAINE (2005-2014) 
 
The victory of Orange camp seemingly put an end to Ukraine’s authoritarian path. 
However, the post-revolutionary period was marked by political instability, rendering the 
development of the country’s democracy crippled. Ukraine under Victor Yushchenko’s 
presidency witnessed four governments in the next five years. Soon after his inauguration 
in January 2005, Yushchenko appointed Yuliia Timoshenko as his prime minister. 
However, the coalition between the leaders of Orange Revolutions was short-lived. In 
September 2005, Yurii Yekhanurov, the leader of Our Ukraine, was appointed as the new 
prime minister, with the support of the deputies of Viktor Yanukovich’s Party of Regions 
in the Verkhovna Rada. 
While Ukraine held its parliamentary elections in March 2006, a new government led 
by Yanukovich could only be formed in August. Soon Yanukovich’s illicit efforts to gain 
300 seats in the parliament to amend the constitution led Yushchenko to call for early 
elections –  held in September 2007. At the same time, in both parliamentary elections 
the leaders of the Orange Revolution continued to garner support in the Ukrainophile 
western and central regions, while Yanukovich, the defeated leader, was again able to 
appeal to the mostly Russophile voters in the eastern and southern regions. In November 
2007, the Timoshenko Bloc (BYuT) and Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine renewed their 
coalition. Despite recurring political conflicts between the two leaders of the Orange 
Revolution, Timoshenko succeed in holding onto her premiership until the end of 
Yushchenko’s presidency. Admittedly however, the failure of the Orange coalitions 




In most respects, Ukraine’s democratic trajectory in the post-Orange revolution era 
was an outcome of ensuing conflicts among the main political forces rather than of 
deliberate efforts towards its consolidation, as noted by some scholars.1 Indeed, the 
political elite of the old regime continued to wield enormous influence within the country, 
simultaneously fending off state reforms necessary for the development of democracy. 
Similarly, close relations between oligarchs and bureaucracy remained intact. All 
political camps enjoyed the support of big businesses during election campaigns, and in 
return big business preserved its access to the corridors of political power. After all, 
Ukraine’s Orange revolution was not able to either ensure the rule of law or reverse the 
wide-spread corruption.2 
Yet the country democratized in the ensuing years, experiencing free and fair 
elections, plurality of media voices,3 and unrestricted street protests. At the same time, 
the leaders of the Orange revolution moved swiftly to improve Ukraine’s relations with 
the EU. In February 2005, Ukraine and the EU signed an Action Plan, which 
unequivocally showed Europe’s strong support for the country’s political and economic 
transformation.4 The same year in December, the EU recognized Ukraine’s market 
economy status.5 In 2008, the country also became a member of World Trade 
Organization. 
                                                 
1 See, Way, Pluralism by Default, pp. 43-92; Adam Eberhardt, The Revolution That Never Was: Five Years 
of ‘Orange’ Ukraine, Warsaw: Punkt Widzenia, 2009, pp. 43-79.  
2 Freedom House, Ukraine: Nations in Transit, 2010, https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-
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3 For an in-depth study of Ukraine’s media development under Yushchenko’s presidency and beyond, see, 
Katerina Tsetsura, Media Map Project. Ukraine: Case study of donor support to independent media 1990-
2010, Washington, DC: Internews; World Bank Institute, 2012. 
4 EU-Ukraine Action Plan, 2005, p.5, http://library.euneighbours.eu/content/eu-ukraine-action-plan-0.  




Nonetheless, Ukraine’s democratization came to an end with the election of 
Yanukovich to presidency in February 2010. The president installed a new government 
in March and appointed his close ally Mikola Azarov as prime minister. From then on, 
Yanukovich swiftly embarked upon a path to instill his authoritarian rule, gaining the 
control of the government, the legislature, and also the judiciary. Indeed, Yanukovich 
used his dominance over the government and the parliament to push for legislation to 
bring the courts under his control. Afterwards, Ukraine’s highly politicized Constitutional 
Court reversed the 2004 amendments to the constitution, effectively reinstating the strong 
presidential system. Yanukovich also exploited the courts to prosecute political rivals and 
regime dissenters. Meanwhile, the president’s allies both in politics and business were 
rewarded for their loyalty with government positions and privatization deals. Ultimately, 
corruption again thrived in Ukraine. 
However, when Yanukovich attempted to shift Ukraine’s foreign policy orientation 
away from the EU, this quickly sparked popular protests against his authoritarian regime. 
Small protests that began in response to the president’s decision not to sign the EU 
Association Agreement transformed into massive demonstrations in Kyiv within days. 
As in the Orange Revolution, the Euromaidan protesters challenged the way in which the 
Yanukovich regime envisioned Ukraine’s political, economic, and cultural prospect by 
invoking an alternative notion of national identity and thus galvanized further popular 
support. Moreover, Ukraine’s private economy brought necessary economic resources to 
the Maidan. This enabled regime opponents not only to stimulate the protest on the 
ground, but also to communicate their message with the public. In the span of three 




reveals that protesters’ effective appeal to a competing vision of national identity and 
regime’s limited control over wealth provides a sufficient explanation for the collapse of 
Yanukovich’s authoritarianism.      
 
Democratization under Yushchenko in 2005-2009 
After Yushchenko mobilized hundreds of thousands of people in response to vote rigging 
in the 2004 presidential election and won the re-run against Yanukovich in December, 
revolutionaries expected his presidency to usher in political and economic transformation 
of Ukraine. The political compromise reached to amend the Constitution in early 
December curbed the strong presidential system in favor of the parliament, although the 
constitutional reform did not come in to effect until the beginning of 2006. While the 
amended constitution played a key role in Ukraine’s democratization by creating a mixed, 
presidential-parliamentary system, the political reforms hastily adopted in 2004 however 
laid the ground for enormous conflict in the country’s system of government.  
With the wide popular support for his presidency and the waning institutional basis 
of Yanukovich’s Regions Party on the eve of the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko could 
have reversed the constitutional amendments – as Yanukovich did when he came to 
power in 2010.6 Instead, Yushchenko’s presidency led to the most democratic era in the 
country’s history. Not only did Ukraine experience clean elections both in 2006 and 2007, 
but also its media and civil society were able to express a variety of opinions without fear 
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of repression by the regime. Yet, none of this meant that the victors of Orange Revolution 
shied away from assaulting their rivals in the Party of Regions. 
When the early Orange Coalition led by Timoshenko launched a campaign to revise 
earlier state privatization deals, this seemingly targeted the assets of Yanukovich’s 
financiers. In 2005, the Ukrainian government re-nationalized the Kryvorizhstal mill 
plant, which was sold to Victor Pinchuk, Leonid Kuchma’s son-in-law, and Rinat 
Akhmetov, Donetsk-based billionaire and Yanukovich’s close ally, for $800 million in a 
questionable deal a year before.7 Soon, the company was re-privatized and acquired by 
Mittal Steel for $ 4.8 billion. Moreover, with the growing government pressure on his 
business, Akhmetov reportedly left the country in April 2005.8 In another instance, Boris 
Kolesnikov, the head of the Donetsk branch of the Party of Regions, was arrested on 
criminal charges.9 
However, the government’s intimidation of Yanukovich’s associates, and so the 
oligarchs, retreated when the first Orange Coalition proved no longer to be functional in 
the midst of allegation of corruption.10 After dismissing Timoshenko, Yushchenko sought 
to appoint Yekhanurov as his new prime minister. To gain sufficient support for the 
approval of his candidate, the president choice to make a deal with Yanukovich. In 
September 2005, the memorandum signed by the two leaders “put an end to prosecutions 
for election fraud” and “closed the questions of re-privatizations” in exchange for the 
Regions’ support of the Yekhanurov government.11 This admittedly opened the door for 
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Yanukovich’s Regions Party to reorganize and later raise a serious challenge to the 
leaders of the Orange camp. 
Within months of Ukraine’s new constitution coming into force, Ukraine held its first 
proportional parliamentary elections. Major businessman provided substantial financing 
to election campaigns of both the Orange parties and its main rival, Party of Regions. At 
the same time, media outlets widely owned by oligarchs covered different political parties 
favorably. As Yushchenko was not able to control the flow of information due to private 
ownership in media, this enabled political parties widely to communicate with their 
potential supporters.12 
In the course of campaigning, the main political forces essentially appealed to 
competing notions of Ukraine’s national identity. Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine Bloc 
strongly supported the country’s potential membership for EU and NATO as well as its 
development of free market economy. Unsurprisingly, the Bloc opposed the elevation of 
Russian to the status of official language. Overall, Yushchenko’s party portrayed itself as 
the voice of the Maidan.13 The Timoshenko Bloc also took a similar stance with Our 
Ukraine in respect to Ukraine’s EU prospect and the status of Russian language. 
However, the populist Timoshenko remained vague about the question of the country’s 
access to NATO.14 In turn, Yanukovich’s Party of Regions called for developing closer 
relations with Russia, upgrading the status of the Russian language, and devolving power 
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to regions. The Party opposed Ukraine’s potential membership in NATO. However, 
Yanukovich appeared to agree with furthering the country’s integration into Europe.15 
Yanukovich’s Regions Party came back strongly to Ukraine’s political scene, winning 
32 percent of votes in the March 2006 elections. Tymoshenko’s electoral bloc also 
performed well and gained 22 percent of votes. However, Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine 
found itself losing substantial support by receiving only 14 percent of votes. At the same 
time, Ukraine’s Socialist Party and Communist Party picked up 6 and 4 percent of votes, 
respectively. 
 
Table 6.1 Russian Parliamentary Elections, March 26, 2006 
Political Party Votes, % 
 
Seats Share of Seats, 
% 
Total Votes (% of electorate) 67.55   
Party of Regions 32.14 186 41.3 
Yuliia Timoshenko Bloc 22.29 129 28.7 
Our Ukraine 13.95 81 18.0 
Socialist Party 5.69 33 7.3 
Communist Party 3.66 21 4.7 
Against all 1.77   
Others 18.31   
Invalid Votes 2.19   
Total 100 450 100 
Election threshold was set at 3 percent. 
Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine, www.cvk.gov.ua. 
 
   
Divisions over Ukraine’s national identity appeared to play a key role in the preferences 
of voters in the 2006 parliamentary elections, as highlighted in the study of Ralph Clem 
and Peter Craumer. 16 The Party of Regions garnered strong support in the east and south. 
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16 Ralph S. Clem and Peter R. Craumer, “Orange, Blue and White, and Blonde: The Electoral Geography 
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The highly industrialized and urbanized eastern regions of Ukraine are mainly populated 
by ethnic Russians and Russophile Ukrainians. Similarly, a large number of ethnic 
Russian population is concentrated in the southern regions. In turn, the Timoshenko Bloc 
and Our Ukraine were largely backed by the electorate in the western and center regions. 
While the west is the hotbed of the Ukrainian nationalism and has mainly ethnic 
Ukrainian population, the center regions’ population is composed of both ethnic 
Ukrainians and Russians. Thus, the country’s Russophile population – which speaks 
Russian and favors closer economic and cultural relations with Russia – gave their votes 
for Yanukovich’s Regions Party, while its Ukrainophile population – which supports the 
development of Ukrainian culture and language as well as the greater integration with 
Europe – showed support for the Orange parties.     
 
Percentage of Votes for the Main Political Parties, 2006 
 
 
The Party of Regions 
 
 




Source: Ralph S. Clem and Peter R. Craumer, “Orange, Blue and White, and Blonde: The Electoral 
Geography of Ukraine’s 2006 and 2007 Rada Elections.” 
 
 





Moreover, election outcomes marked the growing influence of oligarchs in the Ukrainian 
politics. Donetsk based billionaire Akhmetov, along with 60 of his associates, entered in 
to the parliament on the list of the Party of Regions.17 As other oligarchs also provided 
financing for different political parties during the 2006 election campaign, Adam 
Eberhardt notes that approximately two thirds of the lawmakers emerged to represent 
business interest in the Rada.18 
Next, Yanukovich’s Regions Party’s return to the parliament, with the strong support 
from the east and south as well as from the Donetsk-based business, gave way to long 
coalition negotiations in Ukraine. After the Orange parties failed to agree on the terms of 
the coalition, Yushchenko struck a deal with Yanukovich. In exchange for Yushchenko’s 
endorsement for his premiership, Yanukovich agreed to sign the “Universal of National 
Unity.” First, the declaration reiterated the status of Ukrainian as the official language. 
On the other hand, it guaranteed the use of Russian or any other native language “in all 
vital needs.” Second, the Universal called for endorsing Ukraine’s integration with 
Europe, with the prospect of gaining membership in EU. Third, it endorsed Ukraine’s 
participation to Russian-led Single Economic Space for creating free-trade zones. Finally, 
the Universal supported Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO, however its membership to 
the organization was to be decided in a national referendum.19          
In turn, Timoshenko strongly criticized Yushchenko’s agreement with Yanukovich 
as “the betrayal of the Maidan.” However, the Timoshenko Bloc did not shy away from 
collaborating with the Party of Regions in the ensuing months. In fact, Yanukovich, with 
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the support of Timoshenko, passed legislation to move more powers to the parliament. 
Admittedly thus, divisions in the Orange camp enabled Yanukovich to reinforce his 
position. Yet, when Yanukovich’s Regions Party garnered almost 300 votes to amend the 
constitution by purchasing lawmakers, this prompted Yushchenko to dissolve the 
parliament in April 2007. 20 New parliamentary elections were scheduled for September 
30, 2007.  
As expected, Ukrainian political parties held onto their regions in the 2007 elections. 
The Party of Regions gained 34.4 percent of votes, with the concentration in the east and 
south. Timoshenko’s populist bloc also increased its share of votes to 30.7 percent by 
attracting further support in western Ukraine. Yushchenko’s electoral bloc Our Ukraine-
People’s Self Defense received 14.2 of popular votes. At the same time, Ukraine’s 
Socialist Party lost its seats, and Litvin Bloc entered into the parliament.   
 
Table 6.2   Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections, September 30, 2007 
Political Party Votes, % 
 
Seats Share of Seats, % 
Total Votes (% of electorate) 62.03   
Party of Regions 34.37 175 38.8 
Yuliia Timoshenko Bloc 30.71 156 34.6 
Our Ukraine – People’s Self-
Defense 
14.15 72 16.0 
Communist Party 5.39 27 6.0 
Litvin Bloc 3.96 20 4.4 
Socialist Party 2.86 0 0.0 
Against all 2.73   
Others 4.10   
Invalid Votes 1.73   
Total 100 450 100 
Election threshold was set at 3 percent. 
Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine, www.cvk.gov.ua. 
 
 
                                                 




Also, as in the 2006 elections, major businessmen significantly contributed to election 
campaigns. Yanukovich’s Regions party was again supported by the owner of System 
Capital Management Akhmetov and the gas trading mogul Dmitro Firtash. Timoshenko’s 
bloc received support from the Industrial Union of Donbas. The owner of Roshen 
chocolate company Petro Poroshenko financed Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine’s election 
campaign. Ihor Kolomoiskii’s Privat Group supported both Yushchenko’s and 
Timoshenko’s bloc.21 As a result, oligarchs remained to wield substantial influence within 
the parliament. 
In November, BYuT and Our Ukraine formed a new coalition. However, the political 
conflict between Timoshenko and Yushchenko again rendered the Orange Coalition 
dysfunctional. Soon, the Timoshenko Bloc, along with the Party of Regions and the 
Communists, voted for increasing the powers of parliament at the expense of presidential 
authority in September 2008.22 Subsequently, Yushchenko withdrew his support from the 
coalition. More importantly, the president issued a decree to dissolve the parliament in 
October and called for early elections.23 However, a Kyiv court suspended the decree, 
which resulted in Yushchenko dismissing the court itself.24 Although Timoshenko 
succeeded in staying as prime minister in the end with the support of some lawmakers in 
Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine and Litvin Bloc, the coalition was no longer able to 
effectively govern the country. 
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At the same time, Lucan Way highlights that Timoshenko and Yanukovich at this 
time came very close to forming a coalition. However, “political cynicism and mutual 
distrust” of the members of both the Timoshenko Bloc and Regions Party handicapped 
negotiation talks. Next, the electoral bases of the political parties raised the concern for 
furthering political rapprochement. As the two parties were backed by different voters – 
essentially divided by the meaning of Ukraine’s national identity, – the coalition might 
have damaged the images of Timoshenko and Yanukovich in the eyes of their electorate.25 
In the last four years, the Ukrainian politics found itself in a democratizing yet 
unstable state. First, the constitutional reforms, which reduced the presidential powers in 
favor of the parliament, laid the ground for democratic progress. With none of the political 
parties garnering sufficient support to amend the constitution,26 this reduced the 
possibility for sliding back to authoritarianism. Second, divisions in the Orange camp, 
and so their dysfunctional governments, enabled Yanukovich and his Regions Party to 
recover from the defeat of the Orange Revolution. As the leaders of the Orange parties 
sought to collaborate with Yanukovich when they fell into conflict, this resulted in the 
Party of Regions becoming a coalition partner in 2006 and passing legislation to increase 
the powers of the parliament. Next, splits in national identity remained to shape party 
preferences of voters, which in turn raised the cost of political collaboration between the 
Orange parties and Yanukovich’s Regions Party. Finally, the post-Orange revolution era 
did not put an end to close relations between bureaucracy and oligarchy – despite the 
hopes of many. Instead, big business owners provided significant amount of financing to 
different parties, which in turn enabled them to preserve their influence in the parliament. 
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With Yanukovich’s ascent to the presidency in early 2010, the impetus for 
democratization process was lost. The repeated failure of Orange Coalitions, along with 
Ukraine’s worsening economy due to global financial crisis of 2008, benefitted 
Yanukovich’s election campaign.27 At the same time, Yushchenko’s efforts to rehabilitate 
nationalist leaders and organizations who fought for Ukraine’s independence during the 
Second World War and the Orange Parties’ support for the law recognizing the 
holodomor (Great Famine of 1932-33) as “an act of genocide against the Ukrainian 
people” by the Soviet Union did not help these political forces appeal to voters who 
longed for the Soviet nostalgia in the east and south.28 Conversely, Taras Kuzio 
highlights, the Party of Regions often made use of the Soviet narrative of Ukrainian 
nationalists as fascists while discrediting its political rivals and thus galvanizing public 
support in 2005-2010.29 Although none of the candidates were able to garner 50 percent 
of the vote in the first round, Yanukovich succeeded in winning against Timoshenko in 
the run-off 2010 presidential elections, 48.95 percent to 45.47 percent. Hence, 78.5 
percent of voters in eastern Ukraine supported Yanukovich, when 80 percent of voters in 
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Table 6.3   Ukrainian Presidential Elections, 2010 










Total Votes (% of 
electorate) 
 66.5 24,588,268 68.8 25,493,529 
Viktor Yanukovich Party of 
Regions 
35.32 8,686,642 48.95 12,481,266 
Yuliia Timoshenko Fatherland 25.05 6,159,810 45.47 11,593,357 
Serhii Tihipko Self-nominated 13.05 3,211,198  
Arsenii Yatseniuk Self-nominated 6.96 1,711,737 
Viktor Yushchenko Self-nominated 5.45 1,341,534 
Petro Simonenko Communist 
Party 
3.54 872,877 
Volodimir Litvin People’s Party 2.35 578,883 
Oleh Tiahnibok Svoboda 1.43 352,282 
Anatolii Gritsenko Self-nominated 1.2 296,412 
Others  1.71  
Against all  1.65  4.39  
Invalid votes  2.29  1.19  
Total   100  100  
Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine, www.cvk.gov.ua. 
 
The Rise and Fall of Yanukovich’s Authoritarianism in 2010-2014 
In his February 25 inauguration speech before Ukrainian lawmakers, Victor Yanukovich 
at first called for the support of the parliament –  that he described “a place for a strong 
opposition, which should control the actions of the government and the president – in 
future efforts to “create a transparent, effective and accountable system of governance.” 
While the president next promised to ensure political stability, reform economy, and fight 
corruption, his speech also asserted the need to develop “equal and mutually beneficial 
relations with the Russian Federation, the European Unions and the United States.”31 
Contrary to this, the period between 2010 and 2013 saw growing consolidation of power 
in the hands of Yanukovich, undermining the parliament and the courts. Simultaneously, 
Yanukovich’s allies in business found their power restored in Ukraine. Later, the 
                                                 




“Family” – led by the president’s son Olexey – came to strongly control the economy, 
while corruption thrived. Yet, when Yanukovich openly averted the country’s integration 
with Europe in favor of improved relations with Russia, his authoritarian regime met with 
strong resistance. In the span of three months, the Ukrainian opposition movement, which 
effectively appealed to a competing notion of national identity and garnered necessary 
economic resources to spark the protest, led to the collapse of Yanukovich’s 
authoritarianism. 
Within days of rising to power, Yanukovich made quick efforts to consolidate his 
rule. As Timoshenko’s government received a vote of no confidence in the parliament, a 
door opened for the president to form his own government. Yanukovich then signed a 
law which enabled the Party of Regions to recruit lawmakers from other parties to reach 
a majority in parliament, although the 2004 constitutional reforms clearly stated that 
parliamentarians will lose their mandate if they were to leave the political party they were 
elected from (imperative mandate).32 On March 11, the Party of Regions formed a new 
coalition with the Communists, the Litvin Bloc, and parliamentarians that deserted from 
the Timoshenko Bloc and Our Ukraine. While Yanukovich appointed Azarov as the new 
prime minister, his loyal businessmen received critical positions in the government.33 
With his control over the government and the parliament, Yanukovich rapidly moved 
to undermine opposition forces. In the local elections held in October 2010, the Justice 
Ministry blocked the heads of Timoshenko’s Fatherland Party in Kyiv and Lviv from 
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standing as candidates.34 Next, the Party of Regions and its allies passed legislation in 
November which reversed Ukraine’s parliamentary elections from a proportional to a 
mixed system and raised the election threshold to 5 percent.35 As a result of the election  
reforms, Yanukovich’s Regions Party expected to increase its share of seats in the 2012 
parliamentary elections, while making it more difficult for minor parties to have 
representation. 
Even with the election reforms, Yanukovich’s alliance did not yet have sufficient 
votes to amend the constitution unilaterally in parliament. To overcome this, the ruling 
power further turned to the judiciary. First, a law on the judiciary enabled the High 
Council of Justice, dominated by pro-Yanukovich members, to appoint and discharge the 
country’s judges from their post in July 2010.36 This mounted a serious threat to Ukraine’s 
judicial independence. Then, several Constitutional Court justices were fired from their 
positions.37 Consequently, the Constitutional Court reversed the 2004 amendments to the 
constitution and eviscerated the presidential-parliamentary system in Ukraine in October 
2010.38 As Yanukovich gained the power to name a prime minister, appoint and dismiss 
executive officials, and also assign security service positions, his grasp on power 
strengthened.39 
While Ukraine was experiencing significant changes in its judiciary, Yanukovich’s 
regime also began to instigate a serious of political prosecutions against its main rivals. 
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Yurii Lutsenko, a former interior minister and opposition lawmaker, was arrested for 
abuse of office in December 2010 and given a jail sentence for four years.40 Timoshenko, 
the leader of the largest opposition party in the parliament, was sentenced to seven years 
in jail in October 2011 for “exceeding her power” in a gas deal that she signed with Russia 
as a prime minister. Timoshenko was further banned from serving in public office for 3 
years.41 With this sentence, Yanukovich’s regime certainly aimed to eliminate its main 
competitor from standing as the head of her party and a presidential candidate in the next 
elections. 
Moreover, Ukraine’s media pluralism under Yanukovich’s regime began to decline 
in the early 2010s. The largest media groups, owned by Yanukovich loyalists, encouraged 
self-censorship among journalists. Akhmetov’s TV Ukraina and State Channel 1 further 
provided positive coverage of Yanukovich and his Regions Party ahead of the 2012 
parliamentary elections.42 At the same time, Yanukovich directed Valerii 
Khoroshkovskii, the head of Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and also a share-holder 
of Inter Media group, to enforce censorship on opposition media.43 The media crackdown 
continued in 2012 as Ukraine’s tax authorities also launched an investigation against TV 
channel TVi, a strong critic of the regime.44 In the same year, a number of journalists, 
including the leading newspaper Ukrainskaia Pravda’s Mustafa Naiem, were physically 
assaulted.45 
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In turn, international election observers unsurprisingly characterized Ukraine’s 2012 
parliamentary elections “by the lack of a level playing field, caused primarily by the abuse 
of administrative sources, lack of transparency of campaign and party financing, and the 
lack of balanced media coverage.”46 Even with the uneven playing field in its favor and 
strong support from oligarchs, Yanukovich’s Regions Party increased its share of seats 
only by 2.3 percent. In fact, the three opposition parties combined – Tymoshenko’s and 
Yatseniuk’s Fatherland, Vitalii Klitschko’s UDAR (Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for 
Reform), and Oleh Tiahnibok’s nationalist Svoboda (Freedom) –  outperformed the 
Regions in the proportional half of the election, 49 to 30 percent. The Party of Regions 
and its coalition partner Communist Party – both primarily supported in the eastern and 
southern regions – garnered around 9 million votes in the proportional part of the 
elections, while the three opposition parties received 10 million votes – mostly in the 
western and central regions. However, Yanukovich’s party gained 113 seats in the single-
mandate constituencies, while the opposition parties together got 57 seats. In the words 
of Kuzio, the 2012 parliamentary elections “stabilized Ukraine’s political system into 
four or five-party system with the country split between more entrenched mutually 
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Table 6.4 Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections, October 28, 2012 
Political Party PR Votes, % 
 
PR Seats SMD Seats Total Seats Share of 
Seats, % 
Party of Regions 30.0 72 113 185 41.1 
All Ukrainian Union 
“Fatherland” 
25.54 62 39 101 22.4 
UDAR 13.96 34 6 40 8.8 
Communist Party 13.18 32  32 7.1 
Svoboda 10.44 25 12 37 8.2 
Others 6.81 – 7 7 1.5 
Self-nominated – – 43 43 9.5 
Total  225 220 445 100 
Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine, www.cvk.gov.ua. 
 
 
When the new coalition government was formed, Ukrainian politics found itself further 
dominated by Yanukovich’s Family. The latter, along with Akhmetov’s associates, 
controlled the government and so the economy. Moreover, the Family monopolized the 
state’s law enforcement and tax authorities.48 In this way, Yanukovich’s family had 
sufficient resources to build itself as the “wealthiest clan in Ukraine” by the time its chief 
steps out of the office.49 Thus, state procurement auctions and privatization deals were 
delivered to Yanukovich’s business associates. In fact, Serhiy Kurchenko, who ran a gas 
company on behalf of Yanukovich’s son Olexander, emerged as one of Ukraine’s 
wealthiest people in less than two years.50 In contrast, the regime penalized business 
owners which sided with the Orange leaders. 51 In the end, corruption and corporate 
raiding thrived under the Yanukovich regime. Soon, even the “non-Family” clients felt 
threatened as their share of spoils also shrank. Hence, Kuzio notes, “Ukraine’s oligarchs 
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outside “The Family” and Donetsk … withdrew their support during Yanukovich’s 
presidency.”52  Additionally, the Family’s corrupt system burdened ordinary Ukrainian 
citizens and owners of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
To galvanize support both from business and people, Yanukovich admittedly had to 
rebrand his image in the 2015 presidential elections. To do this, the president ostensibly 
favored signing the EU Association Agreement. Ukraine had already concluded the 
“Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA)” with the EU in 2011 and 
negotiated the Association Agreement in 2012. However, the EU pulled back from 
signing the DCFTA because of its concern on Ukraine’s judicial system.53 Nonetheless, 
European leaders kept the door open for signing the Association Agreement during the 
November 2013 Eastern partnership program in Vilnius and demanded that Ukraine 
satisfy a set of conditions. As a result, the Ukrainian parliament passed a number of bills 
to fulfill the EU’s requirements by November. Yet, the regime resisted passing the most 
critical bills for the completion of the Association Agreement, pertaining reforms on the 
judiciary and the release of Timoshenko to receive medical treatment.54 
Most critically, Ukraine’s prospect to sign the EU’s Association Agreement raised 
Russia’s concerns. Ukraine under Yanukovich already refused to become a member in 
Russia’s Customs Union, although the president agreed to prolong the stay of Russia’s 
Black Sea fleet until 2042.55 In the months leading to the Vilnius summit, the Kremlin 
launched its campaign to intimidate Ukraine by blocking trade. Deteriorating relations 
                                                 
52 Kuzio, Ukraine: Democratization, Corruption, and the New Russian Imperialism, p. 430. 
53 Aslund, What Went Wrong and How to Fix It, pp. 94-5. 
54 “Lawyers: EU to Not Sign Association Agreement with Ukraine if Tymoshenko Not Released,” Interfax-
Ukraine, August 13, 2013.  




between the two countries may have weakened Yanukovich’s main constituency in 
eastern and southern Ukraine. Earlier in 2012, Yanukovich successfully appealed to his 
supporters by signing a law which cleared the way for declaring the Russian language an 
official language in the regions.56 However, Ukraine’s “accession to the Customs Union” 
remained popular in the south and east (50.8 % and 44.9 %, respectively), while Ukraine’s 
“accession to the EU” gathered substantial support in the west and center (68.4 % and 
46.5 %).57 In April 2013, overall 45.8 percent of Ukrainians favored joining the EU, while 
35.8 percent disagreed.58 In the end, Yanukovich decided that his regime would be better 
off not signing the Association Agreement. On November 21, 2013, the president 
suspended the EU negotiations.    
 
Euromaidan: “Slaves do not go to Heaven”59 
 
After Yanukovich decided not to sign the EU Association Agreement, a few hundred 
young Ukrainian men and women began to gather in Kyiv’s central square, Maidan. 
Protesters agreed to camp out in the city center until the government heard their call. The 
demonstrations that began as a peaceful gathering of a few hundred-people hoping to 
force Yanukovich’s government to reconsider its suspension of the Agreement swiftly 
evolved into a more dramatic political movement, seeking the removal of a leader who 
had been edging the country toward an autocratic future. Moreover, this part of the study 
argues that the Ukrainian opposition movement’s successful engagement in the symbolic 
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politics of national identity together with access to economic resources together prompted 
the fall of authoritarianism in the span of three months – as in the Orange Revolution. 
From the very beginning of EuroMaidan, protesters drew upon symbolic capital, 
rhetoric, and legitimacy of past struggles in their call. The opposition movement gathered 
in the Maidan of Independence, which was “more than the main square in Kyiv,” but also 
“a landmark of historical continuity.”60 Student protests and hunger strikes that brought 
the government down in 1990, opposition rallies of “Ukraine without Kuchma” in 2000 
and 2001, and the Orange Revolution of 2004 all took place in Maidan.61 
Within days, Kyiv witnessed the largest rallies since the Orange Revolution of 2004. 
On November 24, over 100,000 Ukrainians responded to calls to rally in support of 
European integration. Protesters carried the EU and Ukrainian flags and chanted the 
slogans of “Ukraine belongs to Europe” and “We are for Europe.” My interviews in the 
field revealed that the early phase of protests was rather an outcome of Ukrainian citizens’ 
desire for a better life. As an interviewee puts it, “I knew the Association Agreement was 
not the panacea. But, I hoped such a document could show a road map to fight corruption 
in the judicial system and other things.”62 Another respondent remarks that “when 
Yanukovich was campaigning for the elections, it was written on the boards that 
‘everything was for people.’ Then, we asked ‘who were the people.?’ The people were 
Yanukovich’s ‘Family’ and friends.” 63 In the words of another interviewee, “our purpose 
was then not to overthrow Yanukovich, but to force the government officials – [Prime 
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Minister] Mikola Azarov and his cabinet ministers - to go sit back at the table and sign 
the agreement.”64   
However, the tenor of demonstrations swiftly changed on the night of November 30, 
2013, when Yanukovich’s security forces responded by conducting a brutal sweep 
through the Maidan. Videos of police beating protesters prompted widespread public 
outrage, and led thousands of people from all over Ukraine to join the demonstrations in 
solidarity and march in the streets of Kyiv by early December. As protests grew, 
Euromaidan also became less about Ukraine’s path to Europe and more about penalizing 
those guilty of violence in the Maidan. In the ensuing months, protesters increasingly 
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Table 6.5   Survey of the Fund “Democratic Initiatives of Ilko Kucheriv” with Kyiv International Institute 
of Sociology, December 2013 and February 2014 
What has promoted you to come to Maidan? (chose not more 













Refusal of Viktor Yanukovich to sign an Association Agreement with 
the European Union 
53.5 40 47.0 
Violent repression against protesters 69.6 69 61.3 
Calls of opposition leaders 5.4 6.7 2.8 
The desire to change the government in the country 39.1 38.9 45.6 
The desire to change the life in Ukraine 49.9 36.2 51.1 
Solidarity with friends, colleagues and relatives also are on Maidan 6.2 4.1 3.7 
Collapsing of democracy, the threat of dictatorship 18.9 13.7 17.5 
It is interesting and funny on Maidan 2.2 1.2 0.4 
The desire to take revenge on the government for everything that has 
been committed in the country 
5.2 9.6 9.8 
The danger that Ukraine joins the Customs Union and generally 
returns to Russia 
16.9 14.4 20.0 
The money I have been paid (or was promised to get paid)   0.3 0.2 0.0 
Other (what?) 3.3 8.2 4.6 
IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY 0.5 0 0 
What requirements do you support (those made on Maidan)? 
(mark all the requirements that are important for you) 
   
The release of the arrested members of the Maidan, end of the 
repression 
81.8 63.9 82.2 
Signing an Association Agreement with the European Union 71.0 58.6 49.0 
The dismissal of the government 80.1 74.5 68.2 
Initiation of an investigation on those guilty for beating protesters on 
Maidan 
57.6 50.7 63.7 
The dissmissal of the Parliament and calling for early parliamentary 
re-elections 
55.6 51.4 59.1 
Release of Yuliia Tymoshenko 37.8 36 30.4 
Viktor Yanukovych's resignation and early presidential re-elections 75.1 65.7 85.2 
Change the Constitution, to return to constitutional reform of 2004, 
which limited the government of the president 
37.9 42.8 62.5 
Violation of criminal cases at all who was involved in corruption 49.6 42.8 62.1 
The general increase of living standards 46.9 42.5 41.1 
Other (what?) 3.4 6.7 1.6 
IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY 0 0 0 






Simultaneously, the protest was imbued with more nationalist feelings. As an interviewee 
explains, “when all the protest started, middle aged people had an excuse: they already 
had their fight during the Orange Revolution. … However, when they saw on the TV that 
security of their kids was in danger, the future of the nation was in danger, they did not 
have this excuse any longer.”66 Hence, as Voldymyr Kulyk aptly remarks, “the moral 
resolve not to ‘let them beat our children’ had a nationalist connotation as it treated the 
nation as one big family.”67 At this point, the Maidan also began to display more the 
national colors of Ukraine. Thousands of protesters additionally sang the national anthem, 
“assert[ing] their determination as ‘Ukrainians’ to prevail in a fight with ‘unspecified 
‘enemies.’”68 An interviewee tells, “I never thought that I would sing the himn [anthem] 
with such deep feelings, especially when Berkut attacked. I was sure that I would stand 
to the end whatever happens. With my fellow Ukrainians, I fought for freedom and 
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Table 6.6   Survey of the Fund “Democratic Initiatives of Ilko Kucheriv” with Kyiv International Institute 























Age (%)    Occupation (%)    
15-29 38.0 34.1 33.2 Director (deputy) of 
company, institution, 
unit 
8.0 4.2 4.5 
30-54 49.0 52.0 56.0 Specialist (with a 
higher education) 
39.5 21.7 26.7 
55 and older 13 13.9 10.8 Law enforcement 
officers, military 
1.4 2.7 3.0 
Education (%)    An entrepreneur 
(businessman) 
9.3 12.3 17.4 
Incomplete 
secondary 





22.1 38.9 43.1 Farm worker, farmer 0.6 1.9 2.9 
Incomplete 
higher 
14.4 10.3 9.5 Pupil 0.4 1.1 – 
Higher 62.7 48.7 43.1 Student 13,2 10,1 6.2 
    Pensioner 9.4 11.2 7.4 
    Do not have a 
permanent job, but 
work for the occasion 
in different places 
3.1 8.5 4.5 
    Temporarily 
unemployed and have 
no source of income 
2.4 7.7 8.5 
    Other 6.2 4.2 4.7 




However, protesters’ imagination of the nation as one-big family did not correspond to 
the way some other Ukrainians tend to interpret their experience with the nation. 
Although protesters saw themselves defending the nation’s freedom and independence 




201470 found that less than half of the Ukrainians supported the protest (40 %), while 23 
percent of Ukrainians continued to back Yanukovich’s regime. At the same time, 32 
percent of Ukrainians did not support either side. The support for Yanukovich’s regime 
concentrated in Eastern Ukraine (51.9 %), while 32.2 percent of southern Ukrainians also 
backed the incumbent regime. On the other hand, the protest gathered substantial support 
in the western (80.4 %) and central (51 %) regions. Also, 19.6 percent of the southern 
region revealed its support for the protest. 
 
Table 6.7   KISS’ survey: “Ukraine – by regions” 
Feb. 8-18, 2014 
N:2032 
Macro-regions 
Whom do you support right now in the 









On the side of authorities led by Yanukovych 2.6 10.7 32.2 51.9 
On the side of protesters 80.4 51.0 19.6 7.5 
None of the sides 12.6 32.5 41.7 39.4 
DIFFICULT TO ANSWER 4.3 5.8 6.6 1.2 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
Source: “Attitudes of Ukrainians and Russians Towards Protests in Ukraine,” KIIS in corporation with 




Additionally, as of February 2014, 87.6 percent of protesters came from the regions. 
Among them, the majority visited from western Ukraine (54.8 %).71 Thus, competing 
visions of national identity, concentrated in different regions, played a major role in 
Ukrainians’ perception of the protest. 
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Equally important was the popularity of the national identity, which supports Ukrainian 
culture and language, and favors an orientation toward Europe, in younger age groups, 
compared to the preference for the other notion of national identity, which gravitated 
towards improved relations with Russia as part of material and cultural concerns. 
Younger Ukrainians (aged 18-29 and 30-39) had a significantly larger preference for the 
protest (43.6% and 42.1 %, respectively) than that of Yanukovich’s regime (14.2% and 
20.2 %, respectively). The support for the protest continued across most Ukrainian age 
groups, while the preference for Yanukovich’s regime was higher in older age groups. 
The largest support for the regime came from those aged over 70 with 37.6 percent.72 
Similarly, Ukrainians with higher education tend to back the protest (45.1 %) rather than 
supporting Yanukovich’s regime (17.3%).73 
 
                                                 

















Distribution of Protesters based on Regions
From Kyiv Western Ukraine




Table 6.8   KISS’ survey: “Ukraine – by age,” “Ukraine – by education level” 
Feb. 8-18, 2014 
N:2032 
 
Whom do you support right 
now in the conflict in 
Ukraine?  



















Age      
18-29 14.2 43.6 36.1 6.2 100 
30-39 20.2 42.1 31.7 5.9 100 
40-49 21.5 43.3 31.0 4.1 100 
50-59 26.3 38.3 32.0 2.8 100 
60-69 27.6 37.1 31.3 4.1 100 
70+ 37.6 31.4 27.1 3.9 100 
Education      
Basic (less than 7 years) 28.9 33.3 37.8 0 100 
Incomplete secondary (less 
than 10 years) 
30.9 41.8 25.5 1.8 100 
Complete secondary 25.8 36.1 32.6 5.4 100 
Higher 17.3 45.1 32.0 5.6 100 
Source: “Attitudes of Ukrainians and Russians Towards Protests in Ukraine,” KIIS in corporation with 




From the beginning, the three political parties in parliament involved in the organization 
of the protest. The Orange leader Yuliia Timoshenko’s and Arsenii Yatseniuk’s 
Fatherland, Vitalii Klitschko’s UDAR, and Oleh Tiahnibok’s nationalist Svoboda 
undertook leadership role and financed the protest in the Maidan.74 Similarly, Poroshenko 
was an early supporter of the protest.75 Moreover, regime outsider oligarchs helped to 
organize the protest, providing favorable media coverage. TV channels, including 1+1, 
Channel 5, and those owned by Kuchma’s son-in law Viktor Pinchuk reported from the 
Maidan.76 Also, Inter, the most-watched Ukrainian TV channel owned by the head of 
Presidential Administration Serhii Lovochkin, provided coverage of the Maidan by the 
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end of December. 77 At the same time, the regime loyalist oligarchs, who were threatened 
by Yanukovich’s family, reportedly provided financing to protesters.78 After all, 
Yanukovich’s failure to control the wealth, and thus the media, stimulated the protest 
participation.  
Next, dispersed economic resources strengthened the self-organization of protesters 
in the Maidan. When students were beaten by Berkut in the end of November, more 
protesters vigilantly occupied the Maidan in defending “Ukraine” against Yanukovich. 
They erected tents in the square, seized the City Hall and House of Trade Unions, in 
which nationalist Svoboda played a key role, and coordinated logistics and further 
actions. My discussions with protesters highlighted their voluntary efforts to sustain the 
protest, by helping in outdoor kitchens, bringing medicine and warm clothes, providing 
medical and legal assistance, and donating cash. Ukrainskaia Pravda reported that 
between $21,400 and $41,700 were collected daily in the Maidan.79 At the same time, 
small and medium-sized business owners, who were hit by Yanukovich’s tax policies, 
encouraged their employees to participate in rallies, and provided large amounts of 
financing to stimulate the protest.80 Meanwhile, the Civic Sector of EuroMaidan emerged 
to organize the activities in Kyiv. A coordinator in the movement also highlighted the 
Ukrainian diaspora’s financial support to the protest.81 Additionally, self-defense units 
were formed in the Maidan. Small and midsize businesses reportedly sent their workers 
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to join the self- defense units. 82 The units also benefitted from the financial support of 
business owners. 83 In the end, the cost of sustaining the protest in Kyiv was about $70,000 
per day, according to some estimates.84 
At the same time, interviewees in our discussions often associated the self-
organization in the Maidan with Ukrainian history and culture, while also alluding to 
Russians as lacking a similar tradition. A respondent remarked that “the memories of self-
organization are alive in families in Chernivtsi [which was a part of Austro-Hungarian 
empires],” and added that “in Ukraine, you first need to think about yourself, but [in a 
way of] what you can do for your country. Self-organization is all about this. Russians 
are on the other hand collectivist.” 85 Similarly, another interviewee suggested that 
“Russians need their tsar. Here, in Ukraine, we can self-organize. We still need leaders, 
but we don’t need a leader.” 86Also, many respondents highlighted that the organization 
of self-defense units in the Maidan was drawn upon the military tradition of Ukrainian 
Cossacks in the seventeenth century.  
As the protest intensified, the regime began to crumble. First, Yanukovich’s close ally 
Lovochkin attempted to give his resignation. However, the president did not accept it. 
Next, Inna Bohoslovska, David Zhvaniia,87 Volodimir Melnichenko, and Nikolai 
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Rudkovskii quit the Party of Regions in December 2013.88 Finally, Yanukovich agreed 
to negotiate with the three opposition leaders, Yatseniuk, Klitschko, and Tiahnibok, on 
December 13th. However, the president refused to dismiss prime minister Azarov, who 
was accused of ordering the violent crackdown in the Maidan.89 Instead, Yanukovich’s 
regime brought larger numbers of tituski (hired thugs) from other regions to provoke 
violence in the Maidan, while also organizing its own pro-government rallies in Kyiv.90 
Moreover, Yanukovich signed a new deal with Putin on December 17, which included 
Russia’s $15 billion worth of assistance to Ukraine.91 
By January 2014, the protest seemingly slowed down. In early January, the ultra-right 
Svoboda party, which gathered 10.4 percent of the votes in the 2012 parliamentary 
elections, organized a torch-lit march in Kyiv in the memory of Stepan Bandera, the 
leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in the Second Word War era. As has 
been discussed earlier in this study, Bandera’s organization unified various armed groups 
under the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during the war. However, these organizations’ 
collaboration with Nazi Germany, along with their fight against the Soviet army, to form 
an independent Ukrainian state, is one of the most disputed topics in the country’s 
history.92 Therefore, the Svoboda’s commitment to the protest, and his leader Tiahnibok’s 
ethno-nationalist appeal, provoked a split in the Maidan. In other words, some praised 
Svoboda’s activities during the protest, while others condemned. In the view of an 
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interviewee, “all the opposition leaders were disappointing. They did not organize any 
actions. … Svoboda [however] organized actions in the Maidan. They were all the time 
active. They secured the Maidan for us. They were all the time in the front.”93 However, 
another interviewee suggested that “Svoboda’s image and militarization of the Maidan 
pushed potential protesters away. … Many Kyiv residents even started to avoid the 
Maidan area because they felt threatened.” 94 Most importantly, pro-Yanukovich media 
in Ukraine and Russia capitalized on the images of Svoboda’s activities, Banderite 
symbols and OUN flag to discredit the Maidan. Given that Yanukovich’s allies owned 
the major TV channels, and over 80 percent of Ukrainians received their news from TV, 
the media coverage of nationalists in the Maidan further deepened the alienation of 
Ukrainians in the eastern and southern regions.95 Yet, without the leadership and 
organizational muscle provided by the Svoboda, regime opponents might clearly have 
had a harder time in stimulating the protest.   
Next, Yanukovich pushed a new legislation through the parliament, aimed at curbing 
the protest in the Maidan, on January 16, 2014. However, these new “anti-protest laws” 
once again intensified the protest. Right Sector, an ultra-nationalist group which was 
created in late November, swiftly defied the Yanukovich regime by throwing Molotov 
cocktails and beating riot police. During the violent clashes in Hrushevskii street, Right 
Sector activists, although small in numbers (around 300), emerged in the front lines and 
drew substantial media attention.96 In the view of Right Sector’s leader Dmitrii Yarosh - 
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an adherent of “the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism as interpreted by Stepan Bandera,” 
– many others resorted to violence because of the frustration both with Yanukovich’s 
regime and the opposition leader’s inability to move the protest forward.97 Finally, 
Yanukovich’s regime, in the face of increasing resistance, agreed to revoke the anti-
protest legislation on January 25. In the same day, Yanukovich’s prime minister Azarov 
also gave his resignation. 
By the end of January, protesters seized several government buildings in the western 
and central regions.98 More visitors from western Ukraine poured into the streets of Kyiv. 
Meanwhile, Lovochkin resigned from his position.99 However, Yanukovich remained 
reluctant to compromise with the opposition. Hence, the regime deployed more militias 
from eastern and southern Ukraine in Kyiv in February.100 
On February 18, the protest once again turned violent after the Yanukovich-controlled 
parliament refused to discuss the president’s powers. In the following hours, the regime 
attempted to clear the Maidan but failed. The ongoing negotiations between the regime 
and the opposition leaders did not bring an end to the brawl in the Maidan. On February 
20, Yanukovich’s regime made a fatal mistake by ordering security forces to open fire on 
the protesters. The snipers shot around seventy people to death in downtown Kyiv.101 The 
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same day, several deputies resigned from the Party of Regions.102 The mayor of Kyiv, 
Volodimir Makeienko, also left the ruling party in reaction to the government’s assault 
on the protesters.103 Most importantly, thirty-four members of the Party of Regions voted 
in favor of ending the police violence in the Maidan, along with the deputies of the 
opposition parties in parliament (236 out of 450).104 Hence, Yanukovich was no longer 
able to control the legislature. 
On February 21, delegates of Poland, Germany, France, and Russia, who arrived in 
Kyiv a day earlier, concluded a deal between Yanukovich and the opposition leaders. The 
agreement, signed in the afternoon, called for early presidential elections by the end of 
the year, the restoration of the 2004 constitution within 48 hours, and the formation of a 
national unity government within 10 days.105 The same day, the parliament voted to 
reinstall the 2004 constitution, which was backed by one hundred-forty members of the 
Party of Regions, to remove the Interior Minister Vitalii Zakharchenko, and to amend a 
criminal law leading to the release of Yuliia Timoshenko.106 
However, the agreement between Yanukovich and the opposition leaders was met 
with resistance by protesters in the Maidan. Soon after Klitschko stepped on stage to 
explain the agreement, Volodymyr Parasiuk, a commander in one of the many self-
defense units, interrupted him. Parasiuk called protesters not to leave the Maidan until 
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Yanukovich resigned.107 At the same time, Rights Sector, along with several other groups, 
pledged to continue with the protest.108 In the late evening, the news of Yanukovich 
fleeing Kyiv suddenly circulated.109 In my discussion with interviewees, two things 
became evident regarding this phase of the protest. First, many protesters expressed their 
disapproval of the opposition leaders, as the signed agreement allowed Yanukovich to 
stay in power. In the view of interviewees, “people could not live another year with 
Yanukovich, after the mass shooting.” Second, Yanukovich’s exit was quite unexpected 
for protesters, as it was for the rest of the world. In the end, Ukrainian parliament voted 
to remove Yanukovich on February 22. 
In summary, the Ukrainian opposition’s effective appeal to a competing notion of 
national identity, along with its broad access to economic resources, stimulated the protest 
leading to the fall of Yanukovich’s regime. Yanukovich’s refusal to sign the EU 
Association Agreement and leaning towards Russia to ensure his authoritarian rule, and 
later the violent crackdown on protesters, increased the disagreement over the national 
identity espoused by the regime. In response, many protesters, ascribed to Ukrainophile 
identity, poured into the streets of Kyiv to “defend the nation, Ukraine’s freedom and 
independence” against a leader edging the country towards his vision of authoritarianism. 
Particularly, ultra-right groups’ commitment to the protest played a significant role in the 
ousting of the Yanukovich’s regime. Moreover, support of Ukrainian business, which 
suffered from the “Family’s” economic dealings, brought necessary financing to sustain 
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the Maidan and also helped to disseminate the opposition forces’ message to Ukrainians. 
Simultaneously, the regime began to crumble. At first, few members of the Party of 
Regions deserted Yanukovich. However, after the mass shooting, many former allies 
defied the regime by supporting the majority in parliament to end police violence. Within 
the next few days, the Yanukovich’s regime finally collapsed.        
         
 
 












































CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION 
 
The post-Soviet era witnessed in many countries the rise of authoritarian regimes, 
characterized by flawed elections, unlevel playing fields, and widespread violation of 
civil liberties.1 While some incumbent leaders effectively consolidated authoritarian rule 
in their respective states, others failed to hold onto power in the face of growing 
opposition. This dissertation has focused on two such cases: Russia and Ukraine. The two 
countries inherited weak respect for the rule of law and undeveloped civil societies from 
the Soviet past. Both Russia and Ukraine lacked any prior experience with democracy 
and strong ties to the Western countries. Both states also possessed mass economic 
resources and industries from the Soviet system. In spite of these similarities, Russia and 
Ukraine experienced divergent transitional paths in the post-Soviet era. While Russia 
became a consolidated authoritarian regime, Ukraine oscillated between authoritarianism 
and democracy. This dissertation sought to explain the reasons of different authoritarian 
outcomes in these two countries.  
Post-Soviet scholarship has to date offered a variety of explanations for diverse 
regime trajectories. Some studies focused on the design of political institutions in 
explaining the failure of democratization in this region. For instance, Steven Fish related 
fading democracy in Russia with the super-presidential system.2 Similarly, Timothy 
Colton and Cindy Skach considered undeveloped party systems, along with presidents 
who are not “integrated into an institutionalized party system,” as conducive to a reversal 
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in the democratization of post-Soviet states.3 Although constitutional design wields 
nontrivial influence on regime trajectories, Gerald Easter and Lucan Way aptly point out 
that authoritarianism was rather a cause –  than an outcome – of strong presidential 
systems in the region.4  At the same time, my work also noted that Putin in Russia 
consolidated more powers than Yeltsin without making any changes to the constitution, 
while Yanukovich succeeded in bypassing constitutional constraints to restore the 
presidential system after coming to office. 
Alternatively, Henry Hale focused on formal term limits in analyzing post-Soviet 
regime outcomes. According to Hale, in the post-Soviet “patronal” systems where 
incumbent leaders failed to hold onto power, constitutionally mandated term limits 
promoted elite defection by carrying uncertainty and thus enabled the opposition to 
challenge authoritarian rule.5 However, Kravchuk in Ukraine fell from power in 1994, 
even though he did not approach his term limits. While Hale’s framework also accounts 
for presidential popularity in shaping the political elite’s expectations about a leader’s 
future and their decision to either support or oppose a president approaching his term 
limits, it yet leaves out some key variables – most importantly, a potential opposition 
movement’s ability to mobilize support –  affecting political actors’ perception of the 
likelihood of regime survival. This was how Yanukovich’s authoritarian rule fell in the 
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face of a broad opposition movement in 2014, although his first term was to end a year 
later. 
Another set of studies paid attention to the dissident movements, the tactics and 
repertoires available to them, and the diffusion of opposition techniques among post-
Soviet countries.6 Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik particularly asserted a set of 
strategies for opposition movements seeking to overthrow authoritarian leaders in the 
wake of fraudulent elections.7 Yet some opposition movements adopting  the techniques 
and strategies similar to those that had enabled other opposition movements to thwart 
autocrats nonetheless failed to mobilize sufficient support on the ground after a regime 
stole elections. Moreover, the fall of Yanukovich’s authoritarian rule – as laid out in 
chapter VI – was brought about more by spontaneous acts of Ukrainian people than by 
prior efforts of civil society organizations when there were no elections.  
Recently, Lucan Way – building upon his earlier work with Levitsky – offered an 
approach which looked at both an authoritarian incumbent’s capacity to repress 
challengers and opposition leaders’ ability to mobilize support in regard to national 
identity divisions.8 His study found that authoritarian leaders who possessed vast 
organizational resources or strong control over the economy will be able to repress 
opposition forces in countries where divisions in national identity are negligible. While 
categorizing Russia as having a unified national identity, Way disregards challenges 
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posed by communists and national-patriots throughout the 1990s. The resistance of these 
groups in the Duma against Yeltsin’s rule generated an armed conflict in October 1993. 
Yeltsin was able to unlawfully shut down the Duma – even though he possessed weak 
organizational resources – in part because more people, particularly in Moscow, 
supported Yeltsin’s presidency at the time. Similarly, communist leader Zyuganov, who 
portrayed himself as the candidate of national-patriotic forces, mounted a serious threat 
to Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential elections. Indeed, the very “polarized electorate”9 in 
this race gave way to the only run-off of modern Russian history. Thus, the question is 
why these forces are no longer able to effectively resist the Russian regime. In response, 
my work suggested that Putin’s domination of struggle over national idea weakened 
opposition forces in the parliament which appealed to similar notion of nation and thus 
resulted in potential challengers’ poor electoral showing. 
In summary, little work in post-Soviet scholarship has simultaneously examined how 
autocrats and opposition forces build popular support in their efforts to maintain power 
or resist it, respectively, in understanding divergent regime outcomes. As a result, most 
literature focused on one side of the story, while leaving out (particularly) ideational and 
material bases of support (or the lack thereof) for the other side. Without a thorough 
analysis of the sources of popular support for both authoritarian regimes and opposition 
movements within and across cases, we are left with one-sided explanations of post-
Soviet authoritarian outcomes.  
My work sought to remedy this gap by exploring competing forces’ engagement in 
the symbolic politics of national identity and their access to economic resources in Russia 
                                                 




and Ukraine. The two cases reveal that divergent authoritarian trajectories were less about 
regime dissidents’ strong commitment to democratic values and developed civil societies 
or incumbent rulers’ access to well-organized party institutions and strong coercive 
apparatuses, but more about (dis)agreement over a national identity espoused by 
autocratic incumbents and opposition forces’ ability to mobilize economic resources. 
When opposition forces framed their struggle against authoritarian rule in national terms 
and acquired access to financial and media resources, incumbent leaders failed to hold 
onto power. However, when incumbent regimes either popularized their choice of 
national identity or asserted broad control over economic resources – or both, – this 
strengthened the authoritarian leaders’ ability to retain power. 
Chapter III-VI in this study offer empirical evidence to show how the ideational and 
material bases of mobilizational support both for incumbent leaders and dissident 
movements shaped the authoritarian outcomes in Russia and Ukraine. In both countries, 
the presidents, in the absence of a new constitution delineating institutional powers, 
became locked in severe conflicts with the opposition-dominated parliaments in the 
immediate post-Soviet era. Neither Yeltsin nor Kravchuk was affiliated with any political 
party at the time. With declining economies and increasing opposition to their rule, the 
two presidents were forced to compromise with their parliaments. Yet this process 
eventually led Kravchuk to lose power in early elections. Most critically, national identity 
appeals of candidates appeared in the presidential race as a significant source of voter 
mobilization, along with the regional – economic and political – networks available to 
them. By contrast, Yeltsin, after facing a serious challenge from communists and 




noted in chapter III, this was rather a risky decision on the part of Yeltsin, given that the 
coercive apparatus had occasionally failed to implement orders earlier. Although security 
forces were reluctant to intervene in the conflict, opposition leaders’ failure to appeal to 
the Russian nation and to mobilize broad support on the ground enabled Yeltsin to 
convince troops to shell the parliament. Thus, the military’s potential commitment to act 
was arguably less about a concern regarding capacity, and more about a question of will.10 
In this respect, the low level of popular support on the ground for opposition forces, and 
the low cost of repression associated with it, eased security forces’ decision to engage in 
an assault on the parliament.11 
The following period in Russia under Yeltsin and in Ukraine under Kuchma highlight 
how the two factors analyzed in this dissertation played a key role in authoritarian 
outcomes. The two leaders established strong presidential systems – even though there 
were some differences in terms of the power of president and parliament between the two 
countries. Yet both Yeltsin and Kuchma continued to face serious challenges particularly 
from the leftist parties in the parliament throughout the 1990s. While Yeltsin and Kuchma 
made efforts to form pro-presidential parties, they still had to rely on competing factions 
in exercising their powers. The two leaders also suffered from low-popularity ratings as 
the economy in their respective countries declined at significant rates.12 Nonetheless, 
Yeltsin in 1996 and Kuchma in 1999 won victories in the presidential elections. First, 
newly emerging group of oligarchs in both countries raised large sums of money for each 
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president’s campaign expenditure while also providing broad coverage to the leaders in 
their media outlets, with the expectation of gaining further privileges in privatization of 
state assets. Second, both Yeltsin and Kuchma redefined the content of political debate 
by capitalizing on the threat of communism with the voters in each country, although the 
left-wing opposition candidates primarily made appeals to competing visions of national 
identity. 
As chapter III and IV highlight, the two leaders faced growing challenges from regime 
insiders in the subsequent period. Primakov in Russia and Yushchenko in Ukraine 
emerged as potential candidates, gaining popularity with the people. Yet the recent poor 
showing of opposition parties in the 1999 Russian parliamentary elections due to the rise 
of pro-Kremlin party, Unity, which had access to large financial and media resources to 
stir nationalist feelings in the face of reignited Chechen war, resulted in Primakov’s 
withdrawing from the upcoming race. Simultaneously, Yeltsin’s hand-picked successor, 
Putin, built an image as “the defender of nation”13  by sending troops to Chechnia after 
the Chechen rebels’ incursion to neighboring Dagestan and a wave of apartments 
bombings in Moscow. Unlike Yeltsin whose inability to cultivate a national identity for 
post-Soviet Russia deprived him of a significant source of popular support, Putin thus 
made effective appeals to national sentiments to enlist people behind his rule from the 
beginning. Finally, with the broad financial and media resources provided by various 
oligarchs, Putin became the next president of Russia in 2000. 
In stark contrast to Yeltsin’s Russia, in Ukraine Kuchma’s chosen successor, 
Yanukovich failed to gain sufficient support to win the 2004 presidential elections – 
                                                 




despite possessing massive resources to communicate pro-Russian campaign messages. 
As chapter IV points out, when the regime carried out large-scale electoral fraud to ensure 
Yanukovich’s victory, many individuals ascribed to Ukrainophile identity came out to 
the street in protest. Mark Beissinger’s analysis of different surveys tellingly illustrates 
that a big bulk of protesters came from the western regions which historically had been 
the breeding ground of Ukrainian nationalism.14 Remarkably, also, this study reveals that 
Ukrainian protesters were less motivated by their commitment to democratic values.15 As 
highlighted in my work, several oligarchs’ financial and media resources furthermore 
played a crucial role in opposition forces’ efforts to stimulate the protest. The high level 
of opposition mobilization that followed precipitated a disagreement between Kuchma 
and Yanukovich regarding the use of force against the protesters. All this arguably 
encouraged different security agencies to resist the government’s potential act of 
repression. In sum, the regime opponents’ ability to mobilize strong support based on a 
competing vision of national identity and their access to economic and media resources 
together resulted in the fall of the authoritarian regime in Ukraine. 
Chapter V and VI pick up from the point that the paths of these two similarly 
authoritarian regimes sharply diverged. My analysis of Russia suggests that Putin’s 
appeals to (ethnic) Russian traditional values and patriotic sentiments enabled him to gain 
broad support for his authoritarianism and so legitimized the growing political control of 
the Kremlin in 2000-2008. Simultaneously, Putin’s restoration of state control of the 
economy provided him with the necessary material resources to sustain popular support 
while depriving regime opponents of any meaningful financing to mount challenges 
                                                 





against him. While I do argue that all this partially facilitated Putin’s ability to install 
Medvedev as his successor in 2008, without facing any serious opposition, I do not claim 
that the two factors offered in this work were sufficient to explain authoritarian 
consolidation in Russia. 
Ukraine – unlike Russia – was able to experience democracy in the post-Soviet era, 
even though it lasted only a short while. With Yanukovich’s ascent to presidency in 2010, 
the country swiftly slid back to authoritarianism. While it is undeniable that the level of 
authoritarian consolidation differed in Russia and Ukraine, regime dissenters in both 
countries were nevertheless able to stimulate protests in the first half of the 2010s. Yet 
the Russian opposition movement’s ability to draw people to the streets and acquire 
financial resources to maintain protests remained significantly weaker than their 
Ukrainian counterparts. 
As chapter V reveals, Russian protesters’ image of themselves as distinctive from the 
rest of the people hindered their leaders’ efforts to construct narratives which might have 
cultivated a wider sense of collective-self among Russians. Instead, pro-regime forces 
framed the opposition movement’s demand for democracy as an instance of betrayal 
against the Russian nation. Regime opponents also lacked financial and media resources 
to convey the protest message to the masses, while the Kremlin exploited its control over 
the media to mobilize its base of support. 
As examined in chapter VI, the Ukrainian protest movement – unlike its counterpart 
in Russia – was strongly imbued with nationalist feelings and was able to benefit from 
oligarchs’ various resources. Yet the fact that the early protest emerged in response to 




the fall of the authoritarian regime. Although Ukraine’s engagement with Europe 
markedly increased under Yushchenko’s presidency, it shall be noted that the country has 
not been offered a membership in EU up to now. Along the same line, Steven Levitsky 
and Lucan Way state that “[a]lthough trade shifted toward Western Europe in the 2000s, 
Ukraine’s overall linkage score remained well below the threshold for high linkage.”16 
Then, my work contends that the two factors which led to the victory of opposition forces 
in 2004 played the same role in 2014. 
Overall, this study seeks to shed light on how ideational and material resources 
available to both incumbent leaders and opposition movements are important in shaping 
authoritarian outcomes. While the recent literature on post-Soviet regime trajectories has 
devoted more attention to the role of national identity in respect to the Ukrainian case, 
this factor has largely been sidestepped in examining authoritarian durability. My 
approach is intended to illustrate how the degree of popular agreement over a notion of 
national identity evoked by an incumbent leader can be a significant source of popular 
support both for an authoritarian regime and for an opposition movement seeking to 
challenge it. Moreover, the importance of economic resources available to competing 
political forces is underlined in my work to demonstrate that an autocrat’s broad control 
over the economy induces cooperation of the political and economic elite – particularly 
in the absence of a strong pro-regime political party – and facilitates authoritarian 
survival, while dispersed economic resources stimulate authoritarian instability – even 
when a leader enjoys a relatively well-institutionalized party. Where contested national 
identity and access to economic resources promote a high level of anti-regime 
                                                 




mobilization, my findings additionally suggest that this plays a critical role in 
discouraging the state coercive apparatus from engaging in repression. Yet the question 
of the will and capacity of the coercive apparatus in understanding authoritarian outcomes 
invites further research. 
In sum, my work proposes that opposition forces’ effective appeal to a competing 
vision of national identity and autocrats’ limited control over wealth provides a sufficient 
explanation for the collapse of authoritarianism. Yet incumbent leaders’ preeminence 
over the symbolic struggle of national identity and broad control of economic resources 
enable them to mobilize support both from masses and the political and economic elite, 
while depriving potential opposition forces of meaningful sources of popular support. My 
conclusions are drawn from in-depth interviews in Russia and Ukraine and a myriad of 
primary and secondary sources. Whether the theoretical framework presented in this 
study can be applied to understanding authoritarian outcomes in other post-Soviet states 
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Appendix: The In-depth Interviews  
 
The primary fieldwork for this study was carried out between July and December of 
2015 in Russia and Ukraine. During this time, I interviewed with sixty-two political 
activists, journalists, politicians, and ordinary protest participants in the two countries. I 
also returned to Ukraine between mid-June and mid-July of 2017 and conducted several 
follow-up interviews. While all Russian respondents in this study either observed or 
partook in anti-regime protests in late 2011 and 2012, all Ukrainian respondents also 
observed or partook in anti-regime protests in late 2013 and early 2014. Majority of the 
interviews were conducted in Moscow and Kyiv. The choice of these cities derived from 
a simple fact that they witnessed the most intensive and frequent protest events in the 
countries examined by this study. The interviewees were recruited through snowball 
sampling – in other words, through referrals of respondents, acquaintances, and friends. 
The sampling, however, was not random because I choose respondents to include all the 
political views that were present in the popular protests. The duration of interviews varied 
from fifty minutes to two hours. All the interviews were recorded. The majority of 
interviews were conducted in English, while the remaining interviews were in Russian.  
The interviews consisted closed-ended and open-ended questions. The closed-ended 
questions were designed to compile demographic data including age, gender, city of birth, 
city of residence, education, occupation, socio-economic status, native language, and 
religion. I used the collected data to compare the social composition of respondents with 
the results of larger surveys on protest events. The open-ended questions were structured 




the ways they organized, how did they view and relate to the other protest participants, 
activists, and groups, how did they perceive and express protest demands, what type of 
protest activities did they engage, what were the slogans they shouted and banners and 
placards they carried, what were the meaning of the aforementioned slogans, banners, 
and placards, and what did they think about why other people choice not to join protests. 
The interviews also contained questions in an effort to understand how did respondents 
imagine their “nation” and how did they associate with it. By asking open-ended 
questions, I was able to gain an in-depth understanding of events, narratives, and 
emotions that led respondents’ protest behavior. My interviews with protest organizers, 
journalists, and politicians also allowed me to discuss broader political issues in the 
countries examined by this study. 
Upon the completion of fieldwork, all interviews were transcribed in English. I 
conducted the analysis of transcripts manually and sorted the quotations by theme. The 
amount of time I allocated to analyze each theme varied depending on the focus of an 
interviewee. I then compiled all the quotations of a relevant theme in one document to 
draw comparisons between respondents. The transcribed interviews introduced me to a 
variety of issues that I might not have captured otherwise and thus enriched the theoretical 
framework of this work.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
